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Recent work in lyric studies has been dominated by two opposing camps: the historicism of the 
‘New Lyric Studies’ and the attempt to defend a trans-historical category of lyric, most notably 
by Jonathan Culler. This thesis begins by claiming that these two camps have something in 
common: their practice of exemplification and their attitude towards individual example. Turning 
to Ludwig Wittgenstein and Stanley Cavell, I describe an alternative mode of exemplarity which, 
as Toril Moi attests, is now largely absent from the discipline of literary studies. The argument 
for a practice of exemplification in lyric criticism which attends to individual poems without an 
ultimate appeal to a general conception or the pursuit of historical and cultural knowledge risks 
being dismissed on the grounds that it is ‘New Critical’: politically and methodologically 
backward. My first chapter looks to trouble the ‘New Critical’ caricature which is so often 
invoked, especially in lyric studies, as a means of warding off ways of thinking and reading.  
As I examine the term ‘New Criticism’ with reference to a number of commentators, it becomes 
clear that it is unhelpfully diffuse, and that we need to re-visit many of the perceived critical flaws 
associated with it. My second chapter looks back to, and takes issue with, Jonathan Culler’s 
‘Apostrophe’, which it considers both as an important work in the move beyond ‘New Criticism’ 
and as an emblematic essay for theoretical approaches to lyric poetry. I continue to take Culler’s 
work as an example of the theoretical approach to lyric in chapter three, as we investigate the 
development of ‘Apostrophe’ in the influential Theory of the Lyric, with particular attention to J. L. 
Austin and Jacques Derrida. My fourth chapter moves the thesis into a more positive mood, as it 
looks first at the way in which the argument of this thesis might be situated in relation to ‘post-
critical’ work, before arguing for and describing a practice of wide critical attention to be paid as 
we consider individual poems and our encounters with them. Such a practice, I make clear 
throughout the thesis with reference to the recent work of Joseph North, is incompatible with 
the currently dominant paradigm of literary study, and we’ll consider in an afterword potential 
changes to the discipline which might be necessary to enable work in this spirit of exemplarity to 
become standard, taking its place alongside scholarly work which aims to produce cultural and 
historical knowledge. My final chapter turns to individual lyric poems (a Greek epitaph, a 
medieval lyric, and a Wordsworth poem), seeking to enact the kind of critical work for which the 
thesis has argued, while continuing its project of expanding the range of examples typically 
considered in attempts to create models of lyric. As we read the poems, particular attention will 
be paid to how they interact with claims that lyric poems are events, not objects, and with 
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 ‘Do you mean anything particular – just now?’  
‘No, I mean something general – always.’1 
 




There is a moment in Hegel’s Aesthetics which appears to play a significantly similar role in the 
thought of two recent theorists of lyric poetry whose differences are more often brought to our 
attention: 
 
To define the poetic as such or to give a description of what is poetic horrifies nearly all 
who have written about poetry. And in fact if a man begins to talk about poetry as an 
imaginative art without having previously examined what art’s content and general mode 
of representation is, he will find it extremely difficult to know where to look for the 
proper essence of poetry. But the awkwardness of his problem especially increases if he 
starts from the individual character of single works and then proposes to assert some 
universal derived from this character and supposed to be valid for the most varied genres 
and sorts of poetry. Along these lines the most heterogeneous works count as poetry. If 
this assumption is presupposed and the question is then raised: By what right should 
such productions be recognised as poems? the difficulty just mentioned enters at once. 
Fortunately, at this point in our discussion we can evade this difficulty. In the first place, 
we have not reached the general conception of the matter in hand by deriving it from 
single examples; on the contrary, we have endeavoured to develop the real 
exemplifications of this conception from the conception itself and consequently we 
cannot be required, e.g. in the sphere we are dealing with now, to subsume under this 
conception whatever is commonly called a poem, because the decision on whether 
something actually is a poetical production or not is to be derived solely from the 
conception of poetry itself.3  
 
From this, Jonathan Culler takes it as read that ‘Hegel rightly insists that a properly philosophical 
aesthetics seeks to grasp the logic of art and does not derive its conceptions of art from 
particular examples’; Virginia Jackson asserts that ‘[m]ost of us would agree with Hegel that to 
derive a general conception – a genre – from a single example is a logical mistake’.4 From this 
common position, the two critics go off in separate directions. Culler opts to pursue a general 
                                                        
1 George Eliot, Middlemarch: A Study of Provincial Life (London, 1947), p. 143. 
2 Michel de Montaigne, Les Essais, ed. Pierre Villey (Paris, 1978), vol. 3, p. 1070. 
3 G. W. F. Hegel, Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford, 1975), vol. 2, p. 971.  
4 Jonathan Culler, Theory of the Lyric (Cambridge, MA, 2015), p. 98. Virginia Jackson, Dickinson’s Misery (Princeton, 




conception of lyric ‘as a poetic activity that has persisted since the days of Sappho, despite lyric’s 
different social functions and manifestations’, while Jackson opts to historicise, calling into 
question the ‘precedent, metapragmatic, temporally decisive moment’ during which Hegel has 
‘examined what art’s content and general mode of representation is’; aesthetic theories are 
constantly changing, making the lyric over and again in their own images.5 
 
This is lyric studies’ major split, ever-present in Stephen Burt’s recent survey of the field and 
forming its climax, as he calls for a ‘synthesis’ of Culler and Jackson’s opposing positions.6 A 
synthesis may well one day emerge; in a recent lecture, Jackson intimated that she might have 
begun to reconsider her belief, inherited from Paul de Man, that ‘lyric’ doesn’t exist, but is rather 
a genre which is always merely the construction of any particular way of reading.7 But what 
seems not up for debate amidst the fighting is the extent of the role that individual examples can 
play in our thinking about lyric poetry. This is where I want to intervene, pausing before Jackson 
and Culler diverge. Is Hegel – as he presents himself in this passage, originally from a lecture – 
correct? and are Culler and Jackson right to agree with him (if indeed that is what they do)? That 
Jackson – after quoting him – at once converts Hegel’s plural ‘works’ to a singular ‘example’ 
suggests she may not be fully convinced by the entire proposition. The possibility of the 
development of a general conception from multiple examples Jackson here leaves intriguingly 
unexamined. Most of us – surely all of us – would agree that to derive a general conception from 
a single example is a logical mistake, but the logic of deriving such a conception from multiple 
examples seems sounder. Then, too, there might be a set of relations between examples and 
general conceptions which cannot be classed as merely derivative, but might nonetheless 
illuminate both example and conception. Here example, and not any general proposition, would 
take centre stage, in a mode of exemplarity radically different from that of Hegel, and indeed the 
pre-twentieth-century Western philosophical tradition. 
 
That tradition is broader than Hegel’s attitude to ‘individual works’. Alexander Gelley begins his 
introduction to a collection of essays on ‘the rhetoric of exemplarity’ by describing how the ‘logic 
of exemplarity’ in Greek thought ‘developed along two strands’: in Plato, παραδειγµα (from 
which comes the Latin ‘exemplar’, and from that the English ‘example’) has ‘the primary 
                                                        
5 Jonathan Culler, ‘Why Lyric’, PMLA, 123.1 (2008), 201–6, p. 202. Jackson, pp. 26, 15. 
6 Stephen Burt, ‘What is this thing called lyric?’, Modern Philology, 113.3 (2016), 422–40, p. 440. 
7 Virginia Jackson, ‘Forgetting Lyric: Frances Ellen Watkins Harper and American Sentiment’ (10th May, 2018), 




philosophical sense of […] a model, a standard’, being ‘related to the theory of ideas’.8 This sense 
of ‘the exemplar – as archetype deriving from a transcendent source – continues in later 
Platonism and medieval theology’, and is the predominant sense behind Hegel’s description of a 
(rejected) tactic of exemplification in the above passage. The other strand finds its origin in 
Aristotle, where παραδειγµα ‘functions inductively: the instance serves as vector pointing to a 
principle or conclusion’. ‘Whereas’, Gelley writes, 
 
the Platonic model displays a vertical directionality, from a primary exemplar down to 
multiple instantiations, for Aristotle example involves something like a lateral movement: 
‘neither from part to whole nor from whole to part but from part to part, like to like, 
when two things fall under the same genus but one is better known than the other’. What 
is at work here is a form of induction whereby particulars are linked and traced so as to 
produce, as George A. Kennedy glosses, ‘an “unmediated inference”, or unspoken 
recognition of the universal proposition’.9 
 
What these two kinds of exemplarity do, for Gelley, when brought together under the ‘tactic of 
exemplarity’, is to appear to ‘mingle the singular with the normative’; they ask the question, ‘[i]s 
the example merely one – a singular, a fruit of circumstance – or the One – a paradigm, a paragon?’ 
(Gelley, p. 2).  
 
Any example, then, might be said to exist on a scale that runs between the two unrealisable ends 
of pure generality and pure particular; at one end it may seem to have no value beyond the 
theory it purports to prove, at the other it may seem to have a value in itself which cannot be 
translated into any more general conception (that feeling, when we pay attention to objects, that 
we have come across something significant, but significant in relation to what, we do not know). 
Andrzej Warminski has shown how this hybrid nature of example is apparent in the wider 
thought of Hegel. ‘Beispiel’, ‘example’, is a particularly complex word at the beginning of the 
Phenomenology, he argues, where it is used in relation to sense-certainty.10 ‘[O]n the surface, Hegel’s 
text is not at all bothered by example, by the translation of Beispiel’ (Warminski, p. 175); and yet, 
dwell on this word at any length, and intriguing depths become apparent. Starting from a 
moment in which ‘Beispiel’ (example) is put in opposition to ‘Wesen’ (essence) – ‘“This 
                                                        
8 Gelley recommends John D. Lyons, Exemplum: The Rhetoric of Example in Early Modern France and Italy (Princeton, 
1989), pp. 9–12, for a detailed discussion of the circumstances behind the passage of παραδειγµα into ‘exemplar’. My 
own discussion, for the sake of clarity, avoids interrogating the subtle differences between the many and various 
terms used now and historically to describe the exemplified object.  
9 Alexander Gelley, ‘Introduction’, pp. 1, 2, in Unruly Examples: On the Rhetoric of Exemplarity, ed. Alexander Gelley 
(Stanford, 1995), pp. 1–24. Aristotle, and Kennedy’s gloss, are from Aristotle, on Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse, 
trans. George A. Kennedy (New York, 1991), p. 44. 
10 See Andrej Warminski, ‘Reading for Example’, in Readings in Interpretation: Hölderlin, Hegel, Heidegger (Minneapolis, 




distinction between essence and example…” (“Diesen Unterschied des Wesens und des 
Beispiels…”)’ – Warminski argues that the word ‘Beispiel’ here ‘refers to that side of the 
knower/known, subject/object, relation which is taken to be inessential, accidental, that which is 
not the truth of knowing’.11 Thus ‘Beispiel’ in this instance ‘seems to derive from Hegel’s 
homemade verb beiherspielen’, which has just been used on the same page of the Phenomenology as 
the ‘Beispiel’/‘Wesen’ distinction, and ‘could be translated literally as “to play on the side”’ 
(Warminski, p. 176). Warminski identifies a problem: Hegel uses the word ‘Beispiel’, too, in the 
Phenomenology’s two dialogues between ‘sense-certainty’ and a general ‘we’, to mean ‘an 
illustration, a story, a parable’ (Warminski, p. 177). These are two meanings, ‘Beispiel’ as ‘by-play’ 
(side-show, excess) and ‘Beispiel’ as ‘by-spell’ (parable, illustration), which are ‘not reconcilable, 
not mediatable, because they are not symmetrically opposed’ (Warminski, p. 177). All this is to 
say, at these moments in Hegel’s text, that the particular, the seemingly excessive, is unruly, 
won’t stay there, keeps making an example (in the sense of ‘by-spell’) out of itself: we ask the 
‘question – “What is the example?” – and find that we have to answer it: “The example is the 
example and an example of example”’ (Warminski, p. 178). Example takes on a life of its own, 
here, – ‘[w]e cannot speak for example without the example’s speaking for us’ (Warminski, p. 178) 
– which troubles Hegel’s statement in the above passage about the relations between individual 
works and general conceptions (and troubles, too, for that matter, any vague notions we might 
have of Hegel as the consistent, arch systematiser, king of the general).12  
 
Richard Stamp, in a useful discussion, demonstrates that Warminski’s readings of Hegel have 
been influential in the development of the logic of exemplarity displayed in the work of Slavoj 
Žižek.13 I want briefly to borrow aspects of Stamp’s account – skating over some of its more 
polemical thrusts – to ask some broad questions about the role of example in the work of those 
who prioritise general conceptions. Žižek’s texts, writes Stamp, regularly ‘oscillate between a 
rigid, inflexible theoretical framework and a repetitive, quicksilver proliferation of examples’, a 
practice which has helped to create his ‘well-established brand profile as “the high theorist of 
pop culture”’ (Stamp, p. 162). In the opening chapter of For They Know Not What They Do: 
Enjoyment as a Political Factor, for instance, Stamp describes how Žižek  
                                                        
11 Warminski, p. 176. He takes his Hegel from G. W. F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister 
(Hamburg, 1952), here p. 80. 
12 In another chapter (‘Pre-positional By-play’, pp. 95–111), Warminski points out that ‘if its existence is marginal in 
relation to Hegel’s System, Beispiel is nevertheless ubiquitous in Hegel’s text: not only every time that “Hegel” – the 
text – says “zum Beispiel” but in other, ostensibly more serious, contexts as well’, one of which being the ‘question 
of the meaning of meaning’ (Warminski, p. 97). 
13 See Richard Stamp, ‘Another Exemplary Case’: Žižek’s Logic of Examples’, in The Truth of Žižek, ed. Paul 




circles around Lacan’s notion of the master signifier, or ‘quilting point’ (point de caption), 
via a seemingly endless series of examples: beginning with what he claims to be Freud’s 
sole extant reference to Slovenia […; then] Monty Python; Hegel’s Phenomenology; 
Gulliver’s Travels, Hans Christian Andersen; a short story by Ring Lardner; inversion in 
Marx and Adorno; G. K. Chesterton; Vertigo; Feuerbach; Mein Kampf and anti-Semitism; 
Frederic Jameson on Don Quixote; The Ambassadors; Psycho; the Hegelian monarch; the 
paradox of bodhisattva; the Dreyfus affair; Saint Paul… Etcetera.14 
 
What is the purpose of such a proliferation? Stamp looks to Sarah Kay for a possible answer, 
who ‘reads the characteristic shapelessness of such sequences in terms of an “excess in 
examples”, in which the “seemingly” trivial illustration of an argument is that which opens up 
“unexpected departures” in the attempt to “write around” the real, that impossible element 
which each example in turn necessarily fails to grasp or effectively illustrate’.15 This is a logic 
which ‘echoes that of Žižek’s own characterisations of a certain Hegelian “failure” to realise the 
truth of the matter in hand itself being the Truth’; and thus, for Kay, it is ‘the absence of 
coherence in the sheer profusion of examples that points to Žižek’s true, substantial “point” – the 
thought of “the ‘unassimilable kernel’ of the real” as the very form of formlessness as such’ (Kay, 
p. 163); ‘[i]n other words’, suggests Stamp, ‘it is the ultimate failure of any example that allows it 
to exemplify the real’ (Stamp, p. 163). In the above sequence from For They Know Not, ‘what 
matters for Žižek is not the examples as such, but that excess “in them” which is in and of itself 
indicative of the operation of a logic of the master signifier, or the quilting point: each and every 
example is understood as always already that exceptional, superfluous element (“the One”) which 
sutures the entire symbolic field by becoming the “general equivalent” of all other elements 
therein’.16 It is an understanding which has two consequences: ‘first, these examples present no 
resistance to theory; and second, therefore, there is (paradoxically) no need for examples’. ‘Every 
posited example’, Stamp writes, quoting Žižek, ‘is the displacement “from an initial gap to the 
assertion of an unexpected continuity” of a properly philosophical position, which is the “true 
focus” of his work’.17  
 
Stamp suggests that Žižek’s tactic of exemplarity, where examples function as the ‘“symbolic 
lure” intended to draw readers into the true “theoretical work”’, ‘might lead his readers to 
suspect that they are being taken for idiots’.18 Žižek acknowledges this, taking up an ‘ironic 
                                                        
14 Stamp, p. 162. See Slavoj Žižek, ‘On the One’, in For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor, 2nd 
ed. (London, 2002), pp. 7–60. 
15 Sarah Kay, Žižek: A Critical Introduction (Cambridge, 2003), p. 9, in Stamp, pp. 162–3.  
16 Stamp, pp. 163–4; For They Know Not, p. 21. 
17 Stamp, pp. 164–5. Žižek is here quoted from The Žižek Reader, ed. Elizabeth Wright and Edmond Wright 
(Oxford, 1999), p. viii. 




relation to a Kantian inheritance’, in which examples serve only to sharpen the judgement of 
those who cannot grasp the general concept straight away: ‘Examples are thus the go-karts 
[Gängelwagen] of judgement; and those who are lacking in the natural talent can never dispense 
with them’.19 Stamp summarises like this: ‘The danger here is that of mixing, or confusing, the 
finite case with the properly infinite principle, of being “unable to determine” the proper boundaries 
of and between the empirical and the transcendental. The stupidity of examples is to endanger 
what Kant considers to be the properly philosophical distinction of particular and universal’ 
(Stamp, p. 169). 
 
In a moment I’ll put some pressure on that phrase ‘properly philosophical’, which echoes Culler; 
enquire as to ‘proper boundaries’. But first it will be useful to consider Stamp’s concluding remarks. 
One of the main polemical thrusts of his essay is to accuse Žižek of relying on the very logic of 
exemplarity described by Jacques Derrida, whom Žižek denounces (along with other so-called 
‘deconstructionis[ts]’, such as Warminski). Two moments from Derrida’s work are particularly 
instructive to the point I am about to make: 
 
The example is not substitutable; but at the same time the same aporia always remains: 
this irreplaceability must be exemplary, that is, replaceable. The irreplaceable must allow 
itself to be replaced on the spot.20 
 
Let us […] take an example […]. What example? This one. And certainly, when I say this 
very example, I already say something more and something else; I say something which 
goes beyond the tode ti, the this of the example. The example itself, as such, overflows its 
singularity as much as its identity. This is why there are no examples, while at the same 
time there are only examples; I have said this, too, often about many examples, no doubt. 
The exemplarity of the example is clearly never the exemplarity of the example. We can 
never be sure of having put an end to this very old children’s game in which all the 
discourses, philosophical or not, which have ever inspired deconstructions are entangled 
by the performative fiction which consists in saying, starting up the game again, ‘take 
precisely this example’.21 
  
The first quotation prompts Stamp to suggest, with emphasis, that according to such a logic, 
‘every example necessarily fails to do its job’ (Stamp, p. 172). This is because of that ‘performative 
fiction’ which ‘signifies at once the absolute singularity of this example and its general 
exchangeability for every other example in a signifying chain’. And this is, ‘precisely’ (Stamp is 
                                                        
19 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London, 1958), in Stamp, p. 168. For a 
further discussion of Kant’s attitude to examples see David Lloyd, ‘Kant’s Examples’, in Gelley, pp. 255–76. 
20 Jacques Derrida, Demeure: Fiction and Testimony, trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford, 2000) p. 41, in Stamp, p. 
172. 
21 Jacques Derrida, On the Name, ed. Thomas Dutoit (Stanford, 1995), pp. 17–18. Stamp quotes brief moments from 




fond of italics), the logic of Žižek’s examples, which proves that Žižek is a kind of 
‘deconstructionist-in-disavowal’ (Stamp, pp. 173, 174). 
 
But even more interesting for the present discussion are the questions Stamp asks in his final 
paragraph: 
 
So what, after all, is an example? As we have seen, Žižek’s focus on the logic of examples 
in Hegel’s Phenomenology (and elsewhere) sparks questions about the metaphysical 
grammar of exemplarity: is it possible to think the example otherwise than as the 
illustration of a pre-established universal concept? What would an example that was not 
subsumable under such a general law (of the concept) look like? Is it even possible for 
examples to resist their subsumptive incorporation by concepts? What thinking of 
singularity would this exemplary resistance (if there is any) produce? (Stamp, p. 174) 
 
These questions are so surprising because they seem entirely alien to the philosophical tradition 
of exemplarity which Stamp has just sketched. Alien, too, in Gelley’s account, to Plato, and even 
to Aristotle, whose use of example relies on a relationship with a ‘universal proposition’, or 
involves a ‘mediating generalisation’.22 But positive answers to them would enable us to 
formulate a mode or spirit of exemplification which could not be characterised by Derrida’s ‘very 
old children’s game’, and which might point to a serious option for our study of lyric poetry, one 
in which the role of example would be front and centre.  
 
Wittgenstein and example 
 
What would an example that was not an illustration of a pre-established universal concept, 
subsumable under a general law, look like? Are such examples possible? The later philosophy of 
Ludwig Wittgenstein suggests that they are, and helps us begin to describe how they can work: 
 
One can say that the concept of a game is a concept with blurred edges. – ‘But is a 
blurred concept a concept at all?’ – Is a photograph that is not sharp a picture of a person 
at all? Is it even always an advantage to replace a picture that is not sharp by one that is? 
Isn’t one that isn’t sharp often just what we need? 
Frege compares a concept to a region, and says that a region without clear boundaries 
can’t be called a region at all. This presumably means that we can’t do anything with it. – 
But is it senseless to say ‘Stay roughly here’? Imagine that I were standing with someone 
                                                        
22 William L. Benoit, ‘On Aristotle’s Example’, Philosophy & Rhetoric, 20.4 (1987), 261–67, p. 262. Benoit argues that 
the phrase ‘part to part’, quoted above, ‘is shorthand for “part to whole to part”’, and offers convincing evidence 
from moments later in the Rhetoric, where Aristotle remarks that ‘[a]ll these examples are contained under the same 
universal proposition’ (Benoit, pp. 266, 264). For an alternative view see Gerard A. Hauser, ‘The Example in 




in a city square and said just that. As I say it, I do not bother drawing any boundary, but 
just make a pointing gesture – as if I were indicating a particular spot. And this is just 
how one might explain what a game is. One gives examples and intends them to be taken 
in a particular way. – I do not mean by this expression, however, that he is supposed to 
see in those examples the common feature which I – for some reason – was unable to 
formulate, but that he is now to employ those examples in a particular way. Here giving 
examples is not an indirect way of explaining – in default of a better one. For any general 
explanation may be misunderstood too. This, after all, is how we play the game. (I mean 
the language-game with the word ‘game’.)23 
 
Notice how examples, in this moment from Philosophical Investigtaions, are not being put into the 
service of anything beyond an appeal to another to share the intent and spirit behind their being 
summoned. There is no sharp concept of which they are instantiations; nor is there a hint of a 
process of induction, of gathering them together into a general concept which might serve as a 
‘better’ mode of explanation. As Toril Moi succinctly puts it in her recent book on Wittgenstein 
and literary studies, ‘examples are the explanation’. They ‘neither represent nor hide essences; they 
teach (show, instruct) us how to use words; examples teach us how to go on’.24 ‘You want me to explain 
what a game is? Here are some examples’ is not a response designed for Kant’s idiot, the person 
without the natural talent to grasp the general concept straight away, but the best explanation, 
for certain purposes, one can give.  
 
But why are we dealing with a concept with blurred edges? Should we not aim to make our 
concept more exact? Is that not what philosophy aims to do? Wittgenstein, two sections earlier: 
 
How would we explain to someone what a game is? I think we’d describe games to him, 
and we might add to the description: ‘This and similar things are called “games”’. And do 
we know any more ourselves? Is it just that we can’t tell others exactly what a game is? – 
But this is not ignorance. We don’t know the boundaries because none have been drawn. 
To repeat, we can draw a boundary – for a special purpose. Does it take this to make the 
concept usable? Not at all! Except perhaps for that special purpose. No more than it 
took the definition: 1 pace = 75 cm to make the measure of length ‘one pace’ usable. 
And if you want to say ‘But still, before that it wasn’t an exact measure of length’, then I 
reply: all right, so it was an inexact one. – Though you still owe me a definition of 
exactness. (PI, §69, p. 37e) 
 
                                                        
23 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte, 
4th ed. (Oxford, 2009), §71, p. 38e. References to Philosophical Investigations will henceforward be given in the text by 
PI, followed by section and page number. 
24 Toril Moi, Revolution of the Ordinary: Literary Studies After Wittgenstein, Austin, and Cavell (Chicago, 2017), p. 77. I am 
indebted to Moi for some of my examples from Wittgenstein and elsewhere; and also to Beth Savickey’s informative 
essay ‘Wittgenstein’s Use of Examples’, in The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein, ed. Okari Kuusela and Marie McGinn 




For Wittgenstein, how we actually use a word such as ‘game’, in everyday conversation, is of 
paramount importance. We feel as if we know what we are doing with the word, but if someone 
were to object – but can you not give an exhaustive description of ‘game’, can you not unite all 
games under a general proposition? – we struggle. ‘But this is not ignorance’: it is simply that the 
language-game has shifted. We have been asked to give a bounded definition of a concept which, 
as we ordinarily use it, is unbounded, has blurred edges. A bounded definition may sometimes be 
useful (Moi reminds us that ‘Wittgenstein, who trained as an engineer, is not against precise 
concepts and for rough ones. It takes extremely precise concepts to solve mathematical problems, 
for example. But such concepts are neither superior to nor “more philosophical” than ordinary 
ones’ (Moi, pp. 73–4)). But in the case where we want to explain to someone what a game is, if 
we draw a boundary, we will inevitably find ourselves excluding some of the practices which fall 
under our ordinary, unbounded use of the word. And if we try to define concepts in this way, we 
get into difficult territory, the kind which 
 
Socrates gets caught up in when he tries to give the definition of a concept. Again and 
again an application of the word emerges that seems not to be compatible with the 
concept to which other applications have led us. We say: but that isn’t how it is! – it is like 
that though! – & all we can do is keep repeating these antitheses.25 
 
Or we end up giving up the desire to pursue further applications, turning away from the 
particular; ‘craving for generality’, developing a ‘contemptuous attitude to the particular case’, as 
Wittgenstein has it in The Blue Book.26 Consider these words of Derrida, from that infamous and 
bad-blooded debate with John Searle, in the light of this: 
 
What philosopher ever since there were philosophers, what logician ever since there were 
logicians, what theoretician ever renounced this axiom: in the order of concepts (for we 
are speaking of concepts and not of the colours of clouds or the taste of certain chewing 
gums), when a distinction cannot be rigorous or precise, it is not a distinction at all.27 
 
The later Wittgenstein’s is a philosophy which does not sneer at the ‘colours of clouds or the 
taste of certain chewing gums’, but is founded upon these dismissed particularities, a sustained 
‘attention to particulars’ (Moi, p. 110). The ‘order of concepts’ and our minute experience are not 
                                                        
25 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value: A Selection from the Posthumous Remains, ed. G. H. von Wright, trans. Peter 
Winch, 2nd edition (Oxford, 1998), p. 35e. Henceforward CV. 
26 Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue Book, p. 18, in The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary Studies for the ‘Philosophical 
Investigations’, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1969), pp. 1–74. Both books will henceforward be referenced with BB.  
27 ‘Afterword’, p. 123, in Limited Inc, ed. Gerald Graff (Evanston, 1988), pp. 111–60. For just one account of the 





divided by a clear distinction. Indeed, such a way of thinking gets us into difficulty, distracts us. 
Take this particularly Wittgenstinian moment from near the very beginning of Robert Musil’s 
capacious The Man Without Qualities, in which the narrator asks, 
 
Why are we satisfied to speak vaguely of a red nose, without specifying what shade of 
red, even though degrees of red can be stated precisely to the micromillimetre of a 
wavelength, while with something so infinitely more complicated as what city one 
happens to be in, we always insist on knowing it exactly? It merely distracts us from 
more important concerns.28 
 
A level of precision involving micro-wavelengths of light is not necessary for us to use the 
phrase ‘a red nose’ any more than in the attempt to talk of a city, in all its complexity. The 
pursuit of precision and exactitude (which, as Wittgenstein reminds us, are harder to define than 
they might seem) is not always to be desired; it depends on the language-game we are playing. If 
I am hungry for lunch, and ask you how far it is to the nearest pub, and you reply that it is about 
fifty paces down the road, I may after some time be able to settle upon a precise figure of 37.5 
metres, whip a tape measure out of my pocket, and measure the distance metre by metre. But by 
that time the pub will probably have stopped serving food. 
 
This insistence on the relevance of the particular case, on our ordinary use of language, Cora 
Diamond has called Wittgenstein’s ‘realistic spirit’, a particular ‘attitude towards reality’.29 ‘Spirit’ 
is a useful term both because it reminds us that Wittgenstein’s later philosophy does not present 
anything reducible to a ‘theory’ or ‘method’, and because it facilitates a comparison with other 
disparate philosophical methods, taken together.30 Contrasting a ‘realistic spirit’ with a 
‘theoretical spirit’, as Moi usefully does, negates the validity of any accusation of a too-quick 
grouping together of inevitably differing philosophical positions (see Moi, p. 15). Derrida himself 
seems happy to group together every philosopher under a shared rejection of imprecise 
concepts, as good a justification as any for Moi’s spiritual opposition. It’s a contrast which also 
has the virtue of not implying a hierarchy. There is a time and place for the theoretical spirit as 
there is a time and place for a realistic one; it is not my intention, in arguing for the importance 
of the latter, to attempt some kind of replacement. (Sometimes, of course, we do want to know 
the exact distance between our position and a pub: if we’re trying to plot the course of a 
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‘[A]ttitude towards reality’ is on p. 44 of the latter. 
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marathon, for example, it might be very important to start it 26 miles and 385 yards from a 
building in which, having pushed through the finishing tape, exhausted runners can quickly settle 
down to a well-deserved pint.) The fundamental aim of this thesis is to bring the realistic spirit 
more firmly into the conversation, and to show some of the circumstances (that is, in our talking 
about lyric poetry) in which it might serve us better than the theoretical one (without denying 
that there are circumstances where it can be useful).31 
 
According to Moi, the later Wittgenstein, understood in the tradition of ‘ordinary language 
philosophy’, is ‘absent from the discipline’ of literary studies.32 This is not quite true. Here is Eric 
Griffiths, in a lecture on ‘Beasts’: 
 
Remembering Austin’s philosophically grounded plea for a keener attention to a greater 
variety of examples, it will, I hope, be clear that it is not in a spirit of anti-intellectualism 
or anti-theory that I offer no formulation of the essence of comedy. Thinking about 
comedy does have to submit to the test and the pleasure of examples, and has to deny 
itself the relaxations of the Big Idea.33 
 
To a reader unfamiliar with the view of example I have briefly sketched through moments from 
Wittgenstein’s later thought, Griffiths’s antipathy to ‘the relaxations of the Big Idea’ might seem 
to square uncertainly with the ‘test’ of examples. Despite the stated resistance to a relaxing 
movement into the realms of the Idea, there nevertheless must be some less grand conception, 
hunch, conviction, or feeling which is at play here. Otherwise there would be nothing for 
Griffiths to test his examples against. This, I think, would be a misreading, albeit one which 
would be grist to the mill of the philosopher seeking to argue for the value of rigid concepts, 
who might, along with Wittgenstein’s interlocutor in §65 of the Philosophical Investigations, want to 
argue that Griffiths is letting himself off the hook: 
 
For someone might object against me: ‘You make things easy for yourself! You talk 
about all sorts of language-games, but have nowhere said what is essential to a language-
game, and so to language: what is common to all these activities, and makes them into 
language or parts of language. So you let yourself off the very part of the investigation 
                                                        
31 This example from a conversation with Wittgenstein helps to draw out this distinction in spirit further. ‘Hegel 
seems to me to be always wanting to say that things which look different are really the same. Whereas my interest is 
in shewing that things which look the same are really different. I was thinking of using as a motto for my book a 
quotation from King Lear: “I’ll teach you differences”’. Maurice O’Connor Drury, ‘Conversations with Wittgenstein’, 
in Ludwig Wittgenstein: Personal Recollections (Totowa, NJ, 1981), ed. Rush Rhees, pp. 112–89, p. 171, in Moi, p. 15. 
32 Moi, p. 7. ‘By “ordinary language philosophy” I understand the philosophical tradition after Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
J. L. Austin, as constituted and extended by Stanley Cavell, specifically through his reading of Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophical Investigations’ (Moi, p. 1). 




that once gave you the most headache, the part about the general form of the proposition and 
of language’.34 
 
The interlocutor or philosopher sees examples of language games, or comedy, and thinks the 
hardest task has yet to be performed. Griffiths seems to have a hunch which has not yet been 
turned into a general proposition, a thesis, a theory, and therefore his investigation is unfinished. 
But, as a turn to Stanley Cavell will help to show, this is not the way in which he is using ‘test’: 
 
The philosopher appealing to everyday language turns to the reader not to convince him 
without proof but to get him to prove something, test something, against himself. He is 
saying: Look and find out whether you can see what I see, wish to say what I wish to say. 
Of course he often seems to answer or beg his own question by posing it in plural form. 
[…] But this plural is still first person: it does not, to use Kant’s word, ‘postulate’ that 
‘we’, you and I and he, say and want and imagine and feel and suffer together. If we do 
not, then the philosopher’s remarks are irrelevant to us. Of course he doesn’t think they 
are irrelevant, but the implication is that philosophy, like art, is, and should be, powerless 
to prove its relevance; and that says something about the kind of relevance it wishes to 
have. All the philosopher, this kind of philosopher, can do is to express, as fully as he 
can, his world, and attract our undivided attention to our own.35  
 
Of course, our thinking needs to form part of a conversation. (The man who locks himself away 
to write his pronouncings about comedy may find himself contributing ultimately to our 
understanding of the term, but perhaps not quite in the way he would have wished.) If we read 
Griffiths as having a hunch about the nature or essence of comedy, which for whatever reason 
he doesn’t want to state directly (perhaps he is embarrassed to do so, or feels it shouldn’t need 
expressing), we will encounter a thinker who appears insular and obtuse. But if we read him 
according to the ‘realistic spirit’ I have sketched out with the help of Wittgenstein and others, we 
see a thinker open to interaction and challenge. To test an example is to ask another, do you feel 
you want to say what I want to say about this? Do you take the same pleasure in it as I do? And 
thus we move forward in our understanding of the example, in our understanding of the writer’s 
world, and of our own. 
 
I seek to argue throughout this thesis that, far from restricting or frustrating conversation, such a 
spirit of thought and attention moves our discussion onto new territory. Just before the moment 
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same word for all – but there are many different kinds of affinity between them. And on account of this affinity, or 
these affinities, we call them all “languages”’. I’ll soon be discussing Wittgenstein’s ‘family resemblances’ in relation 
to Culler’s discussion of genre. 




quoted above, Griffiths quotes J. L. Austin (much influenced by Wittgenstein), who expresses 
the wish that, in aesthetics, ‘we would stop talking about the beautiful all the time “and get down 
to the dainty and the dumpy”’.36 ‘[P]hilosophical over-concentration on a narrow range of 
examples’, Griffiths understands from Austin, ‘warps our thinking’; we need instead a ‘collection 
of an appropriately wide range of instances’, for the reasons Austin gives: 
 
It seems to be too readily assumed that if we can only discover the true meanings of each 
of a cluster of key terms, usually historic terms, that we use in some particular field (as, 
for example, ‘right’, ‘good’ and the rest in morals), then it must without question 
transpire that each will fit into place some single, interlocking, consistent, conceptual 
scheme. Not only is there no reason to assume this, but all historical probability is against 
it, especially in the case of a language derived from such various civilisations as ours is. 
We may cheerfully use, and with weight, terms which are not so much head-on 
incompatible as simply disparate, which just do not fit in or even on. Just as we 
cheerfully subscribe to, or have the grace to be torn between, disparate ideals – Why 
must there be a conceivable amalgam, the Good Life for Man?’37 
 
The latter parts of this quotation begin to read as if they have much in common with what 
William Empson describes, in a note to the poem, as the ‘notion’ of ‘Bacchus’: ‘that life involves 
maintaining oneself between contradictions that can’t be solved by analysis’.38 And, too, Marion 
Milner’s words, near the end of A Life of One’s Own: ‘why must the truth of man be one-sided at 
all? Surely it is in his capacity for both that he really exists’.39 Both Empson and Milner will play 
key roles in the penultimate chapter of this thesis, as I bring to culmination the argument that 
lyric poems – like ‘Bacchus’ – are often modes of writing and thinking through which such a 
capacity for contradiction is tested, explored, and made productive, and that we should pay more 
attention to and further develop a kind of criticism with a wide enough attention to hold room 
for the contradictory interpretations which such poems throw up, and ask to be considered. 
(That chapter will take Empson’s criticism – with which, to adopt Freya Johnston’s words, that 
of Griffiths is ‘in perpetual communication, agreement, and disagreement’ (Griffiths, p. 4) – as 
its primary example of existing criticism in such a realistic mode.) Christopher Ricks, another of 
Griffiths’s perpetual interlocutors, draws a useful distinction between the theoretical and realistic 
spirits (though not in such terms), via the proverb, and T. S. Eliot: 
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37 Griffiths, p. 83. Austin is quoted from J. L. Austin, ‘A Plea for Excuses’, in Philosophical Papers, ed. J. O. Urmson 
and G. J. Warnock (Oxford, 1979), pp. 184, 203 n..  
38 William Empson, Collected Poems (London, 1969; first published 1955), pp. 104–5.  





Theory is necessarily, and for its purposes honourably, hostile to contradictions; 
proverbs admit contradictions, and leave us to think not about that but about 
applicability; we are to decide which of the two contradictory truths (‘Look before you 
leap’ / ‘He who hesitates is lost’, or ‘Absence makes the heart grow fonder’ / ‘Out of 
sight, out of mind’) applies in any given situation.40 
 
Poems, as well as some proverbs which Ricks does not consider (‘The early bird gets the worm, 
but the second mouse gets the cheese’, for example), can be situations where two (or more) 
contradictory truths ‘apply’ at once. Such poems, I will argue, are particularly undervalued or 
often misread by criticism performed with a theoretical spirit, with its drive for rigorous and 
precise distinctions. It is for the reading of this kind of poem that Moi and Diamond’s ‘realistic 
spirit’ is especially urgently required; a reading to be performed with a sustained yet wide 
attention, one which can hold in mind competing truths.41  
 
The just mentioned prospect of ‘perpetual communication’ between Griffiths, Ricks and 
Empson may well have already indicated that there is a strong Cambridge context to this thesis; 
it may even have put the reader in mind of a kind of Cambridge University coterie. It is worth 
spending a short time here acknowledging and examining the implications of that context, whilst 
offering some justification for its prominence in the thesis in order to ward off any potential 
appearance of cliquishness. It is the major role played by Griffiths, in particular, which might be 
seen as insular. Whereas Empson and Ricks left Cambridge for substantial careers in China and 
Sheffield, and Oxford, Bristol, and Boston respectively, Griffiths spent his entire academic life in 
Cambridge, apart from a year at Princeton prior to beginning his PhD.42 During that life he 
published only one monograph (The Printed Voice of Victorian Poetry, with which my fourth chapter 
                                                        
40 Christopher Ricks, ‘Literary principles as against theory’, p. 323, in Essays in Appreciation (New York, 1996), pp. 
311–32. 
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effects a transformation in literary studies, but it is a literary studies without literature. Thus strong and legitimate 
criticisms of the theory project come at a price that most literary scholars will be unwilling to pay. Once literary 
artefacts are as transparent as they appear to be for Moi, is there any reason for literary studies to exist as its own 
discipline, and not an annex of philosophy? Is this really what we need – even less of a justification for what we 
do?’. V. Joshua Adams, ‘Out of the Quagmire of Words: Ordinary Language Philosophy and Literary Study’; 
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Cambridge’ – a testament to the phenomenon whereby individual institutional worlds are much larger from within 
than they seem from without (Jonathan Bate, ‘Reckless Eric: Lectures from a Cambridge Outsider’, Times Literary 





will interact at some length); his academic stature, by this measure at least, might appear at odds 
with the prominent place given to his thought here. To this I offer two main responses. The first 
is an acknowledgement of the fact that Griffiths’s claim to disciplinary influence and valency is in 
many ways small. It is hardly a criticism of Toril Moi to accuse her of overlooking a critic with a 
single major publication to his name; calling attention to Griffiths’s work in a Wittgensteinian 
tradition is not performed in a spirit of insular outrage, but in one of a collegial pursuit of truth. 
It is not the aim of this thesis to take Griffiths’s work as an assumed body of knowledge 
available to the reader; rather, one of its aims might be said to be to introduce that work to a 
wider readership. Such introductions have recently been increasing in number, the combination 
of Freya Johnston’s collection of lectures and Griffiths’s closely-following death bringing about a 
number of reviews and then obituaries.43 While these make much of the relative lack of 
publication, they also emphasise a different kind of reach, telling of ‘packed out’ lecture halls at a 
time when it ‘wasn’t uncommon for student attendance at lectures to be in single figures’ 
(Mullan, p. 33). My second response, then, to potential objections as to the discrepancy between 
Griffiths’s stature and the size of his role in this thesis is that it is a discrepancy which, although 
present, is nonetheless both exaggerated by a too-keen focus on publication as an indicator of 
academic reach and success (and a corresponding ignorance of pedagogical breadth), and 
diminishing, as Griffiths’s death and Johnston’s publication have recently increased an audience 
which, especially if John Mullan is granted his wish for more published lectures, will only 
continue to grow.44 
 
Joseph North, with whose recent Literary Criticism: A Concise Political History the early parts of this 
thesis will be interacting at length, writes at one point in that book of ‘the exceptional (should I 
say odd?) enclave of Cambridge’, outside of which ‘the term “practical criticism” has been 
generally abandoned’ (North, p. 105). A temptation to view Cambridge, from the outside, as an 
odd enclave of close reading might give rise to the subsequent temptation to view a Cambridge-
based thesis, arguing for the value of a certain kind of close reading with recourse to a majority 
of critics who spent time in Cambridge themselves (albeit, in most cases, very short), as 
participating in its own kind of insularity: the writer might be seen to hold an exaggerated view 
of close reading’s value, artificially inflated by a shared heritage and shared assumptions; to 
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possess a peculiar, even somehow theological reverence for ‘practical criticism’ (we’ll see in a 
moment Franco Moretti’s famous religiously-charged response to close reading, and will also 
discuss the apparently interchangeable nature of the two terms). North’s brief words are hedged 
and aimed somewhere towards humour; expecting him, anyway, to be well-versed in the 
intricacies of Cambridge English degrees would be unfair, even a symptom of the kind of insular 
arrogance from which I am trying to distance myself. The fact, however, remains that his brief 
account misses the mark. Undergraduate students at Cambridge are no longer examined in 
‘practical criticism’ but ‘practical criticism and critical practice’, a change in accord with the 
general move in academic literary studies away from practical criticism (the Cambridge English 
Faculty website acknowledges, untroubled, that ‘[p]ractical criticism today is more usually treated 
as an ancillary skill rather than the foundation of a critical method’), and which asks students to 
write in the spirit of practical criticism whilst constantly questioning its perceived limitations.45 
Postgraduate students – as they move out of the realm of pedagogical instruction and into the 
realm of scholars-in-training – are expected to leave practical criticism behind almost entirely. 
This may serve to reassure the reader that this thesis comes not out of an eccentric and uniform 
institutional context whose assumptions and quirks remain alien to her, but from an individual 
who has plotted his own path through a more motley set of traditions and practices (Jonathan 
Bate recalls the Cambridge of the late 1970s, when ‘you could attend lectures by Christopher 
Ricks, Raymond Williams and Frank Kermode, the world’s leading exponents of, respectively, 
pyrotechnic close reading, Marxist literary analysis, and the urbane fusion of traditional 
scholarship with new French theory’ (Bate, p. 34)). Raymond Williams, recalling his own time at 
Cambridge, informs us that 
 
[w]hat there was not, […] because in any fully worked-out sense there never had been, 
was a ‘Cambridge English’: a distinctive and coherent course and method of study. The 
Golden Age [of Richards and Empson] was golden only in its beginnings, its searchings, 
its open and free speaking and tolerant experimentation and inquiry.46 
 
It is the spirit of such (lower-case) gold, a spirit of genuine and open searching, which this thesis 
wants to attempt to argue for and share; not an arcane (and illusory) ‘Cambridge English’ 
tradition, to be praised and lamented. Of course, such a spirit is hardly unique to Cambridge. A 
great number of critics writing in something like the realistic spirit for which this thesis will argue 
exist across the globe (though in some cases the ‘something like’ plays a larger role than in 
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others).47 I take Empson, Ricks and Griffiths as my primary examples, however, for two main 
reasons: their strong and at times explicit connection with Wittgenstein (and there may, here, be 
something about his presence in Cambridge that has led to a particularly strong strand of his 
thought persisting in later Cambridge-based criticism), and the fact that it so happens that they 
are the critics who have most influenced me in my own process of individuation as a critic. 
Though the latter may be unjustified from a ‘scholarly’ perspective, it is, I think, justified from a 
‘critical’ one (a distinction between criticism and scholarship will be a major theme in the coming 
chapters). While it is true that this thesis calls for a greater attention to a wider range of 
examples, it also calls for slow, sustained, and focused work: the attention to only a few critics is 
not a contradiction of the former call but the result of the attempt to balance the two, within a 
relatively small number of words. 
 
A final note of potential hand-wringing: it might be objected that more space could be found for 
further examples of positive critics were less time to be spent, in the early parts of this thesis, in a 
more negative mode. As will become clear, that negative, path-clearing mode is absolutely 
essential: a complex set of disciplinary assumptions has grown up over the last four or five 
decades which have provided academic scholarship with an easy way to dismiss work in the 
realistic spirit for which I am arguing. An examination and dismantling of at least some of these 
assumptions is required if my positive examples are to sound in such a way that they demand 
notice, and not, as when a hand is placed on a ringing bell, muffled, and safely – without a 
second thought – ignored.  
 
The kind of criticism for which I am arguing, directed by a ‘realistic spirit’, is a kind of close 
reading. But it may not look like the kind of close reading with which many of us might feel 
ourselves to be familiar. Here is Franco Moretti, at the turn of the century, briefly outlining what 
he sees to be the limits of all of close reading’s ‘incarnations’: 
 
the trouble with close reading (in all of its incarnations, from the new criticism to 
deconstruction) is that it necessarily depends on an extremely small canon. This may 
have become an unconscious and invisible premise by now, but it is an iron one 
nonetheless: you invest so much in individual texts only if you think that very few of them 
really matter. Otherwise, it doesn’t make sense. And if you want to look beyond the 
canon (and of course, world literature will do so: it would be absurd if it didn’t!) close 
reading will not do it. It’s not designed to do it, it’s designed to do the opposite. At 
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bottom, it’s a theological exercise – very solemn treatment of very few texts taken very 
seriously – whereas what we really need is a little pact with the devil: we know how to 
read texts, now let’s learn how not to read them.48  
 
This reads as if close reading and a positive response to Austin’s plea ‘for a keener attention to a 
greater variety of examples’ are incompatible. It presupposes many things: that close reading 
began with ‘the new criticism’; that there were many incarnations of close reading between ‘new 
criticism’ and ‘deconstruction’ (and none beyond); that the only reason for investing a great deal 
of time and attention in any particular text is the critic’s conviction that very few others are of 
much consequence. These are assumptions I will be challenging in the chapters to come. As 
Joseph North has persuasively argued, the ‘close reading’ of I. A. Richards and William Empson 
and the ‘close reading’ of the so-called American ‘New Critics’ ‘were extremely divergent 
methods, directed towards diametrically opposed ends’.49 Moretti’s claim of a theological exercise 
might hold true for the latter group, but not for the former. And it is for the significance of the 
spirit of the former that I want to argue, and for the greater role it might play in our current 
academic thinking about lyric poetry.  
 
If it is right that our prevailing ideas about close reading come from a supposedly ‘New Critical’ 
origin – and more work than this brief turn to Moretti will of course be needed to support that – 
then my argument will need to acknowledge and explore the role that a perceived break with the 
‘New Criticism’ played and continues to play in recent contributions to lyric studies. I am aware 
that, for such an argument to be taken seriously, it will either need to be shown that the practice 
of close reading I am advocating has little that is strictly ‘New Critical’ about it, or that not all of 
what has been and is cast aside as ‘New Critical’ is quite as obnoxious as we like to think. For the 
sake of the latter case, it will be wise to put some pressure on the term ‘New Criticism’ itself: 
what is it, precisely, that a critic such as Jonathan Culler is rejecting or marking off when he 
begins his Theory of the Lyric by describing his essay, ‘Apostrophe’, as ‘a break from [his] own 
training in the New Criticism’ (Culler, Theory, p. vii)? And in doing so I will look to call into 
question the nature of the ‘break’: was it quite as clean and definite as the notion that it was 
marked or even effected by the publication of an essay seems to suggest? My first chapter will 
look to show that, in fact, lyric studies’ move ‘beyond New Criticism’, to quote the title of Hošek 
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and Parker’s landmark 1985 anthology, was protracted and fraught, performed on a polemical 
battleground. This may not be surprising; Peter Dews, writing of the attitude taken by ‘the 
modes of French thought of the 1980s’ towards the structuralism and post-structuralism of the 
’60s and ’70s, reminds us that it is ‘characteristic of major shifts of intellectual orientation, where 
a polemical attitude tends to predominate, particularly among the rising generation’, that a 
‘balanced evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of their immediate predecessors’ is not 
formed by the successors.50 But it is high time to question the role which a move beyond ‘New 
Criticism’ played in lyric studies, and to ask if anything discarded by that move might in fact be 
worth preserving. 
 
My second chapter will focus on Culler’s ‘Apostrophe’ – the essay he sees as heralding that ‘New 
Critical’ break – and examine its attitude towards definition and example. My aim in turning to 
Culler is twofold: to continue chapter one’s investigation of the move beyond ‘New Criticism’, 
and to treat the essay as emblematic of theoretical approaches to lyric. ‘Apostrophe’ draws 
considerable rhetorical force from the claim that apostrophe is embarrassing, and that the ‘New 
Critics’ excluded it from their discussions of lyric as a result. I open by questioning the truth of 
this, examining moments from ‘New Critical’ writers in which apostrophe is acknowledged and 
even theorised, before turning to cognitive rhetoric to increase the range of apostrophic 
examples Culler’s essay is prepared to take, and thereby to show that apostrophe need not always 
go hand in hand with embarrassment. We then turn to dissenting voices from within literary 
studies, as I call attention to two critics – L. M. Findlay and J. Douglas Kneale – who argue 
against what has now become lyric consensus. Returning to the classical origins of the figure, I 
argue that Culler borrows more from Longinus than he does Quintilian, some of whose words 
on apostrophe open his essay. This will show that the decision to equate lyric with apostrophe 
was not the revelatory movement which Culler supposes it was, but in fact the product of 
circular reasoning. Apostrophe in ‘Apostrophe’ is, as it was for Longinus, a label for the essence 
of a figure, the essence of lyric; in stretching the term to cover such width, our attention is being 
diverted from the kinds of effect which make apostrophe particularly interesting. Turning back 
to Quintilian, I draw out the transitive sense of ‘apostrophe’, meaning ‘I turn (someone or 
something) away’, and argue that the literary term should include both transitive and intransitive 
senses. I hold it true that lyric poems often find themselves caught between a freedom to turn to 
whatever they want, and an inability to cause a turn in what is significantly addressed. I read 
Shelley’s ‘Adonais’ as one test of this, returning to Earl Wasserman’s classic account and arguing 
                                                        




that, far from the support to his theory which Culler quotes it to lend, the poem troubles his 
main argument. I end with a reading of Veronica Forrest-Thomson’s ‘Sonnet’, which, in holding 
itself uncertainly between solitude and company, offers an insight into apostrophe to which 
Culler’s account is blind.  
 
I begin my third chapter by examining the transition from ‘Apostrophe’ to Theory of the Lyric. 
Culler’s 2015 book prints much of ‘Apostrophe’ unchanged in a chapter on ‘Lyric Address’. And 
yet his later work on lyric is no longer described by critics and commentators as deconstructive 
and theoretical, but instead practical and inductive. Culler’s work now seems to occupy the 
common-sense ground against which literary theory once strained. This chapter’s aim is to 
demonstrate the extent to which Theory of the Lyric remains rooted in the literary theory of 
‘Apostrophe’s’ day, and thus further to cement the case for the current lack of, and consequent 
need for, a criticism performed in something other than a ‘theoretical spirit’: the ‘realistic spirit’ 
described by Moi and Diamond. Describing the thrust of Culler’s theory – its emphasis on lyric 
poems’ favouring of the present tense, and on their tendency to express general truths, which 
render them particularly suitable for repetition and re-performance – I focus in particular on the 
term ‘iterability’, a borrowing from the thought of Jacques Derrida, and in particular his essay 
‘Signature Event Context’. Examining Derrida’s ‘iterability’ next to Peter Dews’s account of 
possible precursors in German Idealism, I look to trouble the work to which the term is put by 
Culler, as we read at length a revealing discussion of performativity in which Theory of the Lyric 
apparently finds a middle way between Derrida and Austin’s approaches to language. I argue that 
both Austin and Derrida’s arguments are at various points mis-represented, and that the theory 
arrived at by Culler is not as inductive or as authoritative as it might appear. We need, instead, to 
place greater emphasis – as did Paul Celan, quoted by both Culler and Derrida – on the 
‘encounter’ between poem and reader, as we learn to attend to poems without the theoretical 
frameworks or assumptions which Culler and Derrida think of as impossible to remove. 
 
My fourth chapter aims to add more flesh to an account of the ‘realistic spirit’ for which my 
introduction called. I begin by turning to the work of and responses to Rita Felski, locating my 
own work in relation to writing which sees itself as calling for or having taken a ‘postcritical’ 
turn. We then look to William Empson as an example of the spirit for which this thesis is 
arguing. Michael Wood’s recent account of Empson situates him predominantly as a writer, a 
critic whose criticism is often barely recognisable in such terms. Attending in detail to a moment 




North claims, now dominates the discipline. Contrary to Wood, I contend that Empson is 
followable, and has been followed, and that we do better to aim for a re-introduction of the 
critical paradigm within which he operated than to mark him off as an eccentric genius. That 
paradigm involves the paying of a wide critical attention to individual literary texts; to argue for 
it, we need to think once again about how we might define and defend the category of the 
literary. We do this through moments from the work of two very different critics – Eric Griffiths 
and Terry Eagleton – who each take an example of mundane language use in order to reach 
differing conclusions with regard to the nature of literature. Turning to Stanley Cavell, I argue 
that it is possible to retain a usable, if blurred, distinction between the literary and the non-
literary on grounds other than the attention we pay to texts. Thus that attention becomes not the 
inventor of the thing it contemplates but a wide, sensitive and mutable response to a literary 
object. I end by turning to Freud, Adam Phillips and Marion Milner in order to offer a fuller 
description of the form of attention which the chapter has advocated; one which enables the 
example to take centre stage, and not remain in the wings, in thrall to some general conception 
or theory.  
 
The example taking centre stage is what my final chapter aims to show, as it bears in mind 
Wittgenstein’s suggestion for the assembly of a ‘sort of collection of examples’, investigating 
what that might look like, and what criticism performed in a ‘realistic spirit’ can be. As such, the 
rationale behind the selection of the examples I take here might look arbitrary: they have been 
selected on the basis of an inchoate affinity located individually, rather than according to the 
familiar paradigms of periodicity and direct influence. Nonetheless, the examples also maintain 
relevance to the preceding discussions of lyric theory, as the chapter also embarks on some of its 
own, in the attempt to widen the parameters for what can be read as lyric poetry. I begin, then, 
with a medieval poem, ‘A god, and yet a man’, thinking about Ardis Butterfield’s dismissal of 
much of the medieval lyric’s literary value. This is a poem which might initially appear as a slight, 
witty collection of clichés, ripe for memorisation; in fact, I will argue, it is much more profound, 
and demands lengthier engagement. I then turn to Wordsworth’s ‘The Two April Mornings’, 
considering the poet’s own account of his aims in the ‘Preface’ to Lyrical Ballads, and looking to 
alter and expand Culler’s account of repetition and re-performance. Wordsworth’s poem, I’ll 
argue with recourse to moments from Marcel Proust and Kenzaburō Ōe, interrogates the extent 
to which the repetition of a past event is desirable; this is an interrogation to which we cannot 
properly attend if we have decided that the aim of lyric poetry is to make itself repeatable. The 




that lyric need be a performable ‘event’ and not an object. I’ll argue that Greek epitaph 
(overlooked in theories of the lyric such as that of W. R. Johnson, which popularised the idea 
that all ancient lyrics were sung) offers us a way of reading poetry closely, as an object for close 
attention and interpretation, which has a legitimate historical heritage (and thus cannot be 
written off uncomplicatedly as the invention of ‘lyric reading’, as Jackson would have it, or of the 
‘New Critics’, as would Culler). A reading of George B. Walsh will help us to claim that ancient 
epitaphs were written not to be committed to memory but to bring about a one-off act of 
reading, one which prioritised spatial rather than temporal poetic features and concerns, and thus 
that re-visiting such epitaphs can significantly locate ambiguity as a valid and crucial feature of 
many lyric poems.  
 
Jonathan Culler’s practice of exemplarity in Theory of the Lyric 
 
Jonathan Culler’s Theory of the Lyric, as my roadmap will have made clear, plays a significant role 
in this thesis. I want in the remainder of this introduction to justify this significance, to offer a 
summary of the parts of Culler’s thought relevant to the thesis, and to explain the spirit in which 
I approach his work. Theory of the Lyric is a hugely important book for lyric studies, deserving of 
engagement for the breadth of its scope and ambition; though a much greater share of the 
attention I pay to the book will be devoted to criticism rather than praise, I hope it will be clear 
that the amount of attention, of any kind, paid to it here is indicative of its undeniable 
importance. Culler’s ambition is to be admired, but, as will be my argument in the chapters that 
follow, its direction is misguided. The aim of his book is to ‘contribute to a better model’ of lyric 
poetry than ‘the narrow models that have in recent years organised most approaches’ (Culler, 
Theory, pp. 3, viii). My aim – as will be clear from my introductory account of exemplification – is 
to argue that the creation of a ‘model’ is not the best way of approaching lyric; that such models 
will always be inadequate, in profound and wide-reaching ways. In his review of Theory of the 
Lyric, Colin Burrow briefly calls attention to ‘some blind spots’ of Culler’s theory: an ‘early outer 
fringe of lyric’ (that is, ancient Greek occasional poems), ‘conceptual poetry’, and ‘in the work of 
the L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E poets’.51 The examples taken by this thesis are not the result of 
searches for similar ‘instances that don’t quite fit’ (Burrow, p. 35), but rather attempts to show 
that any such ‘model’ of lyric poetry, created in accordance with a ‘theoretical spirit’, will simply 
not do if our aim is to pay sustained attention and do justice to particular poems, whether those 
poems are taken from the ‘outer fringe[s]’ of the canon or from the middle of it. The claim that 
                                                        




‘[i]f students are not presented with an adequate model of the lyric, they will read according to 
whatever inadequate models they have previously assimilated’ (Culler, Theory, p. 4) is well-
intentioned – Culler has a strongly pedagogical bent – but does students a disservice, whom we 
do better to see as people with a genuine interest in the texts they come to study, whose practice 
of reading can be shaped by each encounter with any particular poem. Indeed, in undergraduate 
students there exist the strongest links between institutional and ordinary reading practices: 
university applicants tend to read a small number of texts before they apply for English degrees 
not because only a ‘very few really matter’, to remember Moretti’s phrase, but because they like 
them. Universities can help to further that appreciation, and direct it in each case towards a 
process of enculturation and individuation. I share Culler’s zeal to break down inadequate 
models – although quibble somewhat with his description of the extent of their influence – but 
believe the right way forward to be to leave alone what was modelled once such models have 
been broken down. The Culler of Structuralist Poetics would argue that our responses to any 
particular lyric poem are always governed by the model of reading, attention, and interpretation 
that we happen to bring to it (‘the reading and interpreting of poems is based on an implicit 
theory of the lyric’).52 My most sustainedly polemical response to Culler in this thesis – chapter 
one’s reading of the equally polemical opening to that book’s chapter, ‘Poetics of the Lyric’ – 
seeks to dismantle this assumption. 
 
Culler’s dual existence as a crucial figure in the lyric studies conversation and as a lucid conveyor 
and translator of ostensibly difficult theoretical and Continental thought for an American 
audience is another reason for the size of the role he plays here. As my first chapter makes clear, 
the latter involved him in a polemical shift beyond ‘New Criticism’, the fallout from which 
continues to influence assumptions in lyric studies today, not least because of his influential essay 
‘Apostrophe’ (where those two existences come together), which takes as its point of departure 
what it takes to be a crucial ‘New Critical’ ignorance of matters of lyric address. Culler’s career 
thus provides a very good optic through which to think about the influence of that shift more 
widely, and thus how to position in the lyric conversation any attempt to argue for the greater 
prominence of close reading, attention to poetic ambiguity, and other critical practices often 
bound up under the increasingly wide scope of the term ‘New Criticism’.  
 
A possible objection to the engagement with Culler’s work that I am here foregrounding might 
be that he is in fact sympathetic to the ‘realistic spirit’, and to sustained engagement with 
                                                        




particular examples (to the extent that he finds it necessary to acknowledge his book’s ‘great 
unevenness’ as a result of his examples’ range (Culler, Theory, p. 9)), in a manner which is little 
different from that which the earlier parts of this introduction championed. Let me respond to 
this by going back to the beginning, in the hope of demonstrating the somewhat confused role 
which example and exemplification plays in Culler’s work. Straight after quoting Hegel’s 
‘properly philosophical’ insistence on a theory which doesn’t derive its general conceptions from 
individual works, in the process of attempting to highlight ‘strengths that have often been 
neglected’ in Hegel’s account (Culler, Theory, p. 7), Culler writes, ‘[b]ut for a theory of the lyric, 
one cannot avoid consideration of how it deals with major examples’ (Culler, Theory, p. 98). The 
function of this ‘but’ is not entirely clear, since ‘deals with’ does not imply any revision of 
Culler’s agreement with Hegel’s method (of constructing a theory without recourse to individual 
example). The point of contrast might instead be with what Hegel says about the relevance of 
examples once his theory has been constructed. Remember that Hegel’s paradigmatic 
exemplifications, since they have been developed from his general conception of lyric poetry 
alone, may not include everything that ‘is commonly called a poem’, as ‘whether something is a 
poetical production or not is to be derived solely from the conception of poetry’ which Hegel 
has decided upon (I am quoting again, here, from the passage with which I began). Culler’s 
‘major examples’, meanwhile, are elsewhere lyric poems which are commonly called lyric poems; 
that is, poems commonly considered to be central to the lyric tradition, ‘hypercanonical’ (Culler, 
Theory, p. 6). But rather than exploring the relevance and applicability of Hegel’s ideas about 
language and subjectivity to ‘hypercanonical’ lyrics not mentioned by Hegel, Culler confines 
himself to those writers with which Hegel’s theory explicitly deals (Horace, Pindar, Schiller, 
Goethe), that is, Hegel’s paradigmatic exemplifications.  
 
The function of that ‘but’, then, remains uncertain. It’s a small moment which is indicative of the 
role played by examples in Theory of the Lyric as a whole. Culler finds himself torn between a 
desire to produce a ‘properly philosophical’ theory and an account of lyric which will be 
applicable to a long and well-populated lyric tradition, and thus more widely applicable than 
Hegel himself promises his own theory to be. The book starts by setting out aims which look 
partially admirable to a critic possessed of a ‘realistic spirit’. Culler introduces an ‘inductive 
approach’ (which remind us of Aristotle), one which begins with ‘celebrated poems in various 
languages and from different moments of the Western lyric tradition that can instantiate [lyric’s] 
proclivities and possibilities’, and after a discussion of poems by Sappho, Horace, Petrarch, 





[t]hese lyrics from different periods and languages identify a range of issues or 
parameters of variation that need to be incorporated in any account of the genre. They 
do not constitute a set of necessary features or invariants or a definition of the lyric, but 
they have, I believe, the virtue of being more central to the functioning and power of 
lyrics than elements likely to be cited in any attempt at definition. But the question of 
what the lyric is or has been still awaits. (Culler, Theory, pp. 10, 38) 
 
As the wide temporal range of my own examples in this thesis will show, I am greatly cheered by 
Culler’s practice of writing about Sappho next to Ashbery; in this way his work helps to break 
down overly precise and arbitrarily established boundaries, contributing to recent discussions and 
re-interpretations of periodicity in the work of critics such as Wai Chee Dimock, Derek Attridge, 
and Michael Silk.53 The first sentence and a half, indeed, feels almost compatible with 
Wittgenstein’s ‘affinity’ and family resemblance in the way that it rejects ‘features’ which will be 
common to all poems we call lyric: 
 
I can think of no better expression to characterise these similarities [between games] than 
‘family resemblances’; for the various resemblances between members of a family – 
build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, and so on and so forth – overlap and 
criss-cross in the same way. – And I shall say: ‘games’ form a family. 
And likewise the kinds of number, for example, form a family. Why do we call 
something a ‘number’? Well, perhaps because it has a – direct – affinity with several 
things that have hitherto been called ‘number’; and this can be said to give it an indirect 
affinity with other things that we also call ‘numbers’. And we extend our concept of 
number, as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread 
resides not in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the 
overlapping of many fibres. (PI, §67, p. 36e) 
 
But then comes the claim to centrality, and the promise of the question of what lyric is (and 
before long, a rejection of the ‘concept of family resemblance’ as a helpful way to think about 
genre).54 For a critic possessed of the realistic spirit, this is where Culler’s opening remarks go 
wrong, and where he first reveals that his examples remain in thrall to general conceptions. One 
more of those practical examples so antagonistic to Derrida will help to highlight the error in the 
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move from starting ‘from a series of hypercanonical lyrics of the Western tradition and seek[ing] 
to identify their salient features’ (Culler, Theory, p. 6) to describing such features as central to 
lyric. Say I am minded to take a sample of major European football teams – say Tottenham 
Hotspur, Fulham, Real Madrid – and decide from this selection that a salient feature to all is that 
they play in white. This would be true. But if I then go down the pub and start to talk about 
football as if it were a ball game played by eleven players in white shirts, I’d encounter some 
serious objections and indeed ridicule, whether I happened to be talking to a fan of Cambridge 
United in the fourth tier of English football, or of Barcelona. My observation about those three 
teams was not wrong, but as soon as I hastily moved to generate a general conception, I quickly 
entered into error. 
 
By the time we get to Culler’s chapter on address (a re-worked version of ‘Apostrophe’), the 
general conception is king. Examples now come thick and fast, separated by an average of one 
or two paragraphs, rather than the two or three pages of chapter one, ‘An Inductive Approach’ – 
a sure sign that examples are being led by conception, and not the other way around. We are told 
about ‘triangulated address’, a form of indirection whereby the poet, in the words of Northrop 
Frye, with whose account Culler agrees, ‘pretends to be talking to himself or to someone else’, 
while actually talking to an audience of readers.55 This is ‘the root-form of presentation for lyric, 
underlying even those poems that do not engage in the strange forms of address and invocation 
endemic to the genre’ (Culler, Theory, p. 186). The introductory hesitancy towards an account of 
lyric’s ‘necessary features’, towards over-hasty conceptualisation, seems here to have long ago 
slipped out the back door. Chapter five – ‘Lyric Address’ – aims to catalogue every kind of 
addressive effect which the lyric seeks, as Culler breaks up the genre into address directly to the 
reader, address to people, such as lovers (which is really indirect address), and address to 
inanimate objects (such as rocks, stones, trees, the dead), which he terms ‘apostrophe’. The 
theoretical argument is clear, and takes centre-stage: address helps to constitute the poem as an 
event in the lyric now, which can thus be re-performed, and ritualised. I take extended issue with 
this argument in my second and third chapters neither to show the specific deficiency of Culler’s 
theory, a sort of critical one-upmanship, nor in the manner Burrow predicts, of the kind of nit-
picking of blind spots which is invited by any theory. Rather, I want to show that any theory of 
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lyric – and I take Culler’s as a particularly wide-ranging and well-thought-through example – is 
doomed to fail substantially. And by fail I mean both in terms of giving an accurate account of a 
majority – let alone the entirety – of the poems we call lyric, and of enabling a properly 
productive encounter between reader and any particular poem.  
 
Let me end this introduction with an example, one of Culler’s own: 
 
 This living hand, now warm and capable 
 Of earnest grasping, would, if it were cold 
 And in the icy silence of the tomb, 
 So haunt thy days and chill thy dreaming nights 
 That thou wouldst wish thine own heart dry of blood 
 So in my veins red life might stream again, 
 And thou be conscience-calmed – see here it is –  
 I hold it towards you.56 
 
Culler is quick to assert that Keats’s poem  
 
is a daring attempt to produce a poetic event by exploiting the resources of direct address 
to the reader, boldly collapsing into one the time of articulation – the now when ‘this 
living hand’ is ‘warm and capable of earnest grasping’ – and the time of reading: ‘See, 
here it is, I hold it towards you’. (Culler, Theory, p. 197) 
 
This reading provides a perfect exemplification of Culler’s theory: that a lyric poem is an event, 
that its temporality is dominated by the ‘now’ of articulation, that it is iterable, re-performable in 
a variety of contexts, in which its ‘you’ might just as well be him, or me, or you. But whether or 
not it provides an accurate account of Keats’s poem – which we know him to have ‘drafted or 
copied on the outside recto of a folded sheet on which, after turning it over and around, Keats 
drafted stanzas 45–51 of The Jealousies’, but beyond which ‘there is no guidance as to whether the 
reader is invited to treat this as poem or fragment, whether it is a lyric challenge to the reader or 
part of an unrealised dramatic context’ – that is much less certain.57 Like Culler, I too find this 
poem a powerful instance of lyric, but I do not to any degree feel myself implicated by the 
poem’s ‘you’; indeed, it is the combined, eerie distance of both ‘I’ and ‘you’ from me that make 
it, in my experience, so unsettling. One might wish to read ‘hand’ as simultaneously connoting 
‘handwriting’ in order to support Culler’s interpretation; but not only has Culler no interest in 
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the circumstances of the composition of Keats’s poem, but such a reading would also be 
inconsistent with the poem’s internal logic (how can handwriting ‘grasp’? how can blood run 
through it?).58 ‘This living hand, now warm and capable / Of earnest grasping, would, if it were 
cold’; the poem’s ‘I’ is not yet dead, of course, at the time of writing, and so the statement that 
the ‘poem dares assert that this hand is being held towards us at the moment of reading’ (Culler, 
Theory, p. 197, my italics) is wrong, and there is no need for readers to ‘sacrifice their sense of 
reality’ (Culler, Theory, p. 197) in supposing that a hand is being held towards them, and that they 
have the power to resurrect it. This is not a poem that is addressed to me, however apt an 
example of Culler’s general conception it may be if it is read in that way. And so I might respond 
to Culler’s conclusion, that this ‘is a tour de force that shows what lyric is can do [sic] and why it 
is memorable’, – aside from remarking on the typing error’s apt demonstration of Theory of the 
Lyric’s mutated attitude to ‘necessary features’, as the book quickly switched its aims from an 
account of some of the things lyric can do to what it is – by suggesting that Culler’s reading of 
Keats’s poem well shows what lyric understood according to Theory of the Lyric’s model is and can 
do, but does little to illuminate the potentials of the particular lyric poem at hand. For Culler’s 
example is here under the spell of the general conception; what happens when we break it? 
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Chapter one: lyric studies, close reading, and the ‘New Criticism’ 
 
Introduction: ‘New Criticism’ and lyric studies 
 
Before we can attempt to break the spell of the general conception, it is necessary to think about 
how such an attempt might be received and interpreted. Advocating a prioritisation of attention 
to particular poems, whilst arguing for a tactic of exemplification which may have much less time 
for concepts than examples, will not be able to avoid recalling the perceived ‘New Critical’ 
practice of paying attention to a poem as a ‘thing in itself’, a hangover from an outdated, much-
maligned Kantian understanding of aesthetics.1 That this is not my argument may already be 
clear, since I have placed emphasis in my introduction on the importance of an encounter 
between poem and reader, and thus on a poem’s context of reception. But – as I’ll show with a 
more sustained turn to the work of Joseph North – the academy has long been confused with 
regard to the difference between these positions, since it tends to see the work of I. A. Richards 
and William Empson (radically opposed to a Kantian aesthetics of autonomy) as mostly cognate 
with that of the American ‘New Critics’ (happy, it seems, to embrace it). One of my arguments 
in this chapter will thus be that the ‘New Criticism’ has come to stand for more than the 
dominant group of US critics operating in the American academy in the middle parts of the 
twentieth century. That we keep repeating, now anecdotally, our antipathy to a practice which 
has been officially dead for fifty years ‘suggests a kind of presence which needs to be addressed’, 
in the words of Mark Jancovich.2 Jancovich opens up the possibility that ‘New Criticism’ as a 
label conceals more than it reveals; the term ‘New Criticism’ has become a means of labelling the 
academy’s own unconscious, a trick which enables that unconscious to remain unthought.3 
Jancovich’s work is also useful insofar that it argues at some length that many of the positions 
we tend to associate with the ‘New Critics’ – a perceived denial of history; the claim that a poem 
has no cognitive qualities; adherence to the principles of liberal humanism; the claim that the 
meaning of a text is fixed and ultimately knowable, as opposed to an endless process between 
reader and poem; even the claim that the text is an autonomous and fixed object independent of 
context – are often misrepresentations and caricatures of individual critics’ actual thought.4 For 
                                                        
1 Virginia Jackson and Yopie Prins, for example, describe the ‘postwar classroom, in which readers could be trained 
to recognise a generic version of “poetry as a thing in itself”’. The Lyric Theory Reader: A Critical Anthology, ed. 
Viriginia Jackson and Yopie Prins (Baltimore, 2014), p. 162. For an account of John Crowe Ransom’s handling of 
Kant, see Joseph North, Literary Criticism: A Concise Political History (London, 2017), pp. 36–43. 
2 Mark Jancovich, The Cultural Politics of the New Criticism (Cambridge, 1993), p. 137. 
3 This final phrase was suggested to me by Joe Moshenska, in conversation, and by Adam Phillips’s writing on 
frustration, in Missing Out: In Praise of the Unlived Life (London, 2013). 




both these reasons – that the ‘New Criticism’ as a label refers to people and critical practices 
beyond the mid-twentieth-century American academy, and that the practices and thought of 
those critics who were working in such a time and place are not always well defined by the 
assumptions we tend to associate with the label – I have chosen to keep the ‘New Criticism’ in 
quotation marks throughout this chapter. This may prove tiresome, but I have thought it better 
to risk tiring my reader than to risk us both falling back into assumptions which continue to be 
so pervasive. It may already have been noticed that some of the critical positions I will be 
discussing in support of my reasons for leaving the ‘New Criticism’ in quotation marks are, in a 
manner which is perhaps only to be expected, not always entirely compatible; North’s 
arguments, for instance, which rely on a relatively fixed notion of what ‘New Criticism’ is and 
was, might be somewhat troubled by Jancovich’s claims of disparity. I have felt it satisfactory not 
to choose a side, as it were, to settle on a single truth, since the aim of this chapter is not to make 
a final pronouncement on our ‘New Critical’ legacy (which could not, anyway, be contained in so 
few words) but to offer a summary of some of the arguments which trouble the work which the 
‘New Critical’ label continues to do for us. The aim is to clear the ground for my proposal of a 
spirit of reading lyric poetry which might otherwise find itself assimilated under the ‘New 
Critical’ aegis, and thus swiftly rejected. 
 
The phantom presence of ‘New Criticism’ is particularly strong in lyric studies, because the ‘New 
Critics’ are perceived to have prioritised lyric poetry above all other forms, ‘erasing generic 
differences between poems’ (Jackson and Prins, p. 161), in effect wanting ‘lyric’ to stand for all 
poetry.5 The identity or essence of lyric, then, might be seen to have been and still be under 
threat, and at stake in the urge to repeat the sub-discipline’s ‘New Critical’ point of departure. 
Once the score had been settled and ‘New Criticism’ lost its place at the centre of the American 
academy, Cecily Devereux reminds us that there were ‘only a few exceptions’ to the rule that 
‘hardly anyone mentioned the New Criticism in a direct and sustained way’.6 That Chaviva 
Hošek and Patricia Parker’s 1985 collection, Lyric Poetry: Beyond New Criticism should be one of 
them is indicative of lyric studies’ long unfinished business with its ‘New Critical’ heritage, which 
remains unfinished as I write. Jonathan Culler begins his preface to Theory of the Lyric by locating 
his project as the culmination of a ‘New Critical’ ‘break’: 
                                                        
5 ‘[L]yric became the dominant idea of poetry as the idea of lyric became so large that poetry became synonymous 
with it’ (Jackson and Prins, p. 160). 
6 Cecily Devereux, ‘‘A Kind of Dual Attentiveness’: Close Reading after the New Criticism’, in Rereading the New 
Criticism, ed. Miranda Hickman and John D. McIntyre (Columbus, OH, 2012), pp. 218–30, p. 220. Apart from 
Hošek and Parker’s anthology, she also cites as examples Jancovich’s 1993 study, and Frank Lentricchia’s 1980 After 




[t]hat essay [‘Apostrophe’], the seed from which this project eventually developed, was a 
break from my own training in the New Criticism, where close attention to the language 
of literary works focused on elements that most contribute to a complex interpretation 
of the poem[.] (Culler, Theory, p. vii) 
 
What precisely Culler feels this break to have consisted of is not immediately clear: we can read 
this either as locating as ‘New Critical’ all close attention to the language of literary works, or 
close attention which is primarily directed towards a ‘complex interpretation’. That there is 
nothing exclusively ‘New Critical’ about either practice (as we shall see, Sharon Best and Stephen 
Marcus locate the drive towards interpretation which Culler will argue against at some length 
with the ‘symptomatic reading’ of those who replaced the ‘New Critics’) should prompt us to ask 
what work the repetition of this ‘break’ is doing for Culler here.7 Virginia Jackson and Yopie 
Prins, whose engagement with ‘New Critical’ thought in The Lyric Theory Reader is helpful and 
sustained, begin their section, entitled ‘Anglo-American New Criticism’, like this: 
 
New Criticism did not have one way of reading the lyric. The group of critics usually 
assembled under that name has gradually expanded; these days, it is common to call 
many different kinds of critics of poetry in the twentieth century ‘New Critics’ if they 
attended closely to the formal characteristics of the poem, and especially when in doing 
so they excluded or ignored authorial intent, historical context, or the circumstances of 
composition, publication, and circulation. (Jackson and Prins, p. 159) 
 
Like Culler’s close attention to language, perhaps leading to a complex interpretation, this is an 
account of an absurdly large definition, which Jackson and Prins have little final interest in 
troubling (their project being reliant on the conflation of different modes of reading lyric under 
the header of ‘lyricisation’).8 They are right to point out differences in the approaches of 
Richards and Empson and the American ‘New Critics’, but they do not let such differences 
become so great that the common grouping together of the ‘Anglo-Americans’ becomes 
untenable, which a critic such as Joseph North will suggest it is. One of the questions implicitly 
asked, and left unanswered, by their account is whether there is any place left in our thinking 
about lyric for close attention ‘to the formal characteristics of the poem’, if it is our practice to 
mark off critics who pay such attention as ‘New Critical’, and if the ‘New Criticism’ is 
‘understood to embody the shortcomings of humanist philosophy’, to be irredeemably 
conservative, performed at the expense and causing the exclusion of marginalised identity 
                                                        
7 Stephen Best and Sharon Marcus, ‘Surface Reading: An Introduction’, Representations, 108.1 (2009), 1–21, p. 1. 
8 Culler’s polemical response to Jackson and Prins in Theory of the Lyric criticises them for the ‘historical 




groups.9 For though Jackson and Prins’s account admirably resists caricature, and is no more 
hostile to the ‘New Critics’ than any other of the lyric readers they group together, present, and 
discuss, it remains content to leave undisturbed our cluster of assumptions about the links 
between ‘New Criticism’ and close reading, attention to form and old-fashioned aestheticism, 
and indeed conservatism. 
 
Close reading today 
 
These assumptions run deep. We saw in the introduction Franco Moretti’s famous 
condemnation of close reading on the grounds that it is a ‘theological exercise’. Joseph North 
sensitively engages with this moment at some length, as it is of crucial importance to the main 
argument of Literary Criticism: A Concise Political History (see North, pp. 109–16). Since ‘the crisis 
decade of the 1970s’, the argument goes, literary studies has been ‘unified under a single 
paradigm’, labelled, by turns, ‘historicist/contextualist’ or ‘scholarly’. But prior to the 1970s, 
there were two variously competing and complementary paradigms at play: ‘scholarly’ 
(comprised of those ‘who treated the study of literature as a means by which to analyse culture’), 
and also ‘critical’ (comprised of those who treated it ‘as an opportunity to intervene in culture’) 
(North, pp. 1–2).10 As the critical paradigm died off, so did many of the practices and categories 
associated with it (‘practical criticism’, ‘criticism’, the ‘aesthetic’ (North, p. 109)). ‘Close reading’, 
meanwhile, seems to have persisted; or rather, ‘the term […] has been retained’ (more on this 
difference in a moment; North, p. 105). Moretti’s writing does significant work for North 
because he provides an instance of an argument against close reading in particular on the 
grounds that – like practical criticism, criticism, and the aesthetic – it is ‘irredeemably 
compromised by its purported origin in New Criticism’ (North, p. 109). It is an instance, North 
will argue, which is not an exception but rather a kind of fulfilment, the ‘natural conclusion [of] 
the central logic that has dictated so much of the last three decades of literary study: the rejection 
of the project of criticism – aesthetic education for something resembling, in aspiration if not in 
fact, a general audience – and the embrace of the project of scholarship – the production of 
cultural and historical knowledge for an audience of specialists’ (North, p. 115). 
                                                        
9 Heather Love, ‘Close but not Deep: Literary Ethics and the Descriptive Turn’, New Literary History, 41 (2010), 371–
91, p. 372. See The New Criticism and Contemporary Literary Theory: Connections and Continuities, ed. William J. Spurlin and 
Michael Fischer (New York, 1995) for some discussion of such exclusion; in particular, Reginald Martin, ‘New 
Criticism and New Black Aesthetic Criticism: Debts and Disagreements’ (pp. 247–73), and Penelope J. Engelbrecht, 
‘New Lesbian Criticism or New (Lesbian) Criticism? Reading, Canon, Academy, Polis’ (pp. 339–63). 
10 For a thorough discussion of the opposition during the early and middle parts of the twentieth century, see 




I start this section with Moretti, and North’s incisive reading of him, so as to counter at the 
outset what might be the most immediate objection to my argument here: that there is plenty of 
space for close reading within lyric studies, and literary studies more widely; that we do it all the 
time, and we ‘generally agree to value it’.11 Those are, perhaps surprisingly in this context, the 
words of Jonathan Culler, who presented a brief and astute discussion of the term at a seminar 
discussion in 2009, beginning like this: 
In many English departments, and I daresay foreign language departments as well, the 
practice of close reading, of examining closely the language of a literary work or a section 
of it, has been something we take for granted, as a sine qua non of literary study, a skill 
that we expect our students to master and that we certainly expect of job candidates, 
whatever other sorts of critical activities they may flamboyantly display. (‘Closeness’, p. 
20) 
Culler’s presentation of close reading as a crucial skill for literary study, indeed almost a 
touchstone by which potential academics are judged, sits uncomfortably next to another recent 
and important discussion of the practice by Jane Gallop, who finds herself worrying 
 
about the fate of close reading. It may be a familiar skill to English professors of my 
generation, but I’m not confident that it is still widely taught. If practised here and there, 
it is seldom theorised, much less defended.12  
 
That two such remarkably different general accounts of close reading’s practice and fate can 
spring up within two years of each other should make us pause for thought. What is going on 
here? Are these two distinguished, late-career professors talking about the same thing when they 
invoke ‘close reading’? And if not, how do their two ‘close readings’ differ, and how is it that 
such vast differences came to arise? 
 
Joseph North’s persuasive account suggests some answers. North’s argument divides close 
reading into three periods. For I. A. Richards, close reading and practical criticism are ‘methods 
for the practical training of the aesthetic faculties of readers’ (North, p. 105). ‘Richards’s 
argument in Principles of Literary Criticism’, North writes, ‘was that the most important thing about 
                                                        
11 Jonathan Culler, ‘The Closeness of Close Reading’, ADE Bulletin, 149 (2010), 20–25, p. 20. One potentially valid 
aspect of this objection is the prevalence of ‘critical’ forms of close reading within the culture of literary reviews. I 
will be discussing this aspect in my ‘Afterword’. My focus in the main body of this thesis is strictly on the primary 
element of literary studies as it currently stands, that is, academic research. 
12 Jane Gallop, ‘The Historicisation of Literary Studies and the Fate of Close Reading’, Profession, (2007), 181–186, p. 
182. See also a review of one of Gallop’s monographs: ‘Jane Gallop is a stubborn practitioner of close reading, even 
in times like ours, in which there seems to be no place left for this approach in academy’ (Jan Baetens, Review of 




works of literature was their aesthetic potential, by which he meant not their formal beauty as an 
end in itself, but their ability to act as means by which readers could cultivate many of their most 
useful practical facilities’ (North, p. 29). Richards’s ‘theoretical project is to break the aesthetic 
out of the Kantian loop of self-sufficiency and redundancy and instead to put it back into 
contact with the material concerns of life’, and thus he ‘continually asks us to turn our attention 
away from the artwork “in itself” and to focus instead on the nature of the relationship between 
artworks and their audiences’ (North, pp. 31–2). It is not long before this project finds itself 
essentially turned on its head. American ‘New Criticism’, North thinks, couched in conservative 
ideology, arrives and at once co-opts close reading in the service of the very Kantian aesthetics 
which Richards sought to reject (see North, pp. 38–46); ‘“[c]lose reading” was now being set to 
work as the practical arm of the very kind of aesthetic thinking that it had been built to oppose’ 
(North, p. 43). Taking the example of Cleanth Brooks, North argues that ‘the key move in 
adopting Richards is to rescue the aesthetic from the realm of practical, material, and 
instrumental values, where Richards had tried to put it, and instead put it back into the Kantian 
and idealist realm of transcendental value where it seemed to belong’, resulting in a practical 
criticism and close reading which had turned from a mode of reading ‘directed towards the 
practical end of cultivating readers’ sensibilities’ to one ‘directed towards the “practical” end of 
assessing the value of poems against that of other poems’ (North, pp. 44, 46).  
 
North’s third period of close reading is one of a neutered practice, close reading cut down to 
size, shorn of its aesthetic functions in the service of the scholarly paradigm which has 
dominated literary studies since the move beyond ‘New Criticism’, at the expense of ‘criticism’: 
 
this severing of the association between ‘close reading’ and ‘criticism’ has led to an 
impoverishing generalisation of the former term, which is now usually used simply to 
designate any reading practice that attempts to derive nontrivial meanings from small 
units of text. This does much to mask the fact that what early and mid-century critics 
called ‘close reading’ and what the discipline now calls ‘close reading’ are in many ways 
quite different practices: broadly speaking, earlier modes of criticism saw ‘close reading’ 
as a focus on small units of text for the purposes of relating to the text as an aesthetic 
object, whereas today ‘close reading’ usually means a focus on small units of text for the 
purposes of understanding what the text has to teach us about histories and cultures. It 
may help to make the point if we observe, perhaps too schematically, that today close 
reading is a way to focus one’s attention on small units of text, whereas for the early 
critical paradigm, close reading was a way to use small units of text to focus one’s 
attention. (North, pp. 105–6) 
 
We can start to make sense of the massive disparity in Culler and Gallop’s descriptions of close 




describing a version of what preceded it. Indeed, Culler’s definition – ‘examining closely the 
language of a literary work or a section of it’ (‘Closeness’, p. 20) – sounds similar to, if not vaguer 
than (there is no mention of the ‘nontrivial’), North’s description of the third period (‘any 
reading practice that attempts to derive nontrivial meanings from small units of text’). We may 
still use the term ‘close reading’, but what it variously denotes is scarcely recognisable as a 
practice of paying attention to texts and our encounters with them as a means, primarily, of 
furthering our thinking about such texts and the ways we encounter them. This kind of close 
reading, to adopt Gallop’s words, has been ‘tarred with the elitist brush applied in our rejection 
of the New Critics’ canon, and [has been] thrown out with the dirty bathwater of timeless 
universals’ (Gallop, p. 182). And it is this kind – a spirit of reading attentive to individual 
example for reasons other than the production of theoretical, historical, or cultural knowledge – 
that this thesis wants to make the case for rescuing. 
 
Gallop, it should be noted, remains interested in close reading insofar that it ‘produce[s] 
worthwhile knowledge’ (Gallop, p. 183), and is thus making her defence in ‘specifically scholarly, 
rather than critical, terms’ (North, p. 108). Indeed, close reading is justified on the grounds that it 
is a useful way to approach ‘political, historical, and theoretical texts, rather than literary ones’ 
(North, p. 108): ‘Students trained in close reading have been known to apply it to diverse sorts of 
texts – newspaper articles, textbooks in other disciplines, political speeches – and thus to 
discover things they would not otherwise have noticed’ (Gallop, p. 183). But close reading, 
North argues, cannot be separated from criticism and the aesthetic in the way Gallop thinks it 
can. This is the logic North sees as buried in the scholarly paradigm which has dominated literary 
study for the last three or four decades, and which the work of Franco Moretti clarifies and 
extends. What if, in response to Moretti’s already-quoted argument in ‘Conjectures on World 
Literature’, one were ‘to bring up the example of – reading?’, North asks; ‘[e]ven “having a 
favourite book”?’. It is clear, of course, that we are prepared to ‘invest a great deal in individual 
texts all the time, without feeling it at all necessary to claim that those texts are the only ones that 
“really matter”’.13 In ignoring this eminently practical example, North suggests, Moretti shows 
that the discipline of literary studies has forgotten that people can turn to literature for reasons 
                                                        
13 Patricia Meyer Spacks discusses this point in a recent book On Rereading (London, 2011), with reference to an 
article by Verlyn Klinkenborg (‘Some Thoughts on the Pleasures of Being a Re-Reader’, New York Times, May 30, 
2009’). Klinkenborg, she writes, claims ‘that the books he repeatedly rereads provide not a canon but a refuge. In 
other words, this special group matters to him not because he judges its members to be of particular merit but 
because its books supply a certain kind of emotional satisfaction’. Like me, Spacks is unconvinced by some of 
Klinkenborg’s terms: ‘[h]is manifest excitement at the role of the reader – always a stranger – suggests […] that his 




other than attempted ‘mastery of the entire literary field’. In other words, ‘the only way in which 
literature can “matter” for disciplinary purposes is as a total system, which in turn matters as a 
diagnostic instrument for the analysis of the total system of historical and cultural forces. By this 
stage in the discipline’s history, any other approach just “doesn’t make sense”’ (North, p. 114). 
 
North’s argument, then, generously sees Moretti as a brilliant, ‘genuine thinker’ who boldly 
extends our current paradigm to its implied conclusion. Having discarded both ‘criticism’ and the 
‘aesthetic’ ‘on the grounds that they are irredeemably Kantian, idealist, and New Critical, we have 
little reason to hang on to close reading – or even reading per se – at all’. In fact, hanging on to 
close reading in these circumstances is rather absurd, since 
 
we justify literary study by appealing to standards of scholarship – the production of 
knowledge, ideally of a scientific kind, about history and culture – but continue to use 
tools and concepts – close reading, as well as, residually, the aesthetic distinction between 
the canonical and the noncanonical – that were originally built for the very different task 
of criticism. (North, p. 115) 
 
All this is to say that it is not enough, by any means, to attempt to defend close reading (or 
should we simply call it reading?) by shearing it of its ‘New Critical’ associations and functions, 
as Gallop does, treating it as a methodological tool which can produce knowledge. We need, 
instead, a defence of close reading as a mode of literary study which is substantively different 
from scholarship, from the assumption that literary study exists to produce cultural, historical, or 
theoretical knowledge. North’s arguments are immensely insightful and useful to any attempt to 
create such a defence. But one less helpful turn he takes comes as he endorses Culler’s 
concluding sentiments in ‘The Closeness of Close Reading’, the supposition that we need ‘to 
propose explicit models’ of close reading (‘Closeness’, p. 24; see North, p. 106). We are not in 
need of ‘models’, even finer differentiation; we need a radically different spirit – recalling the 
arguments of my introduction – of literary study, to sit alongside the one which has now long 
predominated. And to begin to offer a contribution to the (re-)introduction of such a spirit into 
literary studies, and to properly defend close reading, we need to think further about the move 
beyond ‘New Criticism’ – and the move beyond criticism – which occurred in the middle parts 








Back to the ‘New Critics’ 
 
North’s reading of Moretti helps to explain one of the reasons for the lingering ‘presence’ of 
‘New Criticism’ to which we saw Mark Jancovich call attention. Why does Moretti, ‘in 2000 and 
then again in 2013’, write as if ‘positions of a New Critical kind are somehow still […] a potential 
threat to the discipline’? North argues that couching ‘what is really a turn to a scientistic model 
of scholarship’ in terms of a critique of ‘New Critical’ close reading (that ‘theological exercise’) 
enables Moretti to lend his argument ‘something of a leftist political valence, as a critique of the 
old idealisms’, despite the fact that the situation that had once allowed ‘New Criticism’ ‘to 
function as a significant form of conservatism has long since been replaced by a situation of a 
very different, and in many ways, quite opposite kind’. Moretti, in a move which ‘should make us 
uncomfortable’, uses the phantom threat of a long-dead ‘New Criticism’ to ensure that ‘data 
analysis comes to seem the proper materialist method’ (North, p. 113). ‘New Criticism’s’ ghost 
ensures that steps in the argument can be missed, and counter-arguments can be held at bay. 
 
This kind of move is widespread, part of the fabric of the discipline. ‘[M]uch of Moretti’s 
position’, argues North, is ‘actually laid out for us […] by the system of assumptions that gained 
ground with the scholarly turn of the late 1970s and early 1980s, and that is now the discipline’s 
paradigmatic mode’ (North, p. 113). North paints a picture of an academy whose dominant 
scholarly paradigm is held in place, and allowed to remain unchallenged, by the lingering ghost of 
‘New Criticism’, summoned ‘in brief excerpts and caricatured shorthand terms’.14 These 
assumptions remain buried to the extent that even those who are beginning to take issue with 
our prevailing paradigm can be found continuing to repeat their caricatured ‘New Critical’ 
disavowals. Rita Felski, for example, to whose The Limits of Critique (which I will discuss in my 
fourth chapter) aspects of the structure of this thesis are indebted, makes sure to state in that 
book that she has ‘no desire to reverse the clock and be teleported back to the good old days of 
New Critical chitchat about irony, paradox, and ambiguity’.15 The effect is to leave ‘criticism’ by 
the wayside: 
 
                                                        
14 Miranda Hickman, ‘Rereading the New Criticism’, in Hickman, pp. 1–21, p. 1. 
15 Rita Felski, The Limits of Critique (Chicago, 2015), p. 5. The ‘New Criticism’ is cast here as an ironic Arcadia, a land 
of vague platitude. That is, in fact, exactly the landscape which I. A. Richards saw himself as inventing practical 
criticism to change. A study of the contradictions of recent literary studies’ attitude to the ‘New Criticism’ could be 
usefully conducted through the lens of that word ‘chitchat’, which is exactly the word Richards uses to describe the 
way of doing criticism which he wants to move beyond (I. A. Richards, Practical Criticism: A Study of Literary Judgement 




the effect of the new critical co-opting of ‘close reading’, and the forgetting of the earlier 
history [that is, North’s first period, as discussed above], has been to motivate the 
widespread conviction that ‘critical’ and ‘aesthetic’ justifications for literary study must 
ultimately be rejected, since they can only be made in idealist terms of the kinds favoured 
by the New Criticism and cognate movements. (North, p. 28) 
 
We can see this in action in the thought of Steven Connor, who, in a piece of writing 
surrounding critique and its possible afterlives, begins with ‘the shift from criticism to critique’, 
describing how 
 
Terry Eagleton once gently mocked a certain kind of literary criticism as the practice of 
inscribing ‘could do better’ in the margins of literary texts, but that mode of criticism 
already seemed mistily antiquarian when I entered my own life of intellectual crime under 
Terry’s witty tutelage at Wadham College in 1973.16 
 
What Eagleton appears to be mocking here is a perceived ‘New Critical’ practice of making 
aesthetic judgements, not ‘criticism’, per se. And yet the apparently humorously-intentioned 
anecdote smooths over the distinction between ‘New Criticism’ and the project of criticism as a 
mode of literary study, with the result that ‘criticism’ can silently drop out of Connor’s article on 
the state of literary studies after its second page, just as it has dropped out of the collective 
consciousness of the academy. My questions here are these: to what extent are such anecdotal 
recollections of ‘New Criticism’ consistent with what the American ‘New Critics’ actually wrote, 
practised, and taught? and to what extent did the immediate move beyond ‘New Criticism’ 
actually differ from what came before, and to what extent might it have been exaggerated, 
resulting in the end of criticism and the dominance of scholarship? 
 
William J. Spurlin’s introduction to his and Michael Fischer’s 1995 re-examination of ‘New 
Criticism’ suggests that much of the polemical opposition to ‘New Criticism’ springs out of its 
institutionalised practice, and not its actual theory (a suggestion which would further help to 
account for the largely anecdotal character of ‘New Critical’ opposition). Spurlin claims that it 
was the ‘unreflective and monotonous application’ of some of ‘New Criticism’s’ valuable ‘methods 
and theoretical assumptions’ which resulted in the widespread opposition to ‘New Criticism’ 
which began in the mid-1960s. ‘But what these critiques often obscure is the much needed 
distinction between New Critical theory and its widespread institutionalised practice, the latter of 
which may have more to do with the reactions against the New Criticism’.17 It is evident, to 
                                                        
16 Steven Connor, ‘Decomposing the Humanities’, New Literary History, 47 (2016), 275–88, p. 275.  




Spurlin, that ‘the New Criticism has often been treated as a scapegoat’, enabling certain 
‘contemporary theorists’ to ‘exaggerate their own radicalism’ (Spurlin, p. xviii) – a different take 
to North’s argument, in which the invocation of ‘New Criticism’ enables Franco Moretti to play 
his own radicalism down. Calling on Paul de Man – whose attitude to the ‘New Criticism’ I’ll 
discuss further in a moment – Spurlin argues that ‘distancing oneself from one’s predecessors 
causes one to regress to them’; that repeated rejections of ‘New Criticism’ are in fact evidence of 
a continuity between those doing the rejecting and that which is rejected, since ‘“[t]he more 
radical the rejection of anything that came before”, de Man writes, “the greater the dependence 
on the past”’.18 This anticipates arguments which the likes of Rodolph Gasché and Paul A. Bové 
made at greater length: that there are key continuities between ‘New Criticism’ and its successors. 
I’ll come to discuss those soon. But even more valuable as a contribution to the ‘New Critical’ 
debate is Spurlin’s calling attention to three instances in the work of ‘New Critical’ writers which 
suggest counter-narratives to the ones usually proposed. A 1943 article by Robert Penn Warren 
is shown to contradict ‘popular assumptions that the New Critics simply assigned monologic 
readings and determinate meanings to poems’, as Warren is understood to be ‘admonishing 
reductive attempts to resolve thematic conflicts paradoxes, and ambiguities once and for all’. 
Spurlin then calls attention to a 1951 piece by Cleanth Brooks, in which he not only ‘intimates 
that the criticism the critic produces is not the definitive or final close reading of the text’, but 
also ‘points out that it is reductive to assume that the influence of the life history of the author or 
the responses of readers individually, collectively, or from different historical periods, must be 
disregarded completely’, in an apparent contradiction, or at least dilution, of the biographical and 
affective fallacies. Finally, Spurlin describes a 1978 article by René Wellek, which problematises 
the idea of ‘New Critical’ ahistoricism (as put forward, for example, in Gallop’s article on close 
reading) by questioning ‘the notion that because the New Critics rejected academic historical 
literary scholarship, this was at the same time a rejection of the historicity of literature’. The ‘New 
Critics’’ ‘focus on the text’ is also defended on the grounds that it is ‘a focus which is not to 
remove the text from social, political, or cultural contexts either in its production or reception, 
but is instead to study the complexity of detail and organisation in poetry which prevents its 
reduction to abstract propositions of “truths” thought to be conveyed straightforwardly to the 
reader’.19 
                                                        
18 Spurlin, p. xx, and Paul de Man, Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism, 2nd ed. 
(Minneapolis, 1983), p. 161, in Spurlin, p. xx. 
19 Spurlin, pp. xxii–xxiii. See, respectively, Robert Penn Warren, ‘Pure and Impure Poetry’, The Kenyon Review, 5.2 
(1943), 228–254; Cleanth Brooks, ‘My Credo – The Formalist Critics’, The Kenyon Review, 13.1 (1951), 72–81; René 
Wellek, ‘The New Criticism: Pro and Contra’, Critical Inquiry, 4.4 (1978), 611–24. See also Gallop, p. 181: ‘The time 




A similar case is made – albeit long after ‘New Criticism’s’ death – by Cleanth Brooks, in 
interview with Spurlin in 1993. Over and again the point is stressed: apparently dogmatic essays 
about paraphrase, intention, and reader response were more reactions to the practices which 
predominated at the time before the ‘New Critics’ rose to prominence in the American academy 
than dogmatic, set-in-stone commands. If the ‘New Critics’ didn’t write much about context, it 
was because everyone else was writing about context, and in such a way as to obscure or even 
ignore the text itself; the emphasis placed on attention to the text itself must be understood in 
these circumstances. It is an emphasis, Brooks seems to admit, which is an over-emphasis, but so 
it then needed to be.20 ‘I think’, says Brooks, ‘there is too much of an attempt to find as many 
things as possible wrong with this loose band of people we call the New Critics’ (Spurlin, p. 380). 
 
‘[L]oose band’ strikes an odd note, given the manner in which the ‘New Critics’ are consistently 
anecdotally invoked, as a coherent, authoritative unit. But if we go back to Murray Krieger, 
whose book The New Apologists for Poetry (1956) is often cited as the first full-length study of the 
‘New Criticism’, the phrase begins to sound a little more accurate. The ‘New Critics’, writes 
Krieger, ‘are commonly referred to as if they constituted a single and defined entity. This is an 
especially convenient device for those who want to issue a blanket condemnation of them’.21 
Many, as we shall see in a moment, are nonetheless happy to refer to Krieger’s book as the first 
step in defining ‘New Criticism’s’ single entity, despite this qualification. It is true, writes Krieger, 
that John Crowe Ransom coined the term, within his specific context, one amongst many others. 
Krieger cites Ferdinand Brunetière (1906), Ludwig Lewisohn (1919) and J. E. Spingarn (1910) as 
others who have used the phrase. A little later, Roland Barthes – it is not often remarked – 
himself wrote of ‘new criticism’ in 1966 to describe his own work and project, in which ‘the 
writer and the critic come together, working on the same difficult tasks and faced with the same 
object: language’.22 When it comes to Ransom’s use, Krieger is quick to point out that some 
‘New Critics’, ‘taking the cue, perhaps, from Allen Tate’, have ‘dismissed the existence of any 
such school’; others have liked the phrase, but ‘have no more succeeded in defining the term 
than have its attackers’. And Krieger even misses a step here: it is not altogether clear that 
                                                        
20 See ‘Afterword: An Interview with Cleanth Brooks’, in Spurlin, pp. 365–83. A summary of the point is made on p. 
371: ‘It is an oversimplification to assume, on the other hand, that just because the text is important, other things, 
such as context, social issues, history, the reader, the biography and intentions of the author, and so on, are not. It 
doesn’t follow that we can simply ignore these things in order to make the point that the text is important. At the 
time we were writing, the text was not getting the attention we thought it should be receiving’. 
21 Murray Krieger, The New Apologists for Poetry (Minneapolis, 1956), p. 4. 
22 Roland Barthes, Criticism and Truth, trans. Katrine Pilcher Keuneman (London, 1987), p. 64. For a discussion of 
this existence of ‘new criticism’ see Laurent Lesage, The French New Criticism: An Introduction and a Sampler (University 




Ransom’s The New Criticism, which, as Joseph North writes, ‘has proved a convenient and 
popular book for those looking to learn something about this particular phase in the history of 
the discipline’ (North, p. 40), is aiming to coin the term ‘New Criticism’, at least so styled, at all. 
Andrew DuBois draws our attention to how ‘the term “New Criticism” […] has been 
hypostatised into a capital-letter entity despite, for instance, appearing in that form in Ransom’s 
book only in the title’. ‘[D]espite the term’s constant use by Ransom’, DuBois suggests, ‘the 
manner of its usage does not necessarily announce its importance as terminology’; 
 
Its first occurrence comes, in fact, with a sideways caveat against generalising the practice 
of a range of writers under any single designation (the critic being discussed is R. P. 
Blackmur): ‘though he is distinct, and repels the tag of any common category, he is 
nevertheless a “new” critic in the sense of this book’.23 
 
North, meanwhile, observes that Ransom’s book, in devoting chapters to I. A. Richards (along 
with William Empson) and T. S. Eliot, has given many, particularly in the US, ‘the impression 
that the work of the early critical revolution was reasonably contiguous with that of the New 
Critics, rather than opposed to it in central respects’ (North, p. 40). From ‘New Criticism’s’ 
dubious inception as a term of classification, it was already being asked to define more than what 
by rights should ever have been possible. 
 
Even missing these close points about Ransom’s work, Krieger concludes his introductory 
discussion of the term by asking, ‘[i]s there such a thing, then, as “the new criticism”? Very likely 
there are no aesthetically meaningful defining qualities which allow us both to call a man a “new 
critic” and to include all those who have gone by that name’ (Krieger, pp. 4–5). Krieger thus 
continues his book with the recognition that his choice of ‘New Critical’ theories and writings 
has been made ‘somewhat arbitrarily’ (Krieger, p. 6). And yet, somehow, by the time Frank 
Lentricchia wrote his 1980 After the New Criticism, Krieger’s book is characterised as ‘definitive’, 
establishing ‘beyond much doubt a unifying effort’ common to all ‘New Critical’ writers.24 In 
reality, of course, Krieger’s Apology tells us in no uncertain terms that such an attempt to 
establish a unifying effort across the board will not and cannot work.  
                                                        
23 Andrew DuBois, ‘Close Reading: An Introduction’, in Close Reading: The Reader, ed. Frank Lentricchia and Andrew 
DuBois (Durham, 2003), pp. 1–40, p. 3. John Crowe Ransom, The New Criticism (Norfolk, CT, 1941), p. viii, in 
DuBois, p. 3. 
24 Frank Lentricchia, After the New Criticism (London, 1980), p. xiii. Lentricchia also cites Gerald Graff’s Poetic 
Statement and Critical Dogma (Evanston, 1970) as an authority for this ‘unifying effort’. While this is not wrong in the 
same way, he ignores Graff’s similar wariness of definition, who begins his study with the important caveat that 
while it ‘has sometimes been convenient to group a number of very different critics together when they were in 
agreement upon a certain issue[, this] should not be taken to suggest that there are no radical differences between 




Mark Jancovich, whose 1993 The Cultural Politics of the New Criticism is the most thorough attempt 
by a single author to call into question the academy’s prevailing ‘New Critical’ narrative, is 
initially somewhat more circumspect in Lentricchia’s regard, choosing to focus on his 
acknowledgement – made immediately before the declaration of a ‘unifying effort’ – that the 
‘New Criticism’ was ‘an inconsistent and somewhat confused movement’ (Lentricchia, pp. xii–
xiii; Jancovich, p. 3). And yet, while Lentricchia, for Jancovich, does ‘acknowledge real 
differences within the movement’, he ‘regards these as the result of a weakness of a lack of 
clarity, rather than the disagreements and discussions which are present in any critical discourse’. 
That is because ‘Lentricchia fails to acknowledge that the social organisation of the New 
Criticism was very different from that of contemporary criticism – at least in its early stages’: 
‘New Criticism’s’ social organisation was ‘largely that of an informal group’, which had only 
begun ‘to formalise itself in an attempt to reorganise the teaching of English in America’, 
whereas the mode of literary study which succeeded ‘New Criticism’ ‘is defined within specific 
institutional and theoretical structures which tend to make it far more monolithic’ (Jancovich, p. 
3). Judging it by the standards of his day, Lentricchia sees the ‘New Criticism’ as a unified 
movement which has simply failed to articulate itself coherently. In treating the ‘New Critics’ like 
this, as having a coherent project which they often struggled to define, Lentricchia is able to 
ignore crucial differences and discrepancies as outliers, failures to toe the party line. A party line 
which, of course, never properly existed, and has therefore been, at least partially, invented (it is 
‘interesting’, Jancovich rather slyly comments, ‘that Lentricchia never tackles the New Criticism 
itself’ (Jancovich, p. 4)). ‘Contemporary theorists’, writes Jancovich, ‘have often misrepresented 
the positions of the New Criticism’, a practice in which Lentricchia engages when he writes of an 
‘extremely subtle denial of history’ (Lentricchia, p. xiii); ‘while this denial’, Jancovich asserts, ‘is 
part of the legacy of the New Criticism, it is the result of a misrepresentation of the New 
Criticism and the way in which it defined literary activity’ (Jancovich, p. 4).  
 
The opening chapter of The Cultural Politics of the New Criticism proceeds, in a similar manner to 
Spurlin, to identify what Jancovich perceives to be many further misrepresentations of the ‘New 
Criticism’ of which its opponents have been guilty. ‘It is argued’, Jancovich writes, that ‘Wimsatt 
and Beardsley’s position’ in their intentional and affective fallacies, ‘which is close to that of 
Brooks and Warren in Understanding Poetry’, ‘regards the individual text as a fixed object which 
bears no relation to its conditions of production or consumption’, resulting in the assumption 
that the ‘New Critics’ claimed that ‘the literary critic should only be concerned with the 




object which was completely autonomous’; they ‘recognised that the production and 
consumption of texts were only moments within broader cultural processes’. ‘The text as such 
never exists as an independent object, but, as Wimsatt and Beardsley stress, it is always an ideal 
construction’, Jancovich concludes (Jancovich, p. 5). Despite this, opponents of the ‘New 
Criticism’ generally agreed that the ‘New Critics’ did see the text as an ‘objective, self-sufficient 
object’ (Jancovich, p. 5), though they differed in their understandings of what this position 
meant, and what might have been the problems with it. Some critics, the argument goes, went so 
far as to criticise the ‘New Criticism’ for a perceived denial of historical context, while also failing 
to ‘identify the autonomy of literary activity’, thereby damning it for simultaneously going too far 
and not going far enough. Jancovich relates how Terry Eagleton ‘is highly critical of those who 
see literature as a simple reflection or expression of either authorial intention or its social or 
historical context’, and, as a result, ‘repeats many of the theoretical manoeuvres which he 
criticizes in the New Criticism’ (Jancovich, p. 6). In moments like this, Jancovich is particularly 
successful at presenting the ‘New Criticism’ as the poorly understood ‘scapegoat’ which Spurlin 
describes. 
 
Jancovich also counters arguments that the ‘New Critics’ ‘adhere[d] to the principles of liberal 
humanism’, which say that ‘New Critical’ close reading saw the reader and the text as ‘stable and 
independent forms’: the reason the ‘New Critics’ saw literary education as important was that 
they recognised ‘that the process of reading was not natural’, and therefore that the ‘forms of 
reading produced by the rationalism of industrial capitalism’ needed to be challenged by 
alternative forms which would in turn ‘challenge the values of bourgeois society’. For Jancovich, 
this is a sign that the ‘New Critics’ were in fact opposed to the liberal humanism many supposed 
them to be in league with (Jancovich, pp. 5–6). Finally, Jancovich disputes the assumption that 
the ‘New Critics’ thought of the meaning of a text as fixed and knowable: 
 
The New Critics themselves were careful to stress that the ‘unity’ or ‘meaning’ of a text 
was a complex series of interrelations which required the reader to think through the 
issues, not accept or reject a specific conclusion. In fact, the New Critics’ references to 
‘the heresy of paraphrase’ – which are often seen as sealing the text off from its context – 
actually meant that the meaning of a text could never be resolved into a ‘univocal 
content’; that it was an endlessly productive process. (Jancovich, p. 10) 
 
The ultimate thrust of Jancovich’s argument is the claim that there are ‘similarities between the 
positions of the New Critics and those of the post-structuralists themselves’ (Jancovich, p. ix). 




Criticism’ sprang and springs out of its institutionalised practice, rather than its theory; that the 
break with the ‘New Criticism’ was as much the product of a power struggle within the 
American academy as a thorough reappraisal of prevailing modes of thinking. 
 
Back to the scholarly turn 
 
This is a line of thinking we can follow by returning to the work of Paul de Man, whose position 
in the American academy during the seventies and eighties served to place him right at the heart 
of ‘New Critical’ opposition. In a thorough discussion of the institutional struggles at Yale during 
the 1970s – onetime home both of many ‘New Critics’ (Wellek, Brooks, Wimsatt) and of 
deconstruction (de Man, Hartman, Miller, Bloom, Derrida (when in the US)) – Marc Redfield 
identifies de Man’s centrality to, even equivalence with ‘theory’: that at once highly specific and 
unfathomably broad word for the practices of writing and reading which came to replace those 
practices of reading and writing which became squeezed into the phrase ‘New Criticism’.25 
Redfield begins to explain this equivalence with reference to Jonathan Culler, who in Literary 
Theory: A Very Short Introduction ‘comments wryly that “theory” can often seem to mean little 
more than “a bunch of (mostly foreign) names; it means Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Luce 
Irigaray, Jacques Lacan, Judith Butler, Louis Althusser, Gayatari Spivak, for instance”’.26 
Personification plays an important role in theory, Redfield argues, as he comments upon ‘the 
identities routinely evoked by the theory canon’, arguing, through Amanda Anderson, that 
‘certain styles of thought have acquired character traits in argumentative practice in the American 
academy’, which are ‘discursive functions’ that ‘refer to the individual speaking as something’, 
and thus ‘compose the stylised attributes of a personification, operative within the polemical 
field of a certain kind of public discourse’ (Redfield, p. 50).27 Thus Redfield can cite with 
approval the 1993 account of John Guillory, who argued that the ‘immense symptomatic 
significance of the figure of de Man’ was confirmed by the earthquake which shook the critical 
profession in the wake of the revelation, in 1988 and ’89, of de Man’s wartime journalism; it 
                                                        
25 Redfield, in Theory at Yale: The Strange Case of Deconstruction in America (New York, 2016), identifies ‘at least three 
competing meanings to juggle’: ‘an explanatory hypothesis’; the narrower but still broad use of the term to refer to ‘a 
recognisable canon of texts, area of instruction, style of thought, and so on, mainly in literary and cultural fields’; the 
narrowest sense, ‘the hyperidiomatic use of the word that de Man signed […] where “theory”, pressed to the wall, 
turns into “deconstruction” and then, pressed harder, turns into “de Manian deconstruction”’ (Redfield, p. 7). I am 
indebted in this section to Redfield’s book, and to private correspondence with the author for which I wish to thank 
him and his generosity of scholarship. 
26 Jonathan Culler, Literary Theory: A Very Short Introduction (New York, 1997), p. 2, in Redfield, p. 49. 
27 Redfield refers here to Amanda Anderson, The Way We Argue Now (Princeton, 2006), p. 15. One of the reasons, 
Redfield argues, that personification plays such an important role in theory is the fact that it played such an 
important role in the work of de Man: ‘arguably’, he writes, de Man ‘came to personify “theory” because his theory 




‘would not have been necessary for so many theorists and antitheorists, de Manians and anti-de 
Manians, to “respond” to these revelations if theory itself were not perceived to be implicated in 
the figure of de Man’.28 
 
My argument here is that, just as Spurlin thought opposition to the ‘New Critics’ had been the 
result more of ‘New Criticism’s’ institutional practice than its actual, disparate body of work, so 
allegiance to de Man – to ‘theory’ – might be understood just as much as an allegiance to a new 
institutional practice which was replacing the old, as to one specific set of theoretical tenets 
replacing another. That Yale, where ‘eager junior faculty’ introduced the textbook Understanding 
Poetry into undergraduate classes in 1939, and which Brooks joined as a faculty member himself 
in 1947 (Redfield, pp. 199–200), was at the centre of the institutional shift from ‘New Criticism’ 
to ‘theory’ certainly serves as evidence of a thoroughly practical struggle within the institution. 
We might also consider the landmark anthology Deconstruction and Criticism, whose motley 
collection of critical views was ultimately bound together more by the fact that it contained a 
group of young critics doing various things in a different manner to the older, established 
hierarchy than by a unified theory (exactly, we might notice, how Cleanth Brooks described the 
arrival of the ‘New Critics’ on the institutional scene).29 ‘What Harold Bloom is doing in this 
book’, wrote Denis Donoghue, ‘I have no idea; he is not a deconstructor. A rabbi, a prophet, he 
would never let himself be shamed out of the language of self, presence, and voice’.30 But the 
best test of this argument is to turn to de Man’s responses to ‘New Criticism’, which could often 
be fond and sympathetic. Here he is, in The Resistance to Theory, on Reuben Brower: 
 
Brower […] believed in and objectively conveyed what appears to be an entirely 
innocuous and pragmatic precept founded on Richards’s ‘practical criticism’. Students, as 
they began to write on the writings of others, were not to say anything that was not 
derived from the text they were considering. They were not to make any statements that 
they could not support by a specific use of language that actually occurred in the text. 
They were asked, in other words, to begin by reading texts closely as texts and not to 
move at once into the general context of human experience or history. Much more 
humbly or modestly, they were to start out from the bafflement that such singular turns 
of tone, phrase, and figure were bound to produce in readers attentive enough to notice 
them and honest enough not to hide their non-understanding behind the screen of 
received ideas that often passes, in literary instruction, for humanistic knowledge.31 
                                                        
28 John Guillory, Cultural Capital: The Problem of Literary Canon Formation (Chicago, 1993), p. 178, in Redfield, p. 53. 
Redfield also cites Jeffrey Williams: ‘It seems to me, more than any other figure, ‘de Man’ has become a synecdochal 
figure for theory and its stakes these past fifteen years’; ‘The Shadow of de Man’, South Central Review, 11.1 (1994), 
44–55, p. 44, in Redfield, p. 214.  
29 See Deconstruction and Criticism, ed. Harold Bloom (London, 1979). 
30 Denis Donoghue, ‘Deconstructing Deconstruction’, New York Review of Books, June 12, 1980, in Redfield, p. 34. 




Heather Love’s arguments about an affinity between ‘New Criticism’ and ‘humanist philosophy’ 
would be troubled by that final sentence, which rightly positions Brower’s pedagogy, partially 
inspired by that of Richards (though de Man misses North’s arguments about ‘New Critical’ co-
opting of Richards’s methods), as a response to, and not mired in, older methods of humanistic 
instruction. Indeed, rather than positioning the ‘New Critics’ in the kind of ancient Eden which 
characterises much of the rhetoric of self-proclaimed champions of ‘Theory’ writing against pre- 
or anti-theorists, De Man’s attitude to ‘New Critical’ writers sees them occupy a more realistic 
middle ground. T. S. Eliot, labelled the ‘perfect embodiment of the New Criticism […] in many 
respects’ (reinforcing, of course, the fact that a lack of interest in, or confusion with regard to the 
historical definition of ‘New Criticism’ has long held sway over American understandings of the 
term), finds himself characterised by de Man as ‘a combination of original talent, traditional 
learning, verbal wit and moral earnestness, an Anglo-American blend of intellectual gentility not 
so repressed as not to afford tantalising glimpses of darker psychic and political depths, but 
without breaking the surface of an ambivalent decorum that has its own complacencies and 
seductions’ (De Man, p. 6). In the main, then, de Man saw the ‘New Critics’ as on the right track, 
but ultimately blind to their own insights.32 Such is the position of Paul A. Bové, for whom ‘[d]e 
Man’s particular contribution is to accuse the New Critics of failing to transfer the practico-
semantic knowledge produced by their techniques and readings to the theoretical or syntactic 
level’. He nonetheless preserves ‘both the theoretical and practical insights – totalization and 
irony – of the New Critics’, ‘remaking’ – not rejecting – the ‘New Critical’ programme.33  
 
The combination of the impossibility of a proper working definition of ‘New Criticism’, the 
fertile times for polemic amidst a radical institutional shift, and de Man’s sympathetic attitude 
towards the practices of close, slow, and attentive reading propagated by many of those labelled 
as ‘New Critics’, led to something which might strike us now as rather preposterous: the labelling 
in turn of de Man as just another ‘New Critic’.34 Rodolph Gasché lambasted ‘some of the Newer 
Critics – the so-called deconstructive critics’ in 1979, on the grounds that American 
deconstruction ‘contributes more to prolonging the impasses of traditional academic criticism 
                                                        
32 See also Paul de Man, ‘Form and Intent in the American New Criticism’, in Blindness and Insight, pp. 20–35.  
33 Paul A. Bové, ‘Variations on Authority: Some Deconstructive Transformations of the New Criticism’, in The Yale 
Critics: Deconstruction in America, ed. Jonathan Arac, Wlad Godzich, Wallace Martin (Minneapolis, 1983), pp. 3–19, pp. 
10, 11. Bové sees further proof of this ‘in the way the practice of certain deconstructive essays echoes the formalist 
paradigm’, going on to discuss how J. Hillis Miller’s ‘Ariachne’s Broken Woof’ ‘illustrate[s] the reformation of the 
New Critics’ practice and the form and shape of their essays’ (Bové, p. 11). 
34 Asked about the (relative) success of Derrida in an interview transcribed in The Resistance to Theory, de Man 
suggests that that success was in part due to American students and teachers being better prepared for Derrida’s 




than to opening up new areas of research’.35 Really, thinks Gasché, deconstruction in America is 
just more formalism, expressed in new terms; ‘[a]part from this rhetoric there is no trace of what 
Bachelard called [anticipating Jonathan Culler’s use of the word in Theory of the Lyric] an 
epistemological break’ (Gasché, p. 178). American deconstructive critics have misunderstood  
 
the notion of deconstruction. It is precisely this misinterpretation that makes its 
accommodation by American criticism possible, and, by the same token, transforms it 
into a mechanical exercise similar to academic thematism or formalism. […] 
Deconstruction is not what is asserted by positive definitions in Newer Criticism. Here 
deconstruction is said to represent the moment where in a text the argument begins to 
undermine itself; or, in accordance with Jakobson’s notion of the poetic and aesthetic 
function, the relation of a message of communication to itself that, thus, becomes its 
own object; or, finally, the self-revelation and indication by the text of its own principles 
of organisation and operation. (Gasché, pp. 178, 180) 
 
Gasché argues that such positive definitions reveal deconstructionist critics – his ‘Newer Critics’ 
– to be merely continuing ‘the claim of American formalism to a totalising principle’, 
‘reconfirm[ing …] the idea of textual unity’. Thus ‘[m]odern deconstructive criticism [is] a 
faithful offspring of New Criticism’ (Gasché, p. 182). 
 
Gasché was by no means alone in his questioning of American deconstruction’s newness to the 
literary scene. Paul A. Bové, in a 1983 chapter we have already encountered, summarised many 
similar views. Gerald Graff, in Bové’s words, asserted in 1979 that ‘deconstruction [was] the heir 
of earlier Modernist formalisms’, while Jonathan Arac identified ‘the New Critical and 
deconstructive fascination with Coleridge, rather than Shelley, as a mark of their common 
genealogy’.36 W. V. Spanos, meanwhile, ‘produced a cumulative indictment of the New Critical-
structuralist-poststructuralist hegemony’, naming ‘the deconstructors the true heirs of the 
Modernist critical aesthetes’ (Bové, p. 4): 
 
The deconstructive reader, like the New Critic […] becomes a distanced observer of the 
‘scene of textuality’ or, in Kierkegaard’s term, an aesthete who perceives the text from 
the infinitely negative distance of the ironic mode. With his levelling gaze, he, too, like 
his adversaries, refines all writing, in Derrida’s own phrase, into ‘free-floating’ texts. All 
texts thus become the same text.37 
                                                        
35 Rodolphe Gasché, ‘Deconstruction as Criticism’, Glyph, 6 (Baltimore, 1979), 177–215, p. 177.  
36 Bové, pp. 3, 4. See Gerald Graff, Literature Against Itself (Chicago, 1979), and Jonathan Arac, ‘Repetition and 
Exclusion: Coleridge and New Criticism Reconsidered’, boundary 2, 8.1 (1979), 261–74. It is, of course, awkward for 
Arac that all of the essays in Deconstruction and Criticism were to be on Shelley (though as we have seen, the positions 
put forward in that anthology were highly disparate).  





Bové himself sees Spanos’s assertion ‘of the identity of New Critic and deconstructor’ as 
‘perhaps too unqualified’ (Bové, p. 7); at the same time, he doesn’t think de Man goes far enough 
in his ‘New Critical’ praise. The ‘most remarkable feature’ of de Man’s ‘Form and Intent in the 
American New Criticism’ is ‘its intentional forgetting of New Critical moments of de Manian 
insight. It is precisely such forgetting in such a formidable scholar and critic as de Man which 
indicates that a transformational struggle is going on’ (Bové, p. 9). To demonstrate this, Bové 
takes as example a moment from Cleanth Brooks’s ‘The Heresy of Paraphrase’, in which 
‘[s]uddenly [Brooks] suggests that the allegory of [critical] closure cannot be sustained, for the 
critical text is itself metaphorised and destabilised as it tries to be more “adequate” to the poem, 
that is, as it tries to close off its metaphorical play’. Here is Brooks: 
 
As [the critic’s] proposition approaches adequacy, he will find, not only that it has 
increased greatly in length, but that it has begun to fill itself up with reservations and 
qualifications – and most significant of all – the formulator will find that he has himself 
begun to fall back upon metaphors of his own in his attempt to indicate what the poem 
‘says’. In sum, his proposition, as it approaches adequacy, ceases to be a proposition.38 
 
What this passage testifies to, asserts Bové, is ‘Brooks’s sense that the attempt to close the poem 
in the discursive language of heretical but inescapable paraphrase throws the critic into the 
dialogue of understanding’ (Bové, pp. 9–10) which Paul de Man describes in Blindness and 
Insight.39 ‘The most amazing thing about this passage’, writes Bové, ‘is that it self-consciously 
announces the instability of the New Critical project in one of the most dogmatic essays of that 
school’ (Bové, p. 10). 
 
Bové rightly concedes that ‘[a] criticism which sees no differences between deconstruction and 
its predecessors is naïve and does a disservice to our self-understanding’ (Bové, p. 18); 
nonetheless, he is at pains to stress the institutional impossibility of seeing too many similarities: 
‘[t]o accept […] the identity of New Critic and deconstructor is impossible for the academy so 
long as it sustains its own power structure by waging these endless battles between civilisation 
and chaos, or, in the latest version, between man and language’ (Bové, p. 7). It is this emphasis 
on deconstruction’s institutional role with which Bové’s essay ends: 
 
                                                        
38 Cleanth Brooks, The Well Wrought Urn: Studies in the Structure of Poetry (New York, 1947), p. 198, in Bové, p. 9. This 
speaks to the discussion of William Empson’s critical practice in my fourth chapter. 
39 The ‘dialogue between work and interpreter is endless’; ‘[w]henever the circle seems to close, one has merely 
ascended or descended one more step on Mallarmé’s “spirale vertigineuse consequent”’: Paul de Man, Blindness and 




It is the quintessence of deconstruction that it responds to the decline of academic 
literary criticism by inscribing within the academy a project for preservation. The 
repetitiveness of deconstruction [because there can be no final reading] is an institutional 
necessity. (Bové, p. 17) 
 
Bové’s account testifies to the fact that what holds apart our conceptions of ‘New Criticism’ and 
what succeeded it is as much of institutional as of theoretical character. Differences, the 
implication is, were exaggerated. Taking place amidst a sea of polemic, the institutional break of 
the 1970s swept along, and like the breaking of a great wave left calm in its wake. We may have 
cast on shore more than we needed or intended to. Certain principles and practices were 
disposed of, perhaps, without proper thought. Wittgenstein describes something like this process 
in a remark in Culture and Value: 
 
At present we are combatting a trend. But this trend will die out, superseded by others. 
And then people will no longer understand our arguments against it; will not see why all 
that needed saying. (CV, p. 49e) 
 
Hastening along the death of a trend involves only creating a viable ‘other’. And if ‘people will 
no longer understand our arguments against’ the old trend once the new one has taken hold, 
what need is there to argue against it at all? All that doesn’t need saying. The time is ripe, I think, 
for us to do better to remember; to cast aside our hostile or patronising ‘New Critical’ anecdotes 
and replace them with more thorough-going investigation of the kind found in the collections of 
Spurlin and Fischer, and Hickman and McIntyre. We need to think further about what was 
actually said, and said well, and what was collateral damage in our desire to rid ourselves of the 
old and ring in the new. This chapter has attempted to explore some of the many ways in which 
our understanding of ‘New Criticism’ is in need of re-examination, as a means of pre-empting 
the possibility that the radical understanding of exemplarity this thesis is arguing for might find 
itself subsumed into our largely unconscious attitudes towards the perceived threat of the ‘New 
Criticism’, and thus rejected. More scholarship, and criticism, is needed on this subject, if we are 
to move forward without such unconscious biases. We need a much fuller picture of everything 
we threw out with the ‘New Criticism’, as part of the development of a much fuller picture of 
how we want to do literary study now. 
 
One moment of polemic 
 
I want to end by examining one example of a piece of criticism in which theoretical differences 




poetry and literature. My argument will be that the force of the anti-‘New Critical’ wave which 
was surging through the academy at the time of its composition and publication enabled its 
author to skip crucial steps in his argument which went unexamined. The author is Jonathan 
Culler, the work Structuralist Poetics, specifically the chapter entitled ‘The Poetics of the Lyric’, and 
the assumptions are 1) that literature bears no qualitative difference to other categories of writing 
or culture, 2) that all reading of poetry is based on an implicit theory, and 3) that interpretation, 
as a means of understanding poetry, is a game which should ultimately be rejected. It’s a 
particularly useful example, I think, because it helps us to think both about the work the 
rejection of ‘New Criticism’ did during the upheaval at the start of the second half of the 
twentieth century, and the work it still does now (Culler, as we shall see in chapter three, remains 
intent on lessening the role which interpretation plays in our study of poetry, and uses the ‘New 
Criticism’ to facilitate his attempt to convince us).40 It also helps us to think further about 
Culler’s practice of exemplarity, thinking which will be continued in my next chapter as we 
consider ‘Apostrophe’, the essay which Culler himself locates as marking his ‘New Critical’ 
break. For we are about to be presented with an example of poetry which is not a poem. My 
subtitle is consciously ambiguous: Culler’s writing is polemical and so, here, is mine. We need, 
predominantly, patient and forensic examination of our ‘New Critical’ rejection which is 
impartial, but there should also be a space for polemic, which can play an important role in 
shocking us out of our assumptions, a prelude to clearer and less involved analysis. 
 
Here, then, is Culler, at length, setting in motion its warding off of interpretation with one 
especially well-chosen example: 
 
If one takes a piece of banal journalistic prose and sets it down on a page as a lyric poem, 
surrounded by intimidating margins of silence, the words remain the same but their 
effects for readers are substantially altered.1 
 
  Hier sur la Nationale sept 
  Une automobile 
  Roulant à cent à l’heure s’est jetée 
  Sur un platane 
  Ses quatre occupants ont été 
  Tués. 
 
(Yesterday on the A7 an automobile travelling at sixty miles per hour crashed 
into a plane tree. Its four occupants were killed.) 
                                                        
40 Theory of the Lyric describes 1975’s Structuralist Poetics as having urged ‘that literary study should [not] be devoted 
[…] to developing new and more intricate interpretations of literary works’ (Culler, Theory, p. viii), and wants to 




To write this as a poem brings into play a new set of expectations, a set of conventions 
determining how the sequence is to be read and what kind of interpretations may be 
derived from it. The fait divers becomes a minor but exemplary tragedy. ‘Hier’, for 
example, takes on a completely different force: referring now to the set of possible 
yesterdays it suggests a common, almost random event. One is likely to give new weight 
to the wilfulness of ‘s’est jetée’ (literally, ‘threw itself’) and to the passivity of ‘its 
occupants’, defined in relation to their automobile. The lack of detail or explanation 
connotes a certain absurdity, and the neutral reportorial style will no doubt be read as 
restraint and resignation. We might even note an element of suspense after ‘s’est jetée’ 
and discover bathos in the possible pun on ‘platane’ (‘plat’ = flat) and on the finality of 
the isolated ‘tués’. 
This is clearly different from the way in which journalistic prose is interpreted, and those 
differences can only be explained by the expectations with which one approaches lyric 
poetry, the conventions which govern its possible modes of signification: the poem is 
atemporal (hence the new force of ‘hier’); it is complete in itself (hence the significance 
of the absence of explanation); it should cohere at a symbolic level (hence the 
reinterpretation of ‘s’est jetée’ and ‘ses occupants’); it expresses an attitude (hence the 
interest in tone as deliberate posture); its typographic arrangements can be given spatial 
or temporal interpretations (‘suspense’ or ‘isolation’). When one reads the text as a poem 
new effects become possible because the conventions of the genre produce a new range 
of signs. 
These interpretative operations are not in any sense structuralist; they are very much 
those which readers and critics apply with greater subtlety to poems of greater 
complexity. But the crudity of the example has the virtue of emphasising the extent to 
which the reading and interpreting of poems is based on an implicit theory of the lyric. 
‘Do not forget’, writes Wittgenstein, ‘that a poem, even though it is composed in the 
language of information, is used in the language-game of giving information’ [Zettel 
(Oxford, 1967), p. 28]. But remembering this is scarcely sufficient; one must enquire 
what is the nature of the language-game in question. (Structuralist Poetics, pp. 188–9) 
 
So begins Structuralist Poetics’ chapter on ‘The Poetics of the Lyric’, with a parody of ‘New 
Criticism’, a reductio ad absurdum of the way critics were then writing critical prose. Its aim, in its 
superior self-consciousness, is to bring us on-side, to join its revolution, or to jump in its 
bandwagon.41 These are powerful paragraphs, designed to persuade, based on a truth which is 
subtly exaggerated to the point where we find ourselves witnessing some kind of magician’s 
trick. We begin with the bringing on-side of the reputable theorist: a footnote (that quoted 1 
which went nowhere) to Gérard Genette’s Figures, which serves as some authority for the 
importance of an attitude de lecture (the attitude we bring to a text as readers), but not to the all-
consuming extent to which Culler stretches it. The essay in question is ‘Langage poétique, 
poétique du langage’, which sees Genette offer an extended response to the theory of poetry (as 
                                                        
41 I am echoing Frank Kermode’s confusion in a 1980 essay as to whether the advent of literary theory was a 
‘revolution’, or a ‘bandwagon’, as he labels it ten lines later, having apparently forgotten his use of the earlier word. 
See ‘Figures in the carpet: on recent theories of narrative discourse’, p. 291, in Comparative Criticism: A Yearbook, ed. 
E. S. Shaffer (Cambridge, 1980), vol. 2, pp. 291–301 (Christopher Ricks also calls attention to this moment in 
‘Literary principles as against theory’, p. 316). It’s a confusion which well encapsulates many of the moves which 




‘un écart [gap] par rapport à une norme’, a deviation from a norm) put forward by Jean Cohen in 
Structure du langage poétique (1966).42 The majority of his essay is taken up by a re-consideration of 
Cohen’s idea with much reference to Mallarmé, through whom Genette proposes with authority 
that ‘loin de s’écarter du langage, elle [la poésie] s’établit et s’accomplit à son défaut. En ce défaut, 
précisément, qui le constitue’ (far from departing from language, poetry is established and 
reaches fulfilment in language’s falling short. In that falling short, precisely, which constitutes 
language).43 There is much more of a place here for a combination of authorial technique and 
readerly attention than Culler is prepared to emphasise. Genette writes that ‘l’essentiel de la 
motivation poétique […] est dans l’attitude de lecture que le poème réussit (ou, plus souvent, 
échoue) à imposer au lecteur’ (the essence of poetic motivation is in the attitude of reading 
which the poem manages (or, more often, fails) to impose on the reader; Genette, p. 150). The 
success or failure of the poem to impose the kind of lyric attention about which Culler writes is 
crucially overlooked in his discussion, which sees criticism as a one-sided game in which the 
poem is not allowed to take part (it makes no qualitative difference whether we discuss a piece of 
chopped-up prose, or a Shakespeare sonnet; both can be poems if we read them as such, and the 
latter is simply a ‘poem […] of greater complexity’). Indeed, the notion that ‘the true structure or 
state of poetry’ lies primarily in readerly attention (Structuralist Poetics, p. 192), the only moment 
from Genette’s essay that Culler quotes, is given a disproportionate weight that is 
unrepresentative of Genette’s overall argument. Genette’s hypothesis arrives three pages before 
his essay’s conclusion, an afterthought in a piece which has dwelt at length on the kinds and 
successes of poetic artifice.  
 
Writing out Culler’s translation as poem, forgetting the French, will help us to see further the 
mechanics of his stretching of Genette’s brief statement: 
 
 Yesterday on the A7  
An automobile  
Travelling at sixty miles per hour crashed  
Into a plane tree.  
Its four occupants were  
                                                        
42 Gérard Genette, Figures II (Paris, 1969), p. 127. The essay runs from pp. 123–53. Very briefly, Cohen’s idea is that 
poetry is an ‘infraction’, and thus ‘[l]a poésie n’est pas pour nous de la prose plus quelque chose. Elle est de 
l’antiprose’ (poetry, for us, is not prose plus something. It is antiprose); Jean Cohen, Structure du langage poétique (Paris, 
1966), p. 51. Genette thinks this argument ultimately falls down on the grounds that Cohen is left with no answer to 
the question, ‘tout style est-il poésie’ (is all style poetry?; Genette, p. 140).  
43 Genette, p. 143; he borrows ‘le défaut’ (falling short) from a passage of Mallarmé’s which he quotes on the next 
page. Verse ‘philosophiquement rémunère le défaut des langues, complément supérieur’ (philosophically makes up 
for the falling short of languages, is their superior complement); Stéphane Mallarmé, Œuvres complètes (Paris, 1945), p. 






At once this looks a lot more – to an English or American reader with a level of French 
somewhere on a scale from the non-existent to the competently rudimentary – like chopped-up 
prose. Poems must do work to engender in us the form and extent of attention we bring to 
them, as Genette made clear. Culler’s French experiment, in setting the majority of English-
speaking readers outside of its comfort zone, allows itself to bypass this step: the poem sounds 
melodic because of its foreignness, because French is a language in which accidental coincidence 
of sound is more common than in English (so we get the rhyme of ‘jetée’ and ‘été’). Conducting 
the language experiment in a foreign language also enables another move which is crucial to 
Culler’s hypothetical, mock interpretation: the inclusion of ‘s’est jetée’. Even the relatively 
competent non-native French speaker may have little idea whether or not this is a common 
deployment of this verb, and give it the benefit of the doubt. It is, in fact, a stretched 
metaphorical usage not quite of the kind one would expect to find in a ‘piece of banal 
journalistic prose’, often used to describe plunging oneself into the sea, drowning, but not used 
uncomplicatedly of a car throwing itself into a tree. It is no equivalent of ‘crashed’. So Culler’s 
point about ‘wilfulness’ is made possible only by an example of a word being used much too 
‘poetically’ for a piece of standard newspaper prose. (Something similar could be said of 
‘platane’, which enables Culler to make a hypothetical point about ‘bathos’: specifying the species 
of tree does not feel particularly consistent with the prose piece’s banality.) 
 
We might, then, begin to wonder whether this is in fact a real piece of journalistic prose at all. 
No reference is provided. The sentences seem too long and specific for a headline, too sparse for 
the body of a column (what time yesterday? where on the A7? who were the occupants?). A 
subheading or lead paragraph, then; but these are hardly sentences which grab their reader and 
invite her to read on, and they still feel too long, too detailed, too syntactically complex even for 
a subheading. Instead, these two sentences feel as if they make up a self-contained unit, a kind of 
distillation or caricature of various individual forms and genres of newspaper prose. And thus we 
start to feel that this has been an example invented, conjured to give it the best possible chance 
of supporting a theoretical point (one of which, indeed, is that a poem ‘is complete in itself’). It 
is not really an example of ‘banal journalistic prose’ at all; it is not banal but peculiar and 
intriguing, one which lends itself particularly suitably to being converted into a six-line poem. 
And turning to Genette, and through him to Cohen, confirms this feeling. This is an ‘exemple 





Evidemment, ce n’est pas de la poésie. Ce qui montre bien que le procédé à lui tout seul, 
sans le secours des autres figures, est incapable d’en fabriquer. Mais, affirmons-le, ce n’est 
déjà plus de la prose. Les mots s’animent, le courant passe, comme si la phrase, par la 
seule vertu de son découpage aberrant, était prés de se réveiller de son sommeil 
prosaïque. (Cohen, pp. 76–7) 
 
Clearly, this is not poetry. What it demonstrates is that this process all by itself [of 
inserting line breaks], without the aid of other figures, is not capable of manufacturing it. 
But, we assert, it is not prose any more. The words come to life, a current passes 
between them, as if the sentence, by the sole virtue of its abnormal divisions, was about 
to awake from its prosaic sleep. 
 
For Cohen, chopping up a line of prose turns it not into a poem, but something which has 
become charged in such a way as to move beyond prose. This is a much more sober point than 
the one in the service of which Culler borrows and distorts Cohen’s example: that setting a piece 
of prose out as ‘a lyric poem’ turns it easily into a lyric poem by virtue of the attention we now 
bring to it.  
 
Cohen’s example finds itself stretched to breaking point, and it is the passage from French into 
English which allows the stretching. If ‘the crudity of the example has the virtue of emphasising 
the extent to which the reading and interpreting of poems is based on an implicit theory of the 
lyric’, it has the vice – if we pause to attend properly – of pulling the rug from out beneath the 
whole operation’s feet. And changing the example to something less ‘crude’ – that is, designed to 
serve as an apt example of the point its creator is trying to make, the kind of example that is a 
general conception’s disposable slave – would lessen the vice but also the virtue: it would no 
longer be so clear that we read and interpret poems based on an implicit theory of lyric, nor what 
that theory might be. These paragraphs work by reducing the interpretation of poems to a 
flippant game (what Wittgenstein is doing here is quite unclear: is he being quoted to legitimise 
the notion of games to poems and literary study, or has he been misunderstood?); they ignore 
both the serious craft and artifice of poems and the serious craft and artifice of critics. The 
polemical narrative is this: you may not know you’re playing a game, but you are, and the way to 
be a serious critic is to rise above it, to get on board with this alternative of non-interpretative 
contemplation. There is no room for subtlety: ‘let us make sure we consider the mode of 
attention we pay to a poem as being of great importance to how we might seek to interpret it’, 
for instance. The drive to have done with previous modes of reading precludes that possibility as 
it squeezes nuance out of the discussion. Nuance, and the poem: for what is beginning to get lost 
as Culler deploys something that is evidently not a poem as an example which can comfortably 




beginning which sees its fulfilment in the work of Moretti, in which reading of any kind is 
rejected as a viable scholarly method. Whether or not we agree with the likes of Spurlin and 
Jancovich that the ‘New Critics’ were heavily misrepresented, that their disparate project held 
room both for the particular and for cultural and historical structures, or whether we instead side 
with North’s less charitable reading of a practice mired in outmoded Kantian aesthetics 
(nevertheless preceded by much more reputable modes of reading which have become mired for 
us as a result of ‘New Critical’ co-opting), it is clear from Culler’s account here that attention to 
the particular is beginning to slip out of the discussion, and attention to cultural and historical 
structures – where the poetic becomes subsumed within the cultural – is beginning to dominate. 
My next chapter, on and responding to Culler’s ‘Apostrophe’, will explore this move with more 
precise attention to what is lost when we allow examples of poetry to become subdued by a 
general conception or structure of the poetic (‘apostrophe’, for Culler, I will argue, is essentially a 
stand-in for the ‘poetic’). My third will explore the influence of Jacques Derrida’s ‘Che cos’é la 
poesia’ on the main argument of Theory of the Lyric: a piece which pronounces on poetry without 




Chapter two: apostrophe 
 
Introduction: the reason for the return 
 
While Structuralist Poetics was ‘urging that literary study should [not] be devoted […] to developing 
new and more intricate interpretations of literary works’, Jonathan Culler’s essay, ‘Apostrophe’, 
was taking shape, ready ‘to explore the [hitherto ignored] most unsettling and intriguing aspects 
of lyric language and the different sorts of seductive effects that lyric may achieve’, having 
unmoored itself from the ‘New Critical assumption that poems exist to be interpreted’ (Culler, 
Theory, p. viii). Such is the narrative which Culler provides in a brief preface to Theory of the Lyric: 
the overturning of the centrality of interpretation to literary study, combined with a focus on a 
central aspect of poetry which the previous manner of criticism missed, led to a ‘break’ with the 
old (‘New Critical’) way of doing things, and the introduction of a new one. The fulfilment of 
that new manner of criticism is what we are reading now, forty years later. You would not be 
alone if you were to find this narrative curiously protracted. The idea that, forty years after the 
rejection of a method and its replacement by a new one, we are only now seeing the fulfilment of 
the replacement, suggests that something might be a little amiss. Here is the second paragraph of 
Culler’s preface, in full: 
 
In 1975 I wrote an essay on the figure of apostrophe, in which I argued that this strange 
habit of address was central to the lyric tradition – the epitome of everything most daring 
and potentially embarrassing in lyric. That essay, the seed from which this project 
eventually developed, was a break with my own training in the New Criticism, where 
close attention to the language of literary works focused on elements that most 
contribute to a complex interpretation of the poem, and where, since questions of tone 
were extremely important – ‘What is the speaker’s tone of voice here?’ – apostrophes 
were neglected: they are so distinctly poetic, so unlike ordinary speech or meditation, that 
they do not help identify a tone recognisable from our usual experience.1 Apostrophes 
are set aside or, at best, treated as conventional marks of emotional intensity, but there 
they are, in the poems. What do they tell us? (Culler, Theory, pp. vii–viii) 
 
This apparently simple, conversational piece of prose soon reveals itself, on closer inspection, to 
be full of oddities. We might wonder, first, at the discrepancy between the description of 
‘Apostrophe’ as an essentially game-changing essay – one which re-orientated the centre of the 
lyric tradition, and provided a radically new insight into the very heart of lyric’s most unsettling 
effects – and as a humble ‘seed’, one which announced a break not with the ‘New Criticism’ per 
                                                        




se, but only with the author’s own ‘training’ in it. ‘Apostrophe’s’ ambitions, in reality, were much 
more closely aligned with the former: it perceives itself to be making a very substantial break 
with the ‘New Criticism’, under the guise of ‘[c]lassic essays’, which, it claims, have not just 
ignored, but ‘systematically repressed or excluded’ apostrophe.2 Indeed, the essay even 
conjectures that one might be justified in ‘seeking to identify apostrophe with lyric itself’ (Culler, 
‘Apostrophe’, p. 60), suggesting – though this is not stated explicitly – that criticism prior to 
Culler has been excluding not just apostrophe, but what is most lyric about lyric poetry itself; 
even, simply, that previous lyric criticism hasn’t really been talking about ‘lyric’ at all. As soon as 
we are past the first ‘where’, which feels syntactically as if it should be referring to ‘training’, it is 
clear that the passage does remember the extent of this ‘break’ after all, as the description offered 
is one not of that training, but of what Culler feels to be, or to have been, ‘New Critical’ practice 
on the largest possible scale. But it is the uncertainty in my phrase, ‘to be, or to have been’, 
which points towards the strangest moment in this passage. Pay close attention to the workings 
of tense in its final three sentences. We are given a description of how apostrophes ‘were 
neglected’ by ‘New Criticism’, before, justifiably, the prose melts into the present as it seeks to 
state a reason (with which, with the help of Alan Richardson, I’ll soon disagree) for that absence, 
a reason inherent to apostrophes which will continue to be the case: ‘they are so distinctly poetic’. 
We are in the present here because the passage is talking about an aspect of apostrophe which, 
so it thinks, was, is, and always will be the case. We’d expect, then, as the prose shifts back to a 
description of historical ‘New Critical’ practice, for the tense to return to the past: that is the still-
present reason why apostrophes were ignored. But instead, we read this: ‘Apostrophes are set 
aside’. Now this is very odd indeed. The ‘New Criticism’ is, in all practical and institutional 
senses, long dead; apostrophe now constitutes a significant area of lyric scholarship, indeed to 
such an extent that Culler’s once ‘radical’ view of apostrophe has, in the words of Alan 
Richardson, ‘now taken on the blind authority of the student handbook’.3 In an endnote to 
Theory of the Lyric, Culler himself asserts that ‘[s]ince the publication of […] ‘Apostrophe’, […] the 
figure has become a topic of serious discussion’ (Culler, Theory, p. 373). There is, and has not for 
several decades been, an obvious way in which apostrophes are being or have been set aside; so 
what do we make of this curious shift?  
 
                                                        
2 Jonathan Culler, ‘Apostrophe’, Diacritics, 7.4 (1977), 59–69, pp. 59, 60. 
3 Alan Richardson, ‘Apostrophe in Life and in Romantic Art: Everyday Discourse, Overhearing, and Poetic 
Address’, Style, 36.3 (2002), 363–85, p. 365. See also The Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry & Poetics, more than half of 
whose substantial entry on ‘apostrophe’ is devoted to Culler’s article and its influence (ed. Roland Greene and 




Remembering Joseph North’s often painstaking investigations of similar pieces of prose, 
undertaken in the service of uncovering prevailing, unconscious assumptions which lie behind 
the ways we do literary study, might help provide an answer. One of those assumptions, 
particularly strong in lyric studies, is that the ‘New Criticism’ is still a real presence, even a threat. 
Culler’s narrative of his own career in lyric studies, in playing down the radical, even paradigm-
shifting effect which ‘Apostrophe’ had in the late seventies, and playing down the nature of the 
‘break’ which it effected (an individual’s break with his own training being quite different from 
an academy’s institutional break with the previous institutional hegemony), enables Theory of the 
Lyric in 2015 to benefit from the rhetorical force of the same anti-‘New Critical’ wave which was 
sweeping through the academy in the sixties and seventies (across a very different political 
background). Theory of the Lyric becomes the culmination of ‘Apostrophe’s’ unfinished business, 
where that business is both the production of a coherent theory of lyric and the bringing to proper 
attention of the figure of apostrophe, despite the fact that only the former has any claim to 
unfinished status. Anyone who wants to offer dissenting views to the central arguments of 
Culler’s work on lyric, from Structuralist Poetics to Theory of the Lyric, needs to recognise that, 
because of the way this narrative has been constructed, she will simultaneously be seen to be 
taking issue with the move beyond ‘New Criticism’, a move seen as politically backwards. It is 
for this reason that persuasive and well-argued negative responses to ‘Apostrophe’ – and there 
are a number, as we are about to see – have often fallen on deaf ears. And it is partially for this 
reason that I devote a chapter of this thesis to the rebuttal of an argument first made over forty 
years ago, as I continue chapter one’s task of exploring and problematising the anti-‘New 
Critical’ thrust which began several decades before now.4 But aside from using ‘Apostrophe’ to 
continue to show the work done in lyric studies by the caricature of ‘New Criticism’ to prevent 
certain ways of thinking, then and now (the majority of ‘Apostrophe’ is reprinted, almost word-
for-word, in Theory of the Lyric’s chapter on ‘Lyric Address’ (Culler, Theory, pp. 186–243)), I also 
want to read Culler’s essay as emblematic of theoretical approaches to lyric, as I attempt to 
demonstrate the need for the ‘realistic spirit’ outlined in my introduction. The aim is to use 
‘Apostrophe’ to show not just its own shortcomings, but also the shortcomings of the theoretical 
spirit in which it is written, if our critical intention is to better interact with individual examples 
of lyric poems. In taking apostrophe as the epitome of lyric, the specifics of the figure in Culler’s 
essay get lost, as do the specific ways in which we might usefully think with the term next to 
individual poems. As the final section of this chapter will attempt to demonstrate, taking as 
                                                        
4 I remember Toril Moi’s account of being told by her colleagues that Culler and Paul de Man are ‘yesterday’s 





example a poem by Veronica Forrest-Thomson, relieving apostrophe of its theoretical role helps 
us to think with it in a manner that can show us differences, can illuminate our encounters with 
specific poems in relation to which the figure is particularly relevant, rather than showing us how 
all poems – grouped together under the one resemblance – are essentially the same. 
 
‘Apostrophe’, the ‘New Critics’, and cognitive rhetoric 
 
The argument of ‘Apostrophe’ runs as follows. Apostrophe has been ‘systematically [...] 
excluded’ from lyric criticism (Culler, ‘Apostrophe’, p. 60). This, Culler thinks, is because 
apostrophes are embarrassing. In the process of justifying that statement, he divides up 
apostrophe into levels, first discussing a simple ‘I-thou’ relationship. Here, apostrophes have 
been described as springing from spontaneous outbursts of feeling, the implication being that 
passion seeks apostrophe, since to apostrophise is to will something to happen. The 
embarrassment stems from the fact that that something can’t and won’t. Critics and readers thus 
temper this embarrassment by treating apostrophe as a poetic convention, a relic of out-dated 
religious beliefs. Culler then moves to introduce a third term: ‘I-thou-audience’. In this case, an 
‘I’ calls to a ‘thou’ in order to dramatise or constitute an image of self, a self which, he claims, is 
embarrassingly poetic: the ‘I’ announces that he is not merely a writer of verse, but the 
embodiment of a whole tradition, or spirit, of poetry. Finally, Culler turns to poems which 
parody their own apostrophic modes, describing this act as one of radical interiorisation: either 
aspects of the self are expanded to fill the world, or else aspects of the world (external objects) 
are internalised. This leads to the claim that ‘apostrophe involves a drama of “the one mind’s” 
modifications more than a relationship between an I and a you’ (Culler, ‘Apostrophe’, p. 66). 
Apostrophes function as ‘stages in a drama of mind’, and so apostrophe works against narrative, 
because the address is happening amongst and within a single self. Apostrophe’s time is one 
composed of a set of present moments, or moments at which writing can be in the ‘now’: thus a 
poem in which apostrophe wins out against narrative is an event in itself. Lyric is defined as 
being constituted of such poems in which apostrophe triumphs, that is to say, in which the 
present moment, the now, is not a moment in a chronological sequence but the moment of 
writing. Lyrics, then, are monuments to immediacy, in which the temporary passes into the 
eternal. Redefined in Culler’s terms, apostrophes should now no longer provoke embarrassment, 





With Eric Griffiths’s reading of J. L. Austin in mind, I’ll first argue that Culler’s statements about 
embarrassment stem from a form of ‘philosophical over-concentration on a narrow range of 
examples’: the move to situate apostrophe as an exclusively lyric or poetic trope ignores many 
examples of the figure which can be found in ordinary language. I’ll then look at two treatments 
of apostrophe which take issue with many aspects of Culler’s argument – especially the account 
of Quintilian which begins his essay – before considering two poetic examples at length, one of 
Culler’s, and one of my own, in an attempt to call into question the usefulness of approaching 
individual lyric poems through a theoretical lens. But before that, I want quickly to consider the 
place of apostrophe in criticism before Culler. Is it as absent as he claims? Certainly, Culler 
would be right to state that apostrophe is not a particularly strong concern of the criticism which 
precedes him, but systematic repression or exclusion over-states the case. Here is Cleanth 
Brooks, in The Well Wrought Urn, on an apostrophe in Keats’s ‘Ode on a Grecian Urn’: 
 
With Stanza V we move back out of the enchanted world portrayed by the urn to 
consider the urn itself once more as a whole, as an object. The shift in point of view is 
marked with the first line of the stanza by the apostrophe, ‘O Attic shape…’. It is the urn 
itself as a formed thing, as an autonomous world, to which the poet addresses these last 
words. (Brooks, pp. 162–3) 
 
There is certainly plenty more which could be said here, but it would be wrong to claim that 
Brooks is embarrassed by the apostrophe he discusses, or that he has any desire to exclude it 
from his reading of the Keats poem. The argument is that addressing the urn directly helps to 
establish the urn as a coherent and separate object, a world in itself, which might be considered, 
too, as a subject, a potentially active agent. Note that, while this view of apostrophe as helping to 
constitute an addressed object as an autonomous world might be embarrassing to Culler, it is not 
embarrassing to Brooks.5 One major contradiction in Culler’s argument is the assertion that the 
‘New Criticism’ – attacked for its religious character (as we saw in Moretti) and for its seeing 
poems as autonomous objects – was simultaneously embarrassed by the idea that an apostrophe 
might imply or help to create its own kind of autonomous object, and that such an idea might be 
uncomfortably religious. When poems at Culler’s first level of apostrophe (a simple ‘I-thou’ 
relationship) ‘address natural objects they formally will that these particular objects function as 
subjects’, and this ‘makes apparent the connection between apostrophe and embarrassment’, 
which ‘[r]eaders temper by treating apostrophe as a poetic convention and the calling of spirits as 
                                                        
5 Culler would perhaps prefer to see this moment as an instance of the self being ‘parcel[led] out to fill the world’, or 
of it ‘interalis[ing] what might have been thought external’ (Culler, ‘Apostrophe’, p. 66; although such a view would 





a relic of archaic beliefs’ (Culler, ‘Apostrophe’, p. 62). Brooks, here, is neither treating the 
address to the urn as a convention nor leaping to the conclusion that such an address is a relic of 
pantheistic beliefs (and this is a leap: Culler does not discuss apostrophic moments from the 
Bible, which would help the discussion along here).6 He is content to see Keats’s urn functioning 
as a subject, and moves on, unembarrassed, certainly leaving much unsaid, but hardly ignoring, 
repressing, or systematically excluding. 
 
For Kenneth Burke, meanwhile, apostrophe plays a systematised role. Attempting, in Counter-
Statement (1931), to ‘define the principles underlying the appeal of literature’, to account for how 
‘effects are produced’, Burke begins by discussing ‘the Nature of Form’, and soon comes to a 
discussion of ‘minor or incidental forms’: 
 
When analysing a work of any length, we may find it bristling with minor or incidental 
forms – such as metaphor, paradox, disclosure, reversal, contraction, expansion, bathos, 
apostrophe, series, chiasmus – which can be discussed as formal events in themselves. 
Their effect partially depends upon their function in the whole, yet they manifest 
sufficient evidences of episodic distinctness to bear consideration apart from their 
context.7 
 
Armin Paul Frank has written that such ‘minor or incidental forms’ ‘take on a particular 
importance’ for Burke, as they play an important part in defining ‘eloquence, the […] ultimate 
principle of Burke’s formalism’.8 Apostrophe might be just one among nine other listed forms 
(and among many others which aren’t listed); but we nonetheless see it deemed important 
enough for inclusion in a theory of literature, in a manner inconsistent with claims of systematic 
exclusion or repression. Burke does not stop theorising here: fourteen years later, he writes in A 
Grammar of Motives of ‘the state of arrest in which we would situate the essence of the lyric’, a state 
which is ‘not analogous to dramatic action’ but is its ‘dialectical counterpart’. The lyric has a 
                                                        
6 Apostrophic speech acts are few and far between in the Old Testament, but the following moment from Ezekiel 
13 would have been interesting for Culler to consider in relation to pantheism. The word of the Lord comes to 
Ezekiel and criticises those ‘prophets that see vanity’, who ‘have seduced’ his people with lies, which, in an extended 
metaphor, function as ‘untempered morter [sic]’ in a wall which, as a result, will fall: ‘Say unto them which daub it 
with untempered morter, that it shall fall: there shall be an overflowing shower; and ye, O great hailstones, shall fall; 
and a stormy wind shall rend it’ (Ezekiel, 13:11; The Bible: Authorised King James Version, introduced by Robert Carroll 
and Stephen Prickett (Oxford, 1997), p. 916). If God himself can address natural objects, the contention that such 
an act is ‘pantheisti[c]’ needs to be revised. 
7 Kenneth Burke, Counter-Statement (Berkeley, 1968; first published 1931), pp. 123, 127. Some critics, such as Andrew 
DuBois, have argued that Burke marks a bridge between ‘New Criticism’ and what succeeded it – see DuBois, pp. 
9–11. 




‘special aptitude for conveying a state of mind, for erecting a moment into a universe’.9 
Apostrophe might be absent from Burke’s discussion here, but that discussion is nevertheless 
one which shares a number of similarities with Culler’s theory, thirty years before ‘Apostrophe’ 
attempts to draw rhetorical force from the claim that nothing like it has been written before. 
 
The fact that we can find examples of apostrophe being considered, and theorised, in major 
works of literary criticism prior to 1977 suggests that it would be worth challenging the broader 
claim that apostrophe goes hand in hand with embarrassment. Alan Richardson’s 2002 essay on 
apostrophe and everyday discourse will help us to do that, as it offers examples of apostrophe 
which are taken from ordinary language and interpersonal interactions. Richardson starts with an 
account of how, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, ‘figurative language suddenly became a topic 
of great moment for cognitive science’, driven by ‘notable failures of early artificial intelligence 
programmes to handle figurative utterances that human speakers readily took in stride’. 
Richardson describes how George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s famous Metaphors We Live By 
(1980) suggested that metaphor ‘is pervasive in everyday language and metaphorical mappings 
characterise even pre-linguistic thought processes’ (contrary to ‘an earlier philosophical tradition 
[which] had long viewed figurative language as ornamental and deviant’). This led later cognitive 
psychologists to become deeply interested in figurative language, and to claims such as ‘the 
literary mind is the fundamental mind’, and ‘human cognition is fundamentally shaped by various 
poetic or figurative processes’.10 But such enthusiasm for the cognitive study of figurative 
language was not shared by many scholars within the field of literary studies: parallel to the rise 
of cognitive understandings of figurative language ran ‘an equally challenging, and at the time 
much more compelling, recasting of metaphor and related figures of speech in the service of 
deconstruction’ (Richardson, p. 364). Richardson takes the example of Paul de Man, who ‘set the 
tone for much of the work that followed in emphasizing the “proliferating and disruptive power 
of figural language”’.11 Contrary to the cognitive rhetoricians, who were celebrating the 
‘generative power and conceptual coherence of figurative thought – in a word, its felicity – 
deconstruction instead stressed the “catastrophic” effect of figures that render the texts that 
harbor them “suspended and unresolved”’.12 For the ‘deconstructive rhetorician, figural language 
                                                        
9 Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (New York, 1945), pp. 475–6, in William K. Wimsatt and Cleanth Brooks, 
Literary Criticism: A Short History, (London, 1957), pp. 697–8.  
10 Richardson, pp. 363–4. The two latter quotations are from, respectively, Mark Turner, The Literary Mind (New 
York, 1996), p. v, and Raymond Gibbs, The Poetics of Mind: Figurative Thought, Language, and Understanding (Cambridge, 
1994), p. 1 (both in Richardson, p. 364). 
11 Paul de Man, ‘The Epistemology of Metaphor’, Critical Inquiry, 5 (1978), 13–30, p. 28, in Richardson, p. 364. 
12 Paul de Man, ‘Semiology and Rhetoric’, p. 10, in Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, 




remains deviant’: the aim of reading is to ‘elicit the disruptive, vertiginous, aberrant workings of 
metaphors and other tropes’ (Richardson, p. 364). 
 
The figure of apostrophe, Richardson claims, ‘has come to epitomize the excessive, disruptive, 
and insistently literary character of rhetorical figures as perhaps no other’, a poster boy, even, for 
deconstructive understandings of figurative language (Richardson, p. 364). This is the backdrop 
in front of which Richardson reads Culler’s essay, one which might seem ‘to pose a special 
challenge for the cognitivist approach to figurative language’, since ‘Lakoff, Johnson, Turner, 
Gibbs, and their adherents all pose a fundamental continuity between literary and everyday 
language’ which Culler – stressing apostrophe’s ‘embarrassing’ nature, making it into ‘the figure 
for linguistic disruption and literary deviance par excellence’ – denies.13 Richardson, however, 
thinks he can develop a cognitive account of apostrophe nonetheless, ‘one that can cover a wider 
range of instances and functions than those considered by deconstructive rhetoric’ (Richardson, 
p. 365). Particularly interesting for our purposes are the examples with which he begins this 
account, examples which suggest a convincing alternative to the primary claim of Culler’s essay, 
that apostrophes are embarrassing. 
 
Richardson proceeds by putting pressure on the connection between apostrophe and 
embarrassment with examples from Romantic poems (the historical heart of ‘Apostrophe’). 
From Wordsworth he takes two addresses to daughters, one from the ‘Ode to Duty’ and one 
from ‘Surprised by joy – impatient as the wind’, arguing that, in the first case, ‘the address to the 
personified abstraction, Duty, indeed sounds highly “poetic” and rather awkward’; in the second, 
however, the address to Wordsworth’s just-dead child ‘does not (at least for me) provoke any 
embarrassment whatsoever’ (Richardson, p. 365). To certain minds such an approach might be 
doomed by its unscholarly subjectivity (Richardson is here providing us with a critical 
judgement), and no doubt aware of this, Richardson is quick to move on to a different approach, 
albeit armed with the claim that, as he sees it, there is a great range of ‘figures of address’, from 
the ‘bombastic’ (and therefore potentially embarrassing) to the ‘conversational’, and that ‘the 
“problematic” theory of apostrophe’ – Culler’s commitment to ‘maximising its linguistic 
                                                        
13 Richardson, p. 365. ‘Continuity’ here is not the same as an equivalence. Neither Richardson nor the cognitivists he 
cites are arguing that literary and everyday language are the same. Eric Griffiths, in concluding some criticisms of 
David Crystal’s assumptions about Shakespeare’s language, is informative here: ‘Comparing different kinds of text 
should help promote alertness to the differences between them, and keep literaturists aware that the kinds of writing 
they mostly read (imaginative fictions) are only a fragment of a much larger landmass of language-use, a landmass 
with which the literary parish remains continuous, and without attention to which even the literary works can’t be 




deviance, its communicative failure, and its literariness or poeticality’ – ‘accounts for only one 
end of a larger continuum’ (Richardson, p. 366). Culler’s all-encompassing theory has been 
derived from too narrow a range of examples. Richardson proceeds to demonstrate this with 
recourse to instances in ordinary language of the ‘conversational’ kind of apostrophe which he 
claims to find in poems. Richardson takes his first example from Richard Gerrig, a cognitive 
psychologist who, as he summarises, ‘understands verbal acts in literary works as continuous 
with “ordinary processes of language use”’, and who is critical of ‘theories that are forced to 
posit “special mental acts dedicated to the experience of poetry”’, arguing instead that readers 
‘bring “vast experience” with comparable utterances in everyday discourse to aid in their 
comprehension of seemingly “nonsensical” poetic addresses’.14 Gerrig’s first example, 
Richardson tells us, is ‘taken from a magazine article describing how the AIDS activist Larry 
Kramer dealt with having Ed Koch, then the mayor of New York, as a neighbour’: 
 
Kramer detested Koch’s AIDS policies and would loudly berate him in the lobby of their 
apartment building until the building management threatened Kramer with eviction. 
After that, whenever he would find himself with Koch in the lobby, Kramer would 
instead address his dog, Molly, with comments such as ‘[t]here’s the man who murdered 
all of Daddy’s friends’ [Gerrig, p. 105] uttered loudly enough for the mayor to overhear 
them. (Richardson, pp. 366–7) 
 
This is a particularly useful example, Richardson suggests, because Kramer’s dog is ‘no less 
“nonsensical” an addressee than would be a nightingale or a personified abstraction’ 
(Richardson, p. 367). If we can find examples from conversational circumstances of addressees 
such as household pets, the range of apostrophes which ‘are so distinctly poetic, so unlike 
ordinary speech or meditation, that they do not help identify a tone recognisable from our usual 
experience’ starts to look rather small (remember that Culler’s words here in Theory of the Lyric 
claim to refer to apostrophe’s entire range, not just the potentially embarrassing end of the 
spectrum which Richardson is happy to concede). Further examples of ‘remarks nominally 
intended for uncomprehending addressees that are clearly meant to be overheard by a second 
auditor’, Richardson tells us, are not hard to come up with. It is common for a parent to address 
a child ‘with remarks made for the benefit of a co-parent: “Don’t worry, honey, I’ll get up and 
change your diaper again because Mommy is just too busy reading The New Yorker”’. It is also 
common for people to address the dead at a funeral – ‘“X, we will miss you”’, Richardson rather 
mathematically puts it – in a manner which is ‘anything but embarrassing’. Richardson somewhat 
                                                        
14 Richard J. Gerrig, Experiencing Narrative Worlds: On the Psychological Activities of Reading (New Haven, 1993), pp. 156, 




overstates the case here: it is possible to imagine many circumstances in which ‘X, we will miss 
you’ will at least fall with a profound awkwardness. But what’s important to Richardson’s wider 
argument is the fact that it is also possible to imagine ordinary language circumstances where it 
won’t: ‘among certain religious communities’, for instance, amongst whom instances of ordinary 
language apostrophe, Richardson conjectures, may be particularly common. He cites the example 
of the mother of a colleague’s friend ‘frequently making remarks along the lines of, “Jesus! don’t 
let these girls drive off a bridge on a way home from that party”, a plea or warning to the girls 
issued in the form of an apostrophic prayer’ (Richardson, p. 367). 
 
But we do not need to consider examples of dead, mute, inanimate, or divine addressees to see 
that – and here Richardson is following Gerrig again – ‘[w]henever a conversation takes place 
before a third party, […] the speakers will ordinarily tailor their remarks to take the presence of 
an overhearer into account’. Gerrig distinguishes between a ‘side-participant’ and a mere 
‘overhearer’, the former being an overhearer who is welcomed in some form into the 
conversation, the latter being an unintended or ‘deliberately excluded’ auditor. In any 
conversation with more than two participants, each person is expected to ‘keep track of the flow 
of talk, deftly and unconsciously shifting between “addressee” and “side-participant” roles 
throughout the conversation’.15 ‘In stark contrast’, Richardson concludes, ‘to the exotic and 
aberrant role given to apostrophe by Culler and other deconstructive rhetoricians, Gerrig sees 
the three-way communicative relation assumed by apostrophe as a natural extension of 
normative and habitual conversational practice’ (Richardson, p. 368). Seizing upon Culler’s 
endorsing of Northrop Frye’s claim (made through John Stuart Mill’s famous ‘not heard but 
overheard’ dictum) that the ‘poet […] turns his back on his listeners’, Richardson counters that 
‘to turn aside from one listener to another does not mean to turn one’s back on the former, and 
in fact […] makes part of normal conversational practice’.16 Thus considered, ‘there is nothing 
inherently deviant, abnormal, or “embarrassing” in the use of apostrophe’. Taking Culler’s ‘self-
referential opening example – a lecturer on apostrophe, presumably Jonathan Culler, intoning 
“O mysterious apostrophe, teach us to understand your workings!”’ – Richardson jokes that 
 
one need only imagine Culler’s colleague in the audience turning to her friend and 
whispering to her, ‘Oh, Jonathan! That’s such a loaded example!’. In this case, the 
                                                        
15 Richardson, p. 367. On ‘side-participants’ and ‘overhearers’, see Gerrig, pp. 104–6.  
16 Frye, p. 250, in Culler, ‘Apostrophe’, p. 60. Frye’s quotation is a crucial hinge in Culler’s essay, providing initial 
justification for the claim – which we’ll soon come to in more detail – that one might ‘identify apostrophe with lyric 




apostrophe might become embarrassing only if uttered loudly enough for the lecturer, its 
nominal addressee, to hear.17 
 
Richardson’s carefully argued article, by slowly dismantling Culler’s recurring contention that 
apostrophes go hand in hand with embarrassment, gives us substantial evidence for the claim 
that the rhetorical force of Culler’s argument is largely derived from a movement against the 
‘New Criticism’, and its other, political, ‘systematic repress[ions and] exclu[sions]’. Apostrophes 
are present in critical work which precedes Culler, even, in the case of Burke, forming a part of a 
theory of literature. But they are not present in the capacity of coming to stand for lyric itself, of 
becoming the sole foundation of a totalising theory of lyric poetry. And so we are now able to 
ask whether or not that is something of which apostrophes are, and should be, capable. If we 
read Culler’s claims about apostrophe in this tempered manner, we find ourselves in a better 
position to consider the work apostrophe is doing and the claims made for it in the Diacritics 
essay. We are not seeing the natural conclusion of a long period of repression and exclusion, 
apostrophe coming to take its always rightful place at the heart of lyric studies, but rather a 
balder and less inevitable claim for the introduction of a new theory of lyric poetry, with little to 
support it beyond its own coherence, and its own applicability to the poems of which it claims to 
speak. In the next parts of this chapter, I’ll consider both. 
 
Dissenting voices from within literary studies 
 
In order to support Theory of the Lyric’s assertion that, since his Diacritics essay of 1977, 
apostrophe has become ‘a topic of serious discussion’, Culler cites a number of works which 
refer to Culler’s essay as their accepted point of departure.18 But despite the apparent 
homogeneity of post-1977 views on apostrophe, it is possible to find counter-narratives which, 
unlike Richardson and Gerrig’s arguments, come from within the field of literary studies. 
Unremarked in Culler’s book are two treatments of apostrophe by L. M. Findlay and J. Douglas 
Kneale which go quite against the grain of Culler’s article.19 Both critics take issue with Culler’s 
partial invocation of Quintilian, which begins ‘Apostrophe’, with Findlay turning to the ninth 
                                                        
17 Richardson, pp. 368–9. Richardson here quotes from ‘Apostrophe’ as it appears in The Pursuit of Signs: Semiotics, 
Literature, Deconstruction (Ithaca, 1981), pp. 135–54. The Diacritics version I am using imagines a reading situation 
rather than a lecture. 
18 Culler, Theory, p. 373. Those works are Paul Alpers, ‘Apostrophe and the Rhetoric of Renaissance Literature’, 
Representations, 122.1 (2013), 1–22; Barbara Johnson, ‘Apostrophe, Animation, and Abortion’, Diacritics, 16.1 (1986), 
28–47; William Waters, Poetry’s Touch: On Lyric Address (Ithaca, 2003 (Culler erroneously writes 1983)); J. Mark Smith, 
‘Apostrophe, or the Lyric Art of Turning Away’, Texas Studies in Literature and Language, 49.4 (2007), 411–437.    
19 L. M. Findlay, ‘Culler and Byron on Apostrophe and Lyric Time’, Studies in Romanticism, 24.3 (1985), 335-353; J. 




book of the Institutio Oratoria and writing that, ‘far from being Culler’s lyric archetrope, 
announcing its troping on “the circuit or situation of communication itself”, in a manner 
“devoid of semantic reference”, apostrophe is here a form of emphasis involving a semantic 
turn, trope or flexus’ (Findlay, p. 339). Between the lines of Findlay’s article lies the implication 
that Culler’s choice of rhetorical figure may in fact be more interested in introducing the terms 
and methodology of American deconstruction to the lyric discussion (‘reconstructing presence, 
parole, and lyric durée, as différance, glyph, and the temporality of écriture’ (Findlay, p. 336)) than in a 
faithful engagement with apostrophe itself, and with the poetry which might contain it. For 
Kneale, ‘the central problem with Culler’s argument lies in his failure to distinguish, on either 
historical or theoretical grounds, between apostrophe and address’ (Kneale, p. 142). In 
emphasising the difference between apostrophe and exclamatio (‘mistranslated as apostrophe in 
the Rhetorica ad Herennium’, he reminds us (Kneale, p. 146)), Kneale (probably unknowingly) 
elucidates J. H. Prynne’s characteristically brusque 1988 dismissal, in footnote, of ‘Apostrophe’, 
on the basis that Culler ignores the exclamatory: 
 
even the modes of apparently outright apostrophe often develop forms of invoking or 
calling-on which function as kinds of meditative exclamation. […] Jonathan Culler’s 
essay on ‘Apostrophe’ fails ultimately to persuade because it ignores the existence of 
these intermediate, hybrid formations.20 
 
Like Richardson, Prynne takes issue with Culler on the grounds that he is focussing exclusively 
on one extreme of a continuum (although the continua of which they write are different), that he 
is concentrating on too narrow a range of examples.  
 
It serves as evidence for the amount and nature of rhetorical force ‘Apostrophe’ derives from its 
opening pages’ implied ‘New Critical’ rejection that such arguments have had so little traction in 
the ‘serious discussion’ Culler characterises, apparently not even scratching the surface of the 
received apostrophic view and what Richardson called its ‘blind authority’. Neither Kneale nor 
Findlay seem conscious of this force. Both essays, at least, are aware of the deconstructionist 
bent of Culler’s position, although they take different stances in relation to it: Findlay shows a 
hostility to deconstruction full stop, claiming that Culler’s readings ‘prove unsatisfying on the 
same grounds as their philosophical analogues in the work of Jacques Derrida’ (Findlay, p. 336), 
while Kneale – echoing Rodolph Gasché and his arguments we saw in the first chapter about 
                                                        





American deconstruction’s misunderstanding of its Continental influence – holds the more 
measured view that there is some contradiction between Culler’s claims of an ‘innate hostility to 
voice’ inherent in critical discourse (Culler, ‘Apostrophe’, p. 59) and Derrida’s arguments – 
summed up in the term ‘logocentrism’ – that voice has ‘always been privileged in Western 
culture’ (Kneale, p. 141).21 But they each fail to see the whole context of ‘Apostrophe’ and its 
rhetorical force. Findlay’s aim is to counter Culler’s ‘rhetorical ruses’, after some ‘theoretical 
reflection’, with ‘practical criticism’, seemingly unaware of the manner in which that phrase and 
practice had long been tarnished, as we saw in Joseph North’s account in chapter one (Findlay, 
p. 336). Kneale, meanwhile, is onto something in beginning his essay by questioning the claim 
that apostrophes are embarrassing, but misses the sense and force of Culler’s ‘[c]lassic essays’ 
and ‘critics’ – stand-ins for the ‘New Criticism’ – and chooses to counter the proposition by 
taking such phrases more broadly than Culler intended, as he lists ten writers who ‘regularly and 
systematically discuss[ed] apostrophe’ between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. There is 
something to be gained from calling attention to the fact that many more commentators have 
discussed apostrophe than the one – Quintilian – to which Culler’s essay refers, but Kneale’s 
opening attack falls short as a counter-claim since it doesn’t address the primary thrusts of 
Culler’s point: that apostrophes have proved embarrassing to literary criticism as manifested by 
the ‘New Critics’, and – in focussing only on rhetorical precedent – that apostrophes are 
divorced from our ordinary language. 
 
When I summarised the argument of ‘Apostrophe’ at the beginning of this chapter, I made no 
mention of Quintilian, despite the fact that he is the first word of Culler’s essay, and an apparent 
summary of his views on apostrophe makes up the bulk of its first paragraph: 
 
Quintilian, speaking of oratory, defines apostrophe as ‘a diversion of our words to 
address some person other than the judge’; and though he cautions against it, ‘since it 
would certainly seem to be more natural that we should specifically address ourselves to 
those whose favour we desire to win’, he allows that occasionally ‘some striking 
expression of thought is necessary […] which can be given greater point and vehemence 
when addressed to some person other than the judge’ [Institutio Oratoria IV, 1, 63]. The 
effects here cited to justify apostrophe do not, of course, distinguish it from other tropes, 
which also are said to seek ‘greater point and vehemence’. But apostrophe is different in 
that it makes its point by troping not on the meaning of a word but on the circuit or 
situation of communication itself. (Culler, ‘Apostrophe’, p. 59; Culler’s reference) 
 
                                                        
21 For a starting point from which to consider Derrida’s views on the transition from speaking to writing, see 




Kneale and Findlay both devote large parts of their responses to ‘Apostrophe’ to examinations, 
and rejections, of this definition. Paul Alpers – the only scholar cited by Culler who responds to 
their arguments – is unfazed by such examinations, happy to concede that ‘Kneale and Findlay 
give accurate accounts of Quintilian’, but still insistent on defending all aspects of Culler’s 
theory, despite Culler’s ‘apparent looseness’, which is ‘consequential only if one assumes that 
rhetorical devices and systems do not change historically’ (Alpers, p. 4). The implied accusation 
that Kneale and Findlay are guilty of such an assumption is unfounded: Alpers makes no 
mention of Kneale’s detailed treatment of apostrophe through Renaissance orators and up to 
Derrida’s The Post Card. But such an untroubled response suggests that the role played by 
Quintilian in ‘Apostrophe’ may not be as significant as its prime position in the essay makes it 
seem, and as Kneale and Findlay have taken it to be. Culler is ‘loose’ with Quintilian, and such 
‘looseness’ is worth examining. As I now turn to classical oratory, my aim is not primarily to 
emphasise the erroneousness of Culler’s account, but to bring that ‘looseness’ into focus, to 
consider the classical precedent for the turning of apostrophe into what Richardson called ‘the 
figure for linguistic disruption and literary deviance par excellence’. As we shall see, the argument 
of ‘Apostrophe’ recalls parts of writing on apostrophe by both Quintilian and Longinus, while 
excluding many aspects of their accounts which will be germane to the final sections of this 
chapter, as we move to consider two examples of poems in the light of Culler’s theory and my 
response to it. 
 
Classical origins and their role in ‘Apostrophe’ 
 
The first word on apostrophe (or, at least, the first rhetorical use of the Greek word) appears in a 
fragment of Philodemus’ Peri Parresias, or On Frank Criticism: 
 
    
                           και πα- 
 σης ἀποστροφης περιγε- 
 γραµµενης και καταρας και 
 λοιδοριας ἁπασης και δι᾽ 
 ἀπονοιας 
 
And when every recourse has been 
determined and every malediction and 
insult, both through madness… 
[or And when every recourse to all 
malediction and insult has been limited, 
both through madness…]22 
 
                                                        
22 Philodemus, On Frank Criticism, trans. David Konstan et al. (Atlanta, 1998), pp. 40–1; for simplicity here I have 
removed square brackets and other scholarly apparatus from the Greek text indicating where it is fragmentary or 
difficult to read. The second, alternative translation is my own. For this as the first use of ‘apostrophe’ see Longinus: 




Here ἀποστροφης, translated as ‘recourse’, is a turning away (ἀπο = away from, στρεφειν = to 
turn) again and again in pursuit, eventually coming to settle on something we do not know (for 
the fragment ends) which might be success or failure, something found or lost. Philodemus’ 
apparent invention – an inconclusive scrap which seems to have had little direct influence on 
further understandings of apostrophe – has, significantly, nothing to do with a self-conscious 
reflection on the circuit of communication, the primary emphasis Culler derives from his 
account of Quintilian.23 Going back to apostrophe’s historical beginnings helps us to keep 
apostrophe separate from address, two concepts which are almost inextricably conflated in 
Culler’s essay, as Kneale notes.24 Longinus’ account of apostrophe, much more influential than 
that of Philodemus, also has little to do with address, and further challenges this conflation. It is 
also an account which, as we shall see, is spiritually germane to other aspects of the argument of 
Culler’s essay. Here is the example of apostrophe Longinus takes in On the Sublime (it is the first 
figure of speech he lists): 
 
Demosthenes brings in a demonstration on behalf of his political positions. What would 
have been natural usage?  
 
You have not made a mistake, you have taken up the struggle on behalf of Greek 
freedom. You have examples that are at home with this, for those at Marathon 
did not make a mistake, nor those at Salamis or Diataea. 
 
But indeed, as if he had suddenly been inspired by a divinity and, as it were, had been 
taken over by Apollo, he gave voice to his oath, swearing by the most excellent men of 
Greece –– 
 
Is it not possible that you were mistaken – by those who faced the danger at 
Marathon –– 
 
In this one figure the oath (which I call apostrophe)… (Longinus, pp. 99–100) 
 
Why is this oath being called apostrophe? James Arieti and John Crossett gloss, in the 1985 
translation I use, that Longinus is here further extending a term which already has a ‘basic sense 
– a speech diverting attention from the persona of the judge’ to include ‘apotheosis’ (Longinus, p. 
101). This is useful, especially when compared to the transitive sense of apostrophe which, as I’ll 
                                                        
23 There are, however, intriguing links between Philodemus and the much later Bernard Lamy: ‘L’Apostrophe se fait 
lorsqu’un homme étant extraordinairement émû, il se tourne de tous côtez, il s’addresse au Ciel, à la terre, aux 
rochers, aux forêts, aux choses insensibles, aussi-bien qu’à celles qui sont sensibles’ (apostrophe happens when a 
man is extraordinarily moved: he turns this way and that, he addresses Heaven, the earth, the rocks, the forests, 
inanimate objects and animate ones too; La Rhetorique ou L’art de parler (Amsterdam, 1712; 5th ed.), p. 164). 
24 ‘Apostrophe’ is caught up in a ‘confusion of apostrophe and address’ (Kneale, p. 148). This is another reason, 
Kneale suggests, why ‘apostrophe’ might have been absent from criticism prior to Culler; Culler is not discussing 




soon discuss, is present in Quintilian’s writing on apostrophe (which is broader than the picture 
Culler paints). But it does little to explain why their interpretation of Longinus’ apostrophe 
figure, extended to include apotheosis, should begin what is in effect the ‘(main) second part of 
On the Sublime’, a catalogue of figures and tropes which extends from chapters 16 to 42.25 The 
first words of chapter 16 announce that this ‘is the place where figures are arranged in order’ 
(Longinus, p. 97): so why, first, apostrophe, and what order? 
 
Francis Goyet might have an answer. Apostrophe in Longinus is not the first in a list of figures, 
but in fact the very quintessence of a figure. In On the Crown (the speech from which Longinus 
quotes), Demosthenes’ famous oath forms part of a paradoxon or admiratio, a digression, 
‘something that is against the audience’s expectation’, which extends from sections 199–210 
(Goyet, p. 26). Goyet’s point is that this ‘announced surprise is, so to speak, a routine’ (par for 
the course in a long speech), one which ‘masks the real one, still to come’: the oath, ‘which 
comes as a real surprise, and is truly unexpected’; ‘an interruption within an interruption’ (Goyet, 
p. 27). Thus Demosthenes 
 
has been using some sort of prodigious volte-face or coup de théâtre: in other words, a 
twist or ‘apostrophe’. And this is what Longinus calls a figure: ‘let us speak now of all the 
figures; but let me show you, first, what is a figure. An oath, yes, but what an oath, what 
an orator, what an ability for volte-face!’. (Goyet, p. 28) 
 
For Longinus, then, as Goyet reads him, apostrophe is the quintessence of a figure. The word 
captures a certain ‘je ne sais quoi’ (Goyet, p. 21). A figure is a special mode of turn or surprise, 
and that special mode is what Longinus labels ‘apostrophe’, one of ‘those chic, mysterious 
words’ which is bandied about ‘within an intellectual circle of friends’ (Goyet, p. 23). Goyet 
justifies this reading by drawing attention to the emphatical character of the moment from 
Longinus’ Greek in which he first deploys the word: φαίνεται δἰ ἑνὸς τοῦ ὀµοτικοῦ σχήµατος, 
µατος, ὅπερ ἐνθάδε ἀποστροφὴν ἐγὼ καλῶ (translated by Goyet, more accurately than Arieti and 
Crossett, as ‘observe what he effects by this single figure of conjuration – here I call it 
apostrophe’). Both ἐγὼ and ἐνθάδε are particularly emphatic; not, as Arieti and Crossett have it, 
‘which I call apostrophe’, but more, ‘this is what I, here, call apostrophe’ (Goyet, p. 23). The sense 
of ‘apostrophe’ in Longinus is thus one of badinage and friendly one-upmanship: ‘look at what I 
                                                        
25 Francis Goyet, ‘The Meaning of Apostrophè in Longinus’s On the Sublime (16.2)’, p. 24, in Translations of the Sublime: 
The Early Modern Reception and Dissemination of Longinus’ Peri Hupsous in Rhetoric, the Visual Arts, Architecture and the 




can make the word mean: the very soul of a rhetorical figure!’. It is a mysterious word which 
defines a mystery. 
 
 
Goyet’s reading of Longinus is informative for understanding the context of more recent, 
deconstructive understandings of the figure. Consider these two proximate moments from near 
the beginning of ‘Apostrophe’: 
 
The fact that [apostrophe] is systematically repressed or excluded by critics suggests that 
it represents that which critical discourse cannot comfortably assimilate. Indeed, one 
might be justified in taking apostrophe as the figure of all that is most radical, 
embarrassing, pretentious, and mystificatory in the lyric, even seeking to identify 
apostrophe with lyric itself. 
 
[I]f we would know something of the poetics of the lyric we should study apostrophe: its 
forms and meanings. Such a project would confront at the outset complex problems of 
definition and delimitation, which I here leave aside in order to focus on cases which will 
be apostrophic by any definition. (Culler, ‘Apostrophe’, p. 60) 
 
Apostrophe is something which we don’t know how to talk about; it is thus mysterious, 
‘mystificatory’, the soul, the ‘je ne sais quoi’ of lyric poetry. This is something which we don’t 
know how to define, but which comes to be defined by that very impossibility of definition. 
Culler’s essay has no sustained interest in the ‘definition and delimitation’ of its titular term 
because so much of the force of the argument stems from its ‘looseness’: apostrophe is defined 
in ‘Apostrophe’ not as a precise effect but as an essentially indefinable mystery which is the 
essence of lyric. We may not know how to talk about ‘apostrophe’, as Culler uses it, because he 
has not defined what he means, in any sense which goes beyond a subjective feeling of lyric’s 
elusive quintessence. But rather than imploring another, with Stanley Cavell, to ‘[l]ook and find 
out whether you can see what I see, wish to say what I wish to say’, Culler builds a theory before 
he has submitted his feeling to test, one which is grounded by the essentially circular argument 
that apostrophe is central to lyric because apostrophe is the indefinable centre of lyric. The test is 
necessary, because what to one person looks like the soul of something to another might look 
quite extraneous, or even absent. And the test needs to consist in a consideration of concrete 
examples which hold the potential to alter our feelings towards lyric as a general conception, as 
opposed to examples which, as they do in ‘Apostrophe’, merely illustrate a pre-conceived theory. 
 
We’ll be testing ‘Apostrophe’ next to two poems in the final sections of this chapter, one 




example is defined by its subsidiary relation to a general conception), and one (Veronica Forrest-
Thomson’s ‘Sonnet’) which he does not (but which is in particularly close proximity to the nexus 
of concerns which surround apostrophe, from its classical origins to now). But Longinus’ is not, 
of course, the only precursor to Culler’s version of apostrophe. Quintilian’s influence is there 
too, and provides Culler with a definition which he appears quick to discard. What, then, is 
Quintilian doing at the start of ‘Apostrophe’? To answer that question, let us return to the 
beginning of Culler’s essay, which I quoted at the end of the last section, and to Quintilian 
himself, also gleaning anything which may be useful to our discussion of the examples to come. 
The heart of Quintilian’s definition of ‘apostrophe’, as it is related by Culler, is the word 
‘diversion’: an apostrophe occurs when the speaker turns away from the judge to address some 
other person. The first test of the relevance of this definition’s influence on ‘Apostrophe’ comes 
as the essay turns to the four ‘cases which will be apostrophic by any definition’ with which 
Culler begins his turn to individual poems. It is easy to argue, as Kneale has, that not one of 
Culler’s cases ‘which will be apostrophic by any definition’ is in fact apostrophic by the one 
Culler takes from Quintilian, that is, a turning away, a diversion, an interruption. ‘O Rose, thou 
art sick’, ‘O wild West Wind’, ‘Thou still unravished bride’, ‘Sois sage, ô ma douleur’ turn away 
from no one and nothing, ‘occurring in the first line of their respective poems, with no 
preceding speech, no pre-textual basis from which to turn’ (Kneale, p. 147). The definition 
which Culler presents to us as Quintilian’s thus appears to have been discarded by 
‘Apostrophe’s’ second page. But it is clear that Culler does think that Quintilian’s definition 
remains relevant here. Having just quoted his four cases, he writes that ‘[s]uch invocations […] 
turn away from empirical listeners by addressing natural objects, artefacts, or abstractions’ 
(Culler, ‘Apostrophe’, p. 60). Once again, it is easy to refute this: despite the equivalence for 
which ‘empirical’ strains, the poems Culler quotes do not have listeners in the same way that 
orators do.26 But let us consider what work the equivalence does for Culler. Pressed through 
Northrop Frye’s claim that the ‘poet […] turns his back on his listeners’, Quintilian’s account of 
a momentary diversion from a default address to the judge which practically occurs the majority 
of the time becomes a prolonged diversion from a default address to the reader which hardly 
ever occurs. Combining Quintilian’s ‘diversion’ with Frye’s ‘lyric poet [who] normally pretends to 
be talking to himself or to someone else’ gives us an ‘apostrophe’ which is simply any moment in 
a poem at which the poem is not directly addressing its reader.27 Following this argument 
                                                        
26 Note Harold Bloom’s comment, in ‘The Breaking of Form’, in Deconstruction and Criticism, pp. 1–38: ‘Rhetoric has 
always been unfitted to the study of poetry, though most critics continue to ignore this incompatibility’ (p. 8). 
27 ‘To the reader’ poems – poems addressed to imagined readers – do not appear in ‘Apostrophe’, but do make up a 




through, apostrophe would look not radical and mystificatory but straightforwardly mundane, a 
standard from which to deviate, not the deviation from a norm.  
 
Where Longinus gives Culler an apostrophe which is radical, lyric’s mysterious quintessence, 
Quintilian, through Frye, gives Culler an apostrophe which is a standard and central, even 
mundane, lyric effect. Those who are accused of repressing and excluding apostrophe are 
thereby attacked on two fronts: they have simultaneously excluded lyric’s ultimate essence and its 
most basic form.  
 
Culler has another use for Quintilian, too. Claiming that ‘he cautions against’ apostrophe, he uses 
the rhetorician to reinforce his claim that apostrophes have proved embarrassing. This rather 
ignores the fact that Quintilian is talking only in relation to the specific case of the exordium in the 
moment he quotes from book four. Far from the force of his words being a general caution 
against apostrophe with an occasional allowing, he in fact raises the notion that apostrophe 
should be left out of an exordium only to dismantle it.28 ‘Quod si accidat, quo iure aut qua tanta 
superstitione prohibeamur dare per hanc figuram sententiae vires?’, ‘if it happens like this, by 
what law or how great a superstition are we disallowed from lending more force to our 
sentiment by the employment of this figure [that is, apostrophe]?’: the ‘law’ that one shouldn’t 
apostrophise in the introduction to a speech is a base superstition, Quintilian writes (and this the 
sentence just after Culler stops quoting), which, as he goes on to show at some length, was 
regularly flouted by Demosthenes and Cicero.29 
 
This is not the only relevant aspect of Quintilian’s account of apostrophe which Culler’s brief 
summary omits. In book nine, Quintilian appears to suggest that when it comes to apostrophe it 
is just as important that the speaker turns away to address someone else as that the listener is 
turned away by the speaker: ‘sed illa quoque vocatur aversio, quae a proposita quaestione abducit 
audientem: Non ego cum Danais Troianam exscindere gentem / Aulide iuravi’, ‘but it is also called this 
[apostrophe] when a turning away is occasioned in the listener by the subject in question: ‘I did 
not swear with the Greeks at Aulis that I would exterminate the Trojan people’’ (Quintilian, 
IX.ii.39, vol. 3, p. 396). This might be expected since the Greek word στρεφειν – from which 
                                                        
28 For even more on the problems with Culler’s claims about embarrassment, see Gavin Hopps, ‘Beyond 
Embarrassment: A Post-Secular Reading of Apostrophe’, Romanticism, 11.2 (2005), 224–241. 
29 The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, with an English translation by H. E. Butler (London, 1921), 4 vols, IV.i.64, vol. 2, p. 
40. Translation mine. All further references will be given to book, chapter and section number, followed by the 




‘apostrophe’ is formed – has a strong identity both as an intransitive and transitive verb. Thus 
‘apostrophe’ might equally mean ‘I turn away [from someone to someone else]’ and ‘I turn 
[someone] away [to something else]’, and in the latter case has a less clear relationship with 
address than in Culler’s account (the example Quintilian quotes, from Aeneid 4, contains the 
words Dido asks Anna to speak to the departing Aeneas (whom she hopes to turn away (back) 
to Carthage), but no direct address to him (‘non ego’, and not ‘non te’)). This cements the 
conclusion that Culler’s equation of apostrophe and address tells only half of apostrophe’s story, 
and that apostrophe is a figure to which some fundamental doubleness is inherent, with which 
lyric poems might sometimes play. In poems, both aspects of apostrophe can be ‘each eternally 
on [their] own side’: to address is get no answer; an answer will not come from address.30 In this 
way apostrophe might function as a lens through which to consider the oddness, sense of near-
miss or often outright failure, of a poem’s attempts to interact with what lies beyond it. 
 
Adonais and discursive time 
 
Having defended Culler from the attacks of Kneale and Findlay, Paul Alpers writes that ‘the final 
defence of Culler is that his account of […] apostrophe is productive when one turns to the 
poems themselves’ (Alpers, p. 4). As this chapter comes to its conclusion, I want to test this 
conclusion by turning to two poems, at length, which will also further help to suggest an 
alternative account of the figure. The first is Shelley’s Adonais, which plays a crucial role in 
‘Apostrophe’, first as the subject of one of the two ‘[c]lassic essays’ which are said to make no 
mention of the ‘problem’ of apostrophe, and then as the first example Culler deploys in the 
attempt to justify the claim that ‘the lyric is characteristically the triumph of the apostrophic 
[over narrative]’ (Culler, ‘Apostrophe’, p. 66). It is, indeed, one of only two poems mentioned by 
name – canonically significant though they may be – which Culler thinks have been misread by 
his precursors as a result of their repression of apostrophe (the other being Wordsworth’s ode, 
‘Intimations of Immortality’).31 Much, then, is at stake in Culler’s use of Adonais as example. Let’s 
see if we find we want to say what he wants to say about the poem. Adonais re-enters the 
                                                        
30 I am borrowing the translated words of Giorgio Agamben in The End of the Poem: Studies in Poetics, trans. Daniel 
Heller-Roazen (Stanford, 1999), p. 114 (he is writing instead about a (related) gap between sound and sense). 
31 I will not discuss this ode here. Kneale has offered a convincing response to Culler’s treatment of George N. 
Shuster, whose The English Ode from Milton to Keats (New York, 1940) functions as ‘Apostrophe’s’ most sustained 
example of previous critical repression of apostrophe. Shuster writes that ‘[t]he element of address is of no especial 
significance, being merely a reflection of the classical influence’ (pp. 11–12), from which Culler concludes that 
‘apostrophe is insignificant because conventional’ (Culler, ‘Apostrophe’, p. 60). But Culler has conflated apostrophe 
and address here. The ‘standard “element of address”’, writes Kneale, has been ‘mistaken for the tropological 




argument just after Culler has described a fourth level of apostrophe, in which poems ‘parody 
their own apostrophic procedures’ in such a way as to effect ‘an act of radical interiorisation and 
solipsism’, in which apostrophes ‘function as nodes or concretisations of stages in a drama of 
mind’ (Culler, ‘Apostrophe’, pp. 64, 66). As my opening summary outlined, apostrophes here 
become addresses not to other people or objects but to aspects of the self of the addresser, 
either in such a way that aspects of that self are expanded to fill the world, or that aspects of the 
world are internalised. Shelley’s prose is invoked in the process of making this argument, as 
Culler quotes the final sentence of the following passage from ‘On Life’: 
 
The view of life presented by the most refined deductions of the intellectual philosophy, 
is that of unity. Nothing exists but as it is perceived. The difference is merely nominal 
between those two classes of thought, which are vulgarly distinguished by the names of 
ideas and of external objects. Pursuing the same thread of reasoning, the existence of 
distinct individual minds, similar to that which is employed in now questioning its own 
nature, is likewise found to be a delusion. The words I, you, they, are not signs of any 
actual difference subsisting between the assemblage of thoughts thus indicated, but are 
merely marks employed to denote the different modifications of the one mind.32 
 
Shelley’s belief in an essential unity leads him to reject any ‘actual difference’ between the 
thoughts of different minds, which are not actually distinct. These claims for a universal mind 
find themselves appropriated as Culler deploys Shelley’s ‘the one mind’ to mean, instead, the 
mind of an individual self, with no acknowledgement of the move. We might do well, then, to be 
wary of the wider context of the eight lines from Adonais which Culler quotes, as he takes the 
poem as a typical example of apostrophic triumph, set in a ‘time of discourse rather than story’, 
in which individual moments and objects ‘resist being organised into events that can be narrated 
for they are inserted in the poem as elements of the event which the poem is attempting to be’ 
(Culler, ‘Apostrophe’, p. 66). Nothing happens in Adonais, and that is because ‘[n]othing need 
happen because the poem itself is to be the happening’ (Culler, ‘Apostrophe’, p. 67). Here is the 
example, in full: 
 
The tension between the narrative and the apostrophic can be seen as the generative 
force behind a whole series of lyrics. One might identify, for example, as instances of the 
triumph of the apostrophic, poems which, in a very common move, substitute a fictional, 
non-temporal opposition for a temporal one, substitute a temporality of discourse for a 
referential temporality. In lyrics of this kind a temporal problem is posed: something 
once present has been lost or attenuated; this loss can be narrated but the temporal 
sequence is irreversible, like time itself. Apostrophes displace this irreversible structure 
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by removing the opposition between presence and absence from empirical time and 
locating it in a discursive time. The temporal movement from A to B, internalized by 
apostrophe, becomes a reversible alternation between A’ and B’: a play of absence 
governed not by time but by poetic power. 
The clearest example of this structure is of course the elegy which replaces an irreversible 
temporal disjunction, the move from life to death, with a dialectical alternation between 
attitudes of mourning and consolation, evocations of absence and presence. In Shelley’s 
‘Adonais’, for example, the apostrophes give us an alternation which is reversible in the 
temporality of discourse: 
 
O, weep for Adonais – he is dead!      
 Wake, melancholy Mother, wake and weep!     
 Yet wherefore? Quench within their burning bed    
 Thy fiery tears, … 
 
  Most musical of mourners, weep again!     
  Lament anew, Urania! 
 
  Mourn not for Adonais …       
  Ye caverns and ye forests, cease to moan! 
 
Moving back and forth between these two postures, the poem displaces the temporal 
pattern of actual loss and, focusing on these two apostrophic commands, makes the 
power of its own evocativeness a central issue. (Culler, ‘Apostrophe’, p. 67) 
 
Culler paints a picture of a poem which continually alternates between the command to mourn 
Adonais and the command to leave him be, as a real, empirical temporality is replaced by a 
temporality of discourse. To test this properly, we’ll need to consider the poem at greater length 
than the eight lines to which ‘Apostrophe’ attends. But it is possible to say something by 
beginning minutely, turning to the first line that Culler quotes (the first of stanza three). The 
possible syntactical functions of the dash in ‘O, weep for Adonais – he is dead!’ are many: weep 
because he is dead; weep – but no, he is dead, weeping would be fruitless; weep for him dying – 
in fact I have just heard he is dead! There are facets of this sentence which would be seriously 
troubled by the notion that the irreversible death of Adonais might be displaced or reversed in 
any way; it’s as if, in the second case, the apostrophe breaks down on the dash, writes itself over 
before it gets going. There is a kind of precursor to this effect which can be found in Shelley’s 









The manuscript, in Shelley’s hand, appears to suggest that Shelley first wrote ‘I mourn Adonis –’, 
‘then’, as Geoffrey Matthews and Kelvin Everest recount, ‘wrote a word which is possibly 
“dead” or “loved” and cancelled it, writing above another now illegible word (possibly “loved” 
or “lost”) which he then also cancelled; and “dead” was then written to the left of this cancelled 
word and above the original dash’.33 But it is not quite ‘above’: ‘dead’ joins to ‘Adonis’ before the 
dash’s start, and Adonis is made dead in this translation by the actual physical process of writing, 
by running out of space. ‘I mourn Adonis dead – loveliest Adonis – / Dead, dead Adonis – and 
the Loves lament’ (Shelley, p. 698). The beginning of Bion’s epitaph sees the translating Shelley 
spin out of nothing the sense of mourning to death. I mourn him dead, I make him dead by 
mourning, each line I speak re-deads him, revives him and re-deads him. This is not a 
phenomenon which is confined to handwritten corrections on a small page. If we have the 
feeling, as Norbert Elias describes it, that ‘the only way in which a dead person lives on is in the 
memory of the living’, then in the living’s forgetting there is the potential for death to re-occur.34 
As soon as I start mourning, I have raised the dead; as soon as I stop, the dead die again. Adonais 
begins, ‘I weep for Adonais – he is dead! / O, weep for Adonais!’.35 Already repeating itself after 
one line, needing to take a breath after four words, we can read this as an opening which comes 
into being spontaneously and then suddenly realises the stakes of its existence, like someone 
having absently taken a step out of an apparent door quickly realising that he is standing on a 
narrow platform of scaffolding attached to a fifth-floor window. Reading the poem in this way, 
the notion that it is happily untroubled by Adonais’ death, having comfortably shifted it into a 
discursive temporality, seems quite wrong. The poem is preoccupied by the fact that, whatever 
temporalities may exist within it, it is bound by a larger temporality which involves its needing to 
come to an end; an end in which the dead it has resurrected in mourning will be killed again. 
 
Of course, the opening of Shelley’s poem, the whole of which he described as a ‘highly wrought 
piece of art’, does not come into being spontaneously.36 Reading the poem in this way leaves us 
with an Adonais which is radically insincere. The circumstances of composition might seem to 
support this reading. On receiving a detailed account of Keats’s death (after writing Adonais), 
Shelley wrote, ‘I do not think that if I had seen it before that I could have composed my poem’ 
                                                        
33 The Poems of Shelley: 1817–1819, ed. Geoffrey Matthews and Kelvin Everest (London, 2003), p. 698. Photograph is 
reproduced in Fair-copy Manuscripts of Shelley’s Poems in European and American Libraries, ed. Donald H. Reimann and 
Michael O’Neill (London, 1997), p. 262. 
34 Norbert Elias, The Loneliness of the Dying, trans. Edmund Jephcott (New York, 2001), p. 33. 
35 Percy Bysshe Shelley, Adonais, p. 235, in The Poems of Shelley: 1820–1821, ed. Michael Rossington, Jack Donovan 
and Kelvin Everest (Oxford, 2014), pp. 235–330. 




(Letters, vol. 2, pp. 299–300). When Angela Leighton sums up ‘the central theme of the poem [as] 
how to express inexpressible grief’, we might want to ask, whose grief?37 There is grief in the 
poem but the poem is not grieving, and doesn’t take grieving seriously. It is a poem which ends 
with a farewell to life, knows all along that grief is fruitless and not required, for it ends by going 
towards Adonais in the realm of the Eternal. The bulk of the poem might, then, seem to be 
pretence. 
 
My aim here is not to offer a ‘correct’ reading to rebut Culler’s, but to show some of the many 
aspects of potential meaning which ‘Apostrophe’s’ account of Shelley’s poem precludes. There 
are, nevertheless, quite significant factual errors in Culler’s reading of the poem, which a turn to 
Earl Wasserman’s once influential account will help us to illuminate.38 We are not, equally, going 
to shy away from Wasserman’s own problems, which are present, and which our brief 
exploration of Adonais’ insincerity will help us to explore.39 Wasserman has convincingly argued, 
with meticulous attention to patterns of imagery in the poem, that Adonais divides into three 
sections. The first, comprising stanzas one to seventeen, holds the ‘general tentative’ hypothesis 
that ‘everything is Nature, man as well as other matter; and that all Nature moves in time to its 
own annihilation’.40 Adonais is equated with Nature on the grounds that ‘Adonis was usually 
interpreted in the fertility myth […as] the sun-god’, hence ‘the quality of chill [which] permeates 
the first movement’ (Wasserman, p. 314). The ‘death of Adonais and the setting of the sun’ are 
contained in one expression, and the expectation is thus that Adonais, like the sun, will rise again 
(Wasserman, p. 318). This expectation builds tension, as the first movement of the poem owns a 
‘quasi-dramatic progress’ through  
 
being placed in a context of passing time, for with the death of Adonais the nature cycle 
begins the closing phase of its rotation. When the poem opens, it is still ‘blue Italian day’ 
(59). Day yields to twilight (65) as the shadow spreads (66) and the law of darkness 
begins to operate (71–72). At length it is night, and the moon (83, 107) and stars (91) 
appear. Since the death of Nature is also the death of its deity, the ending of day and the 
cessation of Adonais’ life are really one (stanza 8). (Wasserman, pp. 316–7) 
 
The narrative of the poem’s first section is one which Culler misses, or represses, in describing 
Adonais as a ‘triumph of the apostrophic’; Wasserman shows us that a focus on the poem’s 
                                                        
37 Angela Leighton, ‘Adonais: The Voice and the Text’, Keats-Shelley Memorial Bulletin, 31 (1980), 39–51, p. 42. 
38 Anthony D. Knerr, in 1984, described Wasserman’s essay as ‘[p]erhaps the single most important recent study of 
[Adonais]’; Anthony D. Knerr, Shelley’s Adonais: A Critical Edition (New York, 1984), p. 128. 
39 The aim here is by no means an uncomplicated ‘rescue’ of a ‘New Critic’; I turn to Wasserman here since his 
account of Adonais’ narrative structure is particularly illuminating to the argument at hand. 




‘temporality of discourse’ at the expense of its internal chronology misses crucial textures of its 
meaning. ‘The progress of time will reveal that Nature’s cessation has been only temporary’ – 
despite Morning’s grief-stricken but momentary neglecting of her duties in stanza fourteen – and 
‘the discovery that nature […] is reborn brings with it full revelation that Adonais does not also 
revive: “He will awake no more, oh, never more” (190)’ (Wasserman, p. 319). The poem, as 
Wasserman describes it, thus moves into a second section, in which the ‘implied materialistic 
monism of the first movement has […] evolved into a dualism of Nature, which forever passes 
through a cycle of life, death, and rebirth, and Mind (Adonais), which terminates in decay’ 
(Wasserman, pp. 319–20). This is why, in stanza twenty-five, Urania – still implored to mourn at 
this stage of the poem – ‘can, at best, cause the breath to revisit [Adonais] for a moment and 
then must yield to Death the victory’; matter passes ‘through an endless cycle’ but mind ends ‘in 
annihilation’ (Wasserman, pp. 320, 327). The final movement of the poem, beginning with stanza 
thirty-eight, adjusts its hypothesis again, realising that 
 
 Thou canst not soar where he is sitting now. –  
 Dust to the dust! but the pure spirit shall flow 
 Back to the burning fountain whence it came, 
 A portion of the Eternal, which must glow 
 Through time and change, unquenchably the same. (Adonais, pp. 311–2) 
 
‘Ultimate reality is neither matter nor vitality, but spirit’, and Adonais’ spirit lives on; he ‘will 
awake forever’ (Wasserman, pp. 328, 329). 
 
Culler’s selected quotations need to be understood in this context of the poem’s progress. 
‘Mourn not for Adonais … / Ye caverns and ye forests, cease to moan!’, the final two lines 
Culler quotes, occur in stanza forty-one, just as Adonais has proceeded into its final movement, 
which has now understood spirit to be the ultimate reality, and thus can comfortably bring all 
mourning to an end. Of course, the poem has often doubted its own hypotheses in the holding – 
Wasserman admits that ‘[t]he first movement, however, is not quite the self-contained statement 
this analysis has implied, for it continually tends to break out of its own boundaries and 
undermine its own assertions’ (Wasserman, p. 318) – and so there has been some wavering with 
regard to the correct course of action. But the phenomenon which Culler describes is finally not 
a reversible alternation but a one-time movement from a command to mourn to a command to 





My aim has been to show how Culler’s theory about lyric and apostrophe has led to him placing 
too much emphasis on one particular aspect of Adonais, and thus to him missing many other 
aspects which contribute to its meaning. Adonais has been twisted out of shape to fit a theory; 
the theory hasn’t been twisted to accommodate Adonais. We may, of course, want ultimately to 
say something similar of Wasserman’s essay, which soon comes to carry something of the 
flavour of biblical exegesis, as it wrenches the final part of Adonais into a condition of bringing to 
fruition and redeeming the first two. His approach sees the poem as a kind of reimagined libri 
salomonis, the progression in the three books ascribed to Solomon running from Proverbs – 
written for a ‘young person’ – to Ecclesiastes – written for ‘a man of a mature age’ – to the Song 
of Songs – written for that man who has been ‘perfected and prepared by treading the present 
age undefoot’.41 Hugh of St Cher, using Jerome, refers to the stages of the progression as the 
‘triplex status hominis’ (three stages of man).42 Once again, the problem with Wasserman’s 
critical approach is that it prioritises something other than the text (it robs Ecclesiastes of its 
stark and stand-alone world-weariness; it robs Adonais of its final Troilus moment (in Chaucer’s 
Troilus and Criseyde), its gazing down at the world and deciding there is nothing left for it, in 
reascribing value to the first two sections of the poem where it was found that there was none).43 
But despite these serious flaws in Wasserman’s account, it nonetheless proceeds through 
attentive textual consideration, and grasps the poem’s logic. Its problem is that, confronting the 
profoundly odd and unnerving nature of Adonais, its radical insincerity as it mourns in the full 
knowledge of mourning’s inefficacy, it decides to temper that oddness through the eventual 
application of what in this case happens to be a soothing religious structure. Wasserman is not 
embarrassed by apostrophe, but he may be embarrassed by insincerity. 
 
‘Sonnet’: towards a different account 
 
In the final section of this chapter, I want to gather together some of the thoughts on 
apostrophe which we have seen expressed and gesture towards the beginnings of an alternative 
account. Let’s consider, again, the potential doubleness of apostrophe which is brought out by 
Quintilian: apostrophe as a turning aside, and apostrophe as causing another to turn. One, of 
course, is easier than the other. A turning away is something one can do regardless of whether or 
not the person or thing to whom one turns is really there or can really hear; turning them or their 
attention away is something that can only be done if one’s listener is capable of response, 
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42 See Eric C. Christiansen, Ecclesiastes through the Centuries (Oxford, 2007), p. 39. 




attention, and movement. Consider the child or doubter’s prayer – ‘O God – if you’re there’ – 
which seems to capture this double aspect of apostrophe, and might variously be heard as a 
request for something to happen made to someone to whom one is not sure one can turn or 
does not know where to turn to find him or a turn to someone whom one is sure one can 
address but is unsure of whether that address will produce any effect. We can see this double 
aspect at play in many poems. Here it is in Tennyson’s In Memoriam A. H. H., as the poem 
lurches into a sudden wish for the dead person to respond, cast uncertainly between emphasis 
and address (remembering J. H. Prynne’s ‘hybrid formations’), preceded by a profusion of 
conditionals, uncertain as to whether any ‘dim touch of earthly things’ will ever reach him: 
 
And in the long harmonious years 
   (If Death so taste Lethean springs) 
   May some dim touch of earthly things 
Surprise thee ranging with thy peers. 
 
If such a dreamy touch should fall, 
   O turn thee round, resolve the doubt; 
   My guardian angel will speak out 
In that high place, and tell thee all.44 
 
‘O turn thee round, resolve the doubt’ that you can indeed hear me: the poem’s address to the 
dead undercuts itself, trips itself up, finds itself caught between an address to another and an 
address which returns to itself. These uncertain spaces between address and emphasis are 
overwritten by Culler’s insistence on ‘levels’ of apostrophe, which allow no potential for the 
cohabitation of and interaction between different attitudes to the act of address in the same 
poem, or phrase. We might want to read Tennyson’s ‘O’ here, as Culler has all ‘O’s’, as ‘the pure 
O of undifferentiated voicing’ (Culler, ‘Apostrophe’, p. 63), but we might also want to read it as 
an expression of exasperation, or of anxiety. As the argument of ‘Apostrophe’ moves 
methodically through its levels, claiming either that apostrophe ‘enforce[s …] an animicity 
[which] is independent of any claims made about the actual properties of the object addressed’ 
(Culler, ‘Apostrophe’, p. 62) or that what apostrophe addresses is essentially an aspect of the 
addresser’s self, it misses all those instances where an apostrophe is troubled by an ‘animicity’ it 
may or may not be able to effect, is aware both that it is or might be addressing someone else 
and itself.  
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The claim that, ‘[d]evoid of semantic reference, the O of apsotrophe refers to other apostrophes 
and thus to the lineage and conventions of sublime poetry’ (Culler, ‘Apostrophe’, p. 63) is 
structuralist in spirit. In a useful attempt to describe that spirit, Raymond Tallis recalls the claims 
of Stéphane Mallarmé (whom he locates in a ‘central position’ in the development of 
structuralism), that a ‘poem was not a repository for a poet’s feelings and intuitions but an 
experiment with the system of language; or an attempt to discover the system’, and of Roland 
Barthes, that ‘it is language which speaks, not the author; to write is, through a prerequisite 
impersonality… to reach that point where only language acts, “performs”, and not “me”’.45 
Veronica Forrest-Thomson, a poet and critic who was well versed in such claims, and must 
indeed have debated them endlessly with her once-husband, Jonathan Culler, was wary of their 
totalising thrust.46 Central to her ‘Sonnet’, the poem we’re about to read, is a tension between 
individual feeling and general system and tradition, as the poem considers the possibilities and 
limitations of address. As they speak of a passage from individual voice to linguistic system, 
Mallarmé and Barthes tell us that the ‘I’ and ‘you’ of lyric poems refer not to real or fictional 
things or people but become a general ‘I’ and ‘You’, comments upon the act and tradition of 
expressing oneself in poetic language. This view of lyric naturally precludes the possibility that a 
poet might want to write a poem for any other reason than to produce a linguistic experiment in 
a long tradition of similar experiments. Examples which demonstrate the paucity of such a view 
are everywhere and easy to find (one might start with poems which address specific people in a 
title or epigraph, for instance). I take ‘Sonnet’ as my example because it takes the structuralist 
claim so seriously, is troubled by the possibility that there may be no way for its ‘I’ and ‘you’ to 
connect with the outside world. The question which ‘Sonnet’ implicitly asks is, ‘what if I actually 
just want to write a poem for you?’.  
 
Culler’s version of apostrophe, and then of ‘lyric address’, as it is presented in Theory of the Lyric, 
is protected from such questions, and thus cannot account for such poems as ‘Sonnet’, for it is 
sure that ‘to address someone directly – an individual or an audience – one would not write a 
poem’ (Culler, Theory, p. 243). Forrest-Thomson herself, indeed, in her critical prose, enquires, if 
someone is ‘talking about something outside the poem, be it feelings or his ideas or his situation, 
                                                        
45 Raymond Tallis, Not Saussure: A Critique of Post-Saussurean Literary Theory (Basingstoke, 1988), p. 5, and Roland 
Barthes, ‘The Death of the Author’, p. 143, in Image – Music – Text, trans. Stephen Heath (London, 1977), pp. 142–8, 
in Tallis, p. 6. 
46 For an account of Forrest-Thomson’s familiarity with contemporary French theory, see the introduction to Poetic 




[…] why should he bother to write a poem?’.47 Poetic Artifice, from which those words are taken, 
might appear to provide an illuminating example for this thesis of a productive tussle between 
realistic and theoretical spirits: Keston Sutherland, who is often prone to mis-representation in 
his account of Forrest-Thomson, nonetheless well describes her critical theory as ‘an unstable 
mixture of insistences from New Criticism, from Pound’s most bullyingly aestheticist prose, 
from Wittgenstein on language games and from numerous currents of structuralism, notably 
Barthes’s work on language and myth’.48 I do not want to dwell at great length on Forrest-
Thomson’s critical writing, however, for two reasons. The first of these is its insistence on 
locating a difference between poetry and prose in the presence of the former’s internal features, 
its ‘artifice’, rather than, more viably, in a context of intentionality (the argument I’ll be making in 
my fourth chapter). The second is simply that such tussles between spirits, general and particular, 
theory and practice, are more genuine, sustained, and interesting in her poetry than her prose; 
where, for instance, the complexity of the question of why one bothers to write a poem cannot 
be so offhandedly dismissed. Whereas Poetic Artifice ends with the simple claim that ‘like all true 
artificers “I” remains enigmatical, presenting only the words on the page’, Forrest-Thomson’s 
poetry – as I’ll argue as my reading of ‘Sonnet’ develops – occasionally suggests something more 
hopeful, some escape from the radical interiority of being sent ‘back inside the poem again’ 
(Forrest-Thomson, Artifice, p. 163).  
 
The claim that to communicate with someone directly one would not write a poem is deaf to the 
mutability of self: to the possibility that one’s existence as poet might be an integral part of one’s 
being, if not the integral one; that addressing another in a poem might be the truest form of 
interaction of which one might feel capable.49 In a preface which we will read more fully in a 
moment, Forrest-Thomson described her final collection, On the Periphery, as forming a ‘quest for 
another human being’.50 Of course, she may not be being entirely straight with us. ‘Sonnet’, the 
final poem of the collection, is one which springs out of a tension between acceptance and 
rejection, parody and prophecy. This is a tension which might be better described as the 
‘generative force behind a whole series of lyrics’ than as Culler’s ‘tension between the narrative 
                                                        
47 Veronica Forrest-Thomson, Poetic Artifice: A Theory of Twentieth-Century Poetry (Manchester, 1978), p. 5. I will be 
quoting from this edition, and not Gareth Farmer’s, which introduces errors into the text. 
48 Keston Sutherland, ‘Veronica Forrest-Thomson for Readers’, Kenyon Review Online 
(https://www.kenyonreview.org/wp-content/uploads/Sutherland.pdf, accessed 29/08/19). 
49 Nobuyuki Yuasa writes that the Japanese poet Matsuo Bashō, for instance, saw his ‘true identity’ as the 
‘everlasting self which is poetry’ (Matsuo Bashō, The Narrow Road to the Deep North and Other Travel Sketches, trans. 
Nobuyuki Yuasa (London, 1966), p. 30). Composing a poem for another was also an integral part of medieval 
Japanese culture (for numerous instances see, to cite the most obvious literary example, Murasaki Shikibu, The Tale of 
Genji, trans. Royall Tyler (London, 2016)).  




and the apostrophic’, an idea which we saw break down in Adonais. I take Forrest-Thomson’s 
poem as example to show that, in a single poem, along with a notion of apostrophe as a vital, 
powerful, prophetic act, there can simultaneously exist a notion of apostrophe as something 
fundamentally internal and close-looped. Poems can struggle along the borderlines between 
turning themselves and causing others to turn, between the two senses of apostrophe. They can 
also resist, as they struggle to carve out an identity for themselves, the kind of totalising theory 
which claims that it already knows what they are. 
 
SONNET          
  
My love, if I write a song for you       
 To that extent you are gone        
 For, as everyone says, and I know it’s true:      
 We are always alone. 
 
Never so separate trying to be two       
 And the busy old fool is right.        
 To try and finger myself from you      
 Distinguishes day from night. 
 
If I say ‘I love you’ we can’t but laugh      
 Since irony knows what we’ll say.       
 If I try to free myself by my craft      
 You vary as night from day. 
 
So, accept the wish for the deed my dear.      
 Words were made to prevent us near.51 
 
Any poem calling itself ‘Sonnet’ inhabits a space between two kinds of non-existence. ‘Sonnet’ 
suggests it cannot exist alone but might, too, be swamped by company. ‘The idea of an identity 
of course assumes that there is something, or someone, that one is identical to, as though one’s 
identity is always one’s elusive double’.52 Who I am tumbles down either side of a narrow ridge: 
my identity is not complete without another; the attempt to define my identity always sees me 
slip into defining something that is not me. 
 
A lyric poem provides a particular lens through which to think about the space for ‘I’ and the 
space for ‘you’. Or, better, identity in a lyric poem might be the elusive double of lived identity. 
‘I’ becomes at once the ‘I’ writing and a trope. ‘I’ is this poem and all poems.  
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It is possible to read ‘Sonnet’ as a straight rejection of writing. Despite Forrest-Thomson’s own 
admirable wariness, in her criticism, of ‘bad naturalisation’ – a too-quick attempt to translate a 
poem ‘into a statement about the non-verbal external world’ (see Forrest-Thomson, Artifice, p. 
xi) – it is impossible to ignore the potential biographical overtones of ‘the deed’: suddenly we see 
a wish for suicide (this is a poem published posthumously by a woman who may well have killed 
herself), read the poem as a last note.53 Thus this would be a poem which would obediently sit 
on Culler’s level of ‘parody’. But this is a poem not (merely) about one kind of non-existence but 
about (and attempting to effect, perhaps) the possibility of the creation of a space where 
existence can happen. Another way of reading ‘accept the wish for the deed’ places the emphasis 
on the wish: accept at least my wish to write you a song, even though I cannot write you a song. 
And we can read this as bitterly sarcastic to support the bleakest of readings, only up to the point 
at which we remember that this wish is still presented in the form of a poem, though it may or 
may not be a song.  
 
One learns in reading a poem by Forrest-Thomson – who was so fond of tripping and forcing 
rereadings, being preoccupied with busting through unsatisfactory modes of reading – that so 
often, as soon as one thinks one has settled on an interpretation that seems correct, to that 
extent it is gone.54 First there is the trip for that reader who has managed to read On the Periphery 
to its end (‘Sonnet’ is the collection’s last poem) and who has not realised, despite its eye on the 
pastoral (see ‘Pastoral’ (p. 123) and ‘Not Pastoral Enough’ (p. 124)), that ‘My love’ are the words 
of the passionate shepherd as much as of ‘Sonnet’. But then the confident, well-versed reader 
who knows his or her Marlowe stumbles over the jarring ‘[t]o that extent’, the first of this 
poem’s many not-quite-comprehensible phrases. If your gone-ness is not measurable there may 
still be a space for you within ‘you’. (It’s a space which finds one possible outlet in time, in the 
suggestion that I might write a song for you, of a certain length, before you are gone.) 
 
                                                        
53 These are not overtones, I think, which Forrest-Thomson the critic would necessarily have wanted us to try to 
ignore. There is ‘good naturalisation’ as well as bad, she acknowledges; ‘[c]ritical reading cannot, of course, avoid 
Naturalisation altogether. Criticism is committed, after all, to helping us to understand both poetry as an institution 
and individual poems as significant utterances’ (Forrest-Thomson, Artifice, p. xi). To employ biographical 
information in the attempt to read a poem is not inconsistent with Forrest-Thomson’s critical project, as long as 
such information is not prioritised over the many other elements which make that poem up. 
54 In an introduction to a reading of her poem ‘Richard II’ (which she was not ultimately able to give), Forrest-
Thomson wrote that ‘at the present time poetry must progress by deliberately trying to defeat the expectations of its 
readers or hearers’ (Forrest-Thomson, Poems, p. 169). When it comes to interpretation, it might seem that Forrest-
Thomson is thus arguing poetically for something similar to what Culler is arguing for critically: interpretation’s end. 
But in fact coming up with interpretations and having them shift from beneath you is a crucial part of the drama of 




‘[A]lone’ continues to leave undetermined just how far ‘gone’ is gone. The word’s so-near miss 
with ‘gone’ in rhyme, like an erotic longing unfulfilled, conjures at once a tantalising proximity 
and an unbridgeable distance.55 If ‘everyone says [it], and I know it’s true’, I am similarly close to 
and far from others: in a company ever slipping into the vagueness of cliché, the unwanted adage 
which offends with its trite pretension to encompass the various existences of the changing me. 
(This poem speaks to the simultaneous comfort and burden of general experience, one facet of 
addressing the value of address.) And the proverb, when it comes, exemplifies the point, the 
first-person plural pulling against ‘alone’, those two ‘al’ sounds summoning the ghost of ‘all’. We 
are not alone, at all, if we can still speak of a ‘we’. In one context – of a real statement meant to 
console – this phrase might be frustratingly experienced as undercutting itself, provoke the 
angst-ridden cry of the solitary melancholic, you think you understand me but you don’t, how 
can you, for you are you and I am me. In another – the uncertain dynamic of ‘Sonnet’s’ I and 
you – it might too suggest the solidarity of a two: I have found you, my love, my double, who 
else in the world do we need? 
 
Always one step ahead the poem delivers a phrase which – it’s becoming a familiar pattern – 
supports and troubles this latter reading. Encouraged once again by the gappy syntax, as the 
clause has no subject or main verb, the ambiguity all hinges on the ‘so’: ‘we’re never as separate, 
when we’re trying to be two’; ‘we’re never so separate as when we’re trying to be two’. Which 
one the busy old fool is right in saying remains as unclear as whether or not the busy old fool is 
in fact saying this at all. Sophie Read writes that this line has the feel of an allusion, which may 
itself be right: ‘the line feels, to my hypothetical ignorant reader, as if there is something she 
ought to know about it: it looks like an allusion’.56 Forrest-Thomson’s poems often feel as if they 
want hypothetical ignorant readers, or want us to conjure them; real readers (mostly final-year 
school students) with whom I have discussed ‘Sonnet’ have been ignorant of the Donne poem 
to which this line refers, but also of the feeling of allusion. This may not contradict Read’s point 
but does help us embark on a discussion of whether this poem can be made to ‘work’ by itself 
(interpretatively), or whether it needs another – which is, of course, another way ‘Sonnet’ 
approaches the questions of identity it has at its heart. One intelligent student attempted a 
domestic explanation which I had not previously considered: ‘busy old fool’ as wearied words in 
                                                        
55 On the erotics of rhyme see, for example, Eric Griffiths, ‘Blanks, misgivings, fallings from us’, in The Salt 
Companion to Peter Robinson, ed. Adam Piette and Katy Price (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 55–84.   
56 Sophie Read, ‘Veronica Forrest-Thomson’s Acts of Articulation’, Kenyon Review Online (accessed 10th October, 
2017). Critics, myself included, like to conjure imaginary readers when writing about Forrest-Thomson’s poetry. 




a lovers’ tiff, an interpretation which fits somewhat well with the initial stanza’s cliché and with 
Forrest-Thomson’s concern as poet-critic with ‘domestics’.57 Day and night seemed to cause little 
problem, perhaps feeling legitimate enough in their generality that students did not feel the need 
to ask themselves how they might be incorporated into an interpretative understanding which 
‘Sonnet’ demands. 
 
My feeling, to that extent I can know, is that unsurprisingly the answer lies somewhere in the 
middle, that the poem can and can’t be made to cohere without a turn to Donne.58 Unsurprising 
because once again ‘Sonnet’ is finding a way to interrogate that space between itself and another 
within which it might possibly be said to properly exist, on either side of which, again, lie the 
twin troughs of not being enough without another and losing oneself in that other. And 
naturally, as I quote now in this chapter Donne’s poem in its entirety, we’re going to lurch 
towards the latter trough: 
 
The Sunne Rising. 
 
Busie old foole, unruly Sunne, 
 Why dost thou thus, 
Through windowes, and through curtaines call on us? 
Must to thy motions lovers seasons run? 
 Sawcy pedantique wretch, goe chide 
 Late schoole boyes and sowre prentices, 
   Goe tell Court-huntsmen, that the King will ride, 
   Call countrey ants to harvest offices; 
Love, all alike, no season knowes, nor clyme, 
Nor houres, dayes, moneths, which are the rags of time. 
 
 Thy beames, so reverend, and strong 
 Why shouldst thou thinke? 
I could eclipse and cloud them with a winke, 
But that I would not lose her sight so long: 
 If her eyes have not blinded thine, 
 Looke, and to morrow late, tell mee,  
   Whether both th’India’s of spice and Myne 
   Be where thou leftst them, or lie here with mee. 
Aske for those Kings whom thou saw’st yesterday, 
And thou shalt heare, All here in one bed lay. 
 
 
                                                        
57 I owe this formulation to Edith Franklin.  
58 I am using ‘New Critical’ terms here. My argument is ultimately that a poem can be coherent in its incoherence; 
that poems are often much more aware of their own problems and inconsistencies than the symptomatic readers 
who replaced the ‘New Critics’ gave and give them credit for (and equally that many so-called ‘New Critics’ were 




 She’is all States, and all Princes, I, 
 Nothing else is. 
Princes doe but play us, compar’d to this, 
All honor’s mimique; All wealth alchimie; 
 Thou sunne art halfe as happy’as wee, 
 In that the world’s contracted this. 
   Thine age askes ease, and since thy duties bee 
   To warme the world, that’s done in warming us. 
Since here to us, and thou art every where; 
This bed thy center is, these walls, thy spheare.59 
 
Let me start by plundering the poem for a paraphrase.60 A lover berates the sun for ending the 
night of love, first telling him he would be better to shine his light elsewhere, but then (and 
here’s the conceit) deciding that, the sun getting on a bit, and the two lovers forming their own 
complete world, to warm the lovers alone is all the sun needs to do to fulfil its function of 
warming the whole Earth – and the reduced workload will mean that the sun will no longer have 
to take nightly breaks, and thus can be fully happy in a state of constant shining, constant day.  
 
For the reader who did not previously know or could not recall ‘The Sunne Rising’, a hundred 
connections will be becoming apparent. Let’s dive back in at the busy old fool, who of course in 
Donne’s poem makes no claim at all, and so cannot be right or wrong, the whole poem 
addressed to a mouthless sun who does not reply. If there is Culler’s parody of prophetic 
apostrophe going on in ‘Sonnet’, this might be the place, the poem doing its bit, mockingly, to 
leave ‘The Sunne Rising’s’ ‘I’ adrift, shouting at an unresponsive sky (an effect not dissimilar to 
that achieved by Marvell’s ‘Damon the Mower’, in which Damon, grandly claiming to be ‘known 
/ Through all the meadows I have mown’, is then himself mown ‘[b]y his own scythe’).61 But 
prophetic isn’t right for Donne’s playful poem at all, and ‘Sonnet’s’ claim might be better read as 
commenting on the difficulty and problems inherent in alluding to and addressing another poem 
in this way (at once so insufficient and too sufficient an act).  
 
‘To try and finger myself from you’ jars less with its crudeness when read in the context of ‘The 
Sunne Rising’, in one sense a plea for an eternal (illuminated) night of sex. But we can 
understand even more from this line by turning to Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who gives us an 
                                                        
59 John Donne, The Complete English Poems, ed. C. A. Patrides (New York, 1991), pp. 53–4.  
60 Cleanth Brooks made his views on the ‘heresy’ of paraphrase known in The Well Wrought Urn, pp. 192–214. Helen 
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especially useful way of thinking about the kind of boundaries (and their lack) between internal 
self and external world with which ‘Sonnet’ is so preoccupied. Moreover, it is not impossible that 
there is a direct allusion to Merleau-Ponty here, given the significant role played by ‘finger’ in 
both texts (and the fact that Forrest-Thomson, as I have said, was deeply familiar with 
contemporary French theory). Merleau-Ponty writes that we ‘situate ourselves in ourselves and in 
the things, in ourselves and in the other, at the point where, by a sort of chiasm, we become the 
others and we become world’.62 He then gives the example of a finger, whose potential existence 
as finger lies somewhere in the space between its existence as touching and being touched, its 
‘phenomenal’ and ‘objective’ states (Merleau-Ponty, p. 261). To try to separate myself from you 
would be to break Donne’s conceit, because we would no longer form a world, and so night and 
day would once again return (the sun having to return to its old task). And that the poem has 
‘finger’ for separate intensifies the point: I cannot finger myself from you any more than a finger 
can finger itself from its two states of (non-)existence, as thing touching and touched. 
 
The third stanza functions as a kind of interrogation of Merleau-Ponty’s use of ‘world’ next to 
‘The Sunne Rising’s’, world in the plural versus world in the singular, and thus reveals ‘Sonnet’s’ 
own conceit. For us to stand for the world, in Donne’s poem’s sense, we need to be like others, 
and thus we need to say ‘as everyone says’, do as everyone does. But we, within our own world, 
our own I and you, cannot inhabit such words: ‘we can’t but laugh / Since irony knows what 
we’ll say’. To free myself to inhabit them, to rescue new and personal meaning from the 
commonplace, would be to break up the metonymic relation of us to the world too, and so night 
and day again return, and we are alone from all others, and I – perhaps – alone from you.  
 
The final Empsonian line arrives, reinforcing the ambiguity one more time: we are at once 
separated and brought together by the grandiose implication that words were made just for ‘us’.63 
                                                        
62 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, trans. Alphonso Lingis, ed. Claude Lefort (Evanston, 1968), p. 
160. Merleau-Ponty’s borrowing of a rhetorical term to describe a bodily phenomenon contains both a promise that 
writing and the body might touch and a concession that writing which attempts to touch the body will always be 
trapped in itself. There is also probably an allusion to Homer’s ‘rosy-fingered dawn’ here. 
63 By Empsonian I mean lines such as ‘It is the pain, it is the pain endures’, ‘It is this deep blankness is the real thing 
strange’ (Empson, Collected Poems, pp. 22, 81). These speak to the bleakest of readings. It is not unnoteworthy that 
the first lines which come to mind here are first lines: despite ‘[i]t is the pain’s’ stumbling lack of the relative 
pronoun, its repetitive struggle to express, it goes on to be followed by eighteen further lines (of a villanelle, yes, and 
so the struggle endures, but the line also has a heightened generative force). ‘It is this deep blankness is the real thing 
strange’, another first line, is from another poem which might be conceived of as a farewell to poetry; but again, 
there are lines to write, which can still be written, after it has been written. Not absent from the last line of ‘Sonnet’ 
then is a flavour of one-upmanship, a contest of bleakness (as if the poem responds to those lines of ‘East Coker’ to 
which On the Periphery’s ‘preface’ (which we will soon see) points: ‘but there is a competition’), as if the poem is 




‘Words were made to prevent us from coming near’ might be how this line would read if one 
decided to make it a syntactical whole. And the absence of ‘from coming’ follows on from 
‘finger[ing] myself’, recalling the fact that it is not ‘the deed’ but the wish for it that the poem 
asks ‘my dear’ to accept, and so like the death pun in reverse ‘Sonnet’ can’t come and so cannot 
die, both in the simple sense that it can’t finish with a sentence and at the more complex sense of 
sense: ‘[w]ords were made to prevent us near’ is its own little triumph in the face of words as the 
line resists a definitive finality. As I too am resisted: I am prevented from coming near to this 
poem, all its difficulties contradicting and folding over each other and refusing to be ‘solved’, as 
Read says; whereby a solution might be a kind of critical orgasm which ‘Sonnet’ refuses to give. 
‘The Sunne Rising’ is, of course, from Donne’s ‘Songs and Sonets’, and since it is not a sonnet it 
must be a song. And we might want to keep going here, to talk about what ‘Sonnet’ (with that 
‘song’ in its first line) might have to say about the prioritisation of writing over reading (I can 
write something for you which can’t be performed or inhabited?), to find some interpretive key, 
the final point which will render this poem untroubling, which will enable it to be forgotten, to 
no longer exist. 
 
In this poem which holds itself on the edge of an answer, Forrest-Thomson is playing with all of 
this: 
 
Thus also, the last poem ‘Sonnet’ is the love poem I have tried throughout to write 
straight and have been held back from by these technical and sociological difficulties. 
For, as to theme, this book is the chart of three quests. The quest for a style already 
discussed, the quest for a subject other than the difficulty of writing, and the quest for 
another human being. Indeed such equation of love with knowledge and the idea of style 
as their reconciliation is as old as the art itself, for the other person is the personification 
of the other, the unknown, the external world and all one’s craft is necessary to catch 
him. And, of course, being caught as a poetic fiction, as a real person he is gone. And so 
one is left with the poems – what they do and what they suggest as possible. ‘For us 
there is only the trying / The rest is not our business’. (Forrest-Thomson, p. 168) 
 
The word ‘theme’ here recalls Poetic Artifice and the concept of ‘thematic synthesis’, the constant 
reminder that poetry is ‘something other than an external thematic statement about an already-
known world’, its directing of the reader ‘back to rediscover the other levels of organisation’ in a 
poem beyond the thematic (Forrest-Thomson, Artifice, pp. xi, 81). Stated so baldly, it acts as a 
signpost for a knowing act of refusal to reduce the poetry which follows to the level of the 
‘thematic’ alone, as the poems in the collection fail in different ways to achieve, or even embark 
upon, these three ‘quests’. No ‘style’ has clearly been discussed; the collection ends with a poem 




quests for other human beings, certainly, can at least much more efficiently be carried out in 
media other than poems (and here is ‘Sonnet’ suggesting that as soon as a poem is written 
another human being is gone, and gone somewhere we don’t know). That those lines from ‘East 
Coker’ with which Forrest-Thomson finishes this preface are in fact not lines but a line (and a 
heavily punctuated one) – ‘For us, there is only the trying. The rest is not our business.’ – seems, 
then, like something more than a slip of memory.64 In not trying even to get right Eliot’s words 
Forrest-Thomson suggests that she might be up to something with failure. It is in failing to 
achieve its ‘quests’, perhaps, that ‘Sonnet’ achieves them. This is the final volte-face, to 
remember Goyet’s Longinus: ‘Sonnet’ sees the potential for success, to write itself ‘straight’, in 
the space created by its failing; a space created by a tension between parodic internalisation and 
prophetic act which Culler’s account of apostrophe does not allow. Holding in play a wider 
range of apostrophe’s meanings and interstitial spaces helps us to think with the word in a way 
which is useful to our understandings of and interactions with particular poems, instead of being 
bound to use poems with the aim of keeping that range narrow. As we continue to think about 
apostrophe, we might do well to remember that the word, in Antiquity, ‘had a very broad range, 
it was for Greek speakers a living metaphor and the substantive never lost its connection to the 
verb apostrepein’ (Goyet, p. 24). It is time for our discussions to recapture that sense of ‘living 
metaphor’, and leave behind the stale authority of the ‘student handbook’. For as opposed to a 
fixed theoretical account, a mutable, ‘living’ understanding of apostrophe is one which is capable 
of adapting itself to, and being led by, the poems with which it comes into contact.
                                                        




Chapter three: Theory of the Lyric and iterability 
 
Introduction: transition from ‘Apostrophe’ to Theory of the Lyric 
 
As we turn to Theory of the Lyric, it might initially appear that the role played by apostrophe has 
diminished. The figure takes up only one of three sections of a chapter entitled ‘Lyric Address’, 
the first of which is entitled ‘address to listeners or readers’, a phenomenon which is quickly 
described as rare. ‘[B]asic instance[s] of direct address’ typically occur in prefatory or dedicatory 
poems, which ‘are experienced as exceptional, explicitly metapoetic, dependent on the collection 
they introduce’ (Culler, Theory, p. 191). Other instances of direct address, Culler argues, present 
an ambiguous ‘you’ which is ‘not […] easily identified with a reader’, or, where it is, such a 
‘“you” construable as the reader’, according to ‘the authoritative Handbook of Literary Rhetoric’, 
‘has the effect of an apostrophe since it is an unusual turning away from the anonymity of 
readership’ (Culler, Theory, pp. 194, 192).1 It is notable that the attention to hybridity and 
ambiguity which was lacking in ‘Apostrophe’ appears here when a theory is being refuted: the 
moments when Theory of the Lyric breaks free from the reins of its driving general conception 
(which I’ll soon describe) are those when it is able to pay attention to the broadest range of 
examples, and of complexities within them. Culler soon acknowledges that his position on direct 
address goes against W. R. Johnson’s The Idea of Lyric and its position that the ‘model of an “I” 
speaking to a “you” […] remains central to the best lyric tradition’, one in which the ‘I’ and ‘you’, 
‘speaker and listener’, are ‘directly related to one another in a community’ (Culler, Theory, p. 198). 
Johnson is wrong to argue that this relationship signals ‘direct address to the audience’, Culler 
asserts, arguing that there probably never was a time when address in lyric poetry was so simple: 
‘direct address to the audience sitting in front of the performer is the exception rather than the 
rule, and of course even where it does take place, the possible separation of the performer from 
the figure that says “I”, which arises immediately not only from choral lyric but wherever there is 
reperformance, gives us those structures of iterability and textuality that complicate poetry in the 
modern and early modern world as well’ (Culler, Theory, pp. 200, 201). 
 
The first section of Culler’s chapter, then, disputes the need for itself: direct address is essentially 
an anomaly. His second section, on ‘addressing other people’, soon becomes subsumed within 
the chapter’s definition of apostrophe, which is appended to 1977’s original invocation of 
Quintilian: ‘outside the courtroom, apostrophe has long denoted address to someone or 
                                                        




something other than the actual audience; it includes address to individuals, but it especially 
denotes address to what is not an actual listener: abstractions, inanimate objects, or persons 
absent or dead’ (Culler, Theory, p. 212). Although the figure takes up only one section of a 
chapter on ‘Lyric Address’, the reduction of apostrophe’s role in Theory of the Lyric is only 
apparent: it remains at the heart of, and facilitates, a theory which posits that a poem is an event in 
the lyric now, which can be re-performed, and ritualised: that lyrics ‘strive to be an event in the 
special temporality of the lyric present’, and are therefore typically in the present tense, resist 
narrative, and aim especially to be memorable (‘[t]he lyric performance succeeds as it acts iterably 
through repeated readings, makes itself memorable’; Culler, Theory, pp. 243, 131). These are 
statements which hold, according to Culler’s theory, not just for the majority of lyric poems but 
for all, since they are ‘fundamental underlying structure[s] of lyric’: 
 
Ever since Pindar and doubtless before, lyrics have been constructed for reperformance, 
with an iterable now: not timeless but a moment of time that is repeated every time the 
poem is read, and the English simple present only intensifies that underlying possibility 
of lyric. Its structure, like that of triangulated address or of hyperbole is only 
dissimulated, never eliminated, and provides a framework for a great range of lyric 
invention.2  
 
To reiterate my introduction’s contentions, such searches for the ‘fundamental underlying 
structure[s]’ of so large a set of poems are doomed to fail. My aim in this chapter is to continue 
an investigation of the machinery which enables Culler’s claims – which I take to be emblematic 
of theoretical approaches to lyric – to be made with such all-encompassing certainty. They are 
claims which, according to one critic, seem to provide anyone who wants to think about ‘lyric’ as 
a category with one of her only alternatives to the historicism of the ‘New Lyric Studies’. The 
following words of Stephen Burt, from the end of his review of The Lyric Theory Reader (2014), 
will help us to think about the change in critical landscape in which Culler’s work appears, to 
which my last chapter began by alluding: 
 
Without contraries is no progression; let Culler’s, or Warton’s, or Albright’s, claim – that 
‘lyric’ has almost always been with us in some form, even if it is not called by that name; 
even if it does not dominate every literary period where it occurs – stand as the contrary, 
or the antithesis, to the New Lyric Studies’ claim that ‘lyricisation’ occludes the categories 
and the ways of reading of even the recent past. Can we have, now, a synthesis? What 
could it accomplish? Is this ambitious, admirable, yet partial anthology the best that we 
can do? (Burt, p. 440) 
                                                        
2 Culler, Theory, pp. 259, 294–5. Culler defines hyperbole as phenomenon whereby ‘apparently trivial observations 




Thomas Warton wrote in the eighteenth century; Burt quotes from a work which Daniel 
Albright, who died in 2015, wrote in 1985.3 It is easy to conclude from reading Burt’s review that 
the only major, up-to-date and viable alternative to the view which sees lyric as non-existent is 
Culler’s body of work. This places that work in a very different position to the one it occupied at 
the time of ‘Apostrophe’, which staked its claims against a critical orthodoxy which supposedly 
missed what was most radical about lyric poetry. It was an avowedly deconstructive essay, one 
which sought to offer an entirely new understanding of lyric, riding the waves of anti-‘New 
Critical’ sentiment which had swept, and continued to sweep, through the academy, helped 
along, initially, by the alternative of deconstruction. The first words of Paul Alpers’s article on 
apostrophe state that Culler’s essay ‘has become a classic of deconstructive criticism’ (Alpers, p. 
1); L. M. Findlay saw ‘Apostrophe’ as attempting to ‘claim the lyric for deconstruction’ (Findlay, 
p. 337); for Alan Richardson, the ‘trope of apostrophe has come to epitomise the excessive, 
disruptive, and insistently literary character of rhetorical figures [that is, the deconstructive 
understanding of them] as perhaps no other’ (Richardson, p. 364). Colin Burrow’s review of 
Theory of the Lyric, meanwhile, makes no mention of Culler’s deconstructive heritage, nor do many 
similar accounts.4 Elizabeth Helsinger, indeed, opens her review with the assertion that Theory of 
the Lyric is not ‘Theory’ but ‘theory’, describing the book as ‘a poetics of the lyric poem’ intended 
‘to be of practical use to poets, readers, and teachers of poetry’ (Helsinger, p. 590). Reviewers do 
not miss the similarity of the book’s arguments to those espoused in ‘Apostrophe’ – Isobel 
Palmer, for example, describes Culler’s chapter on ‘lyric address’ as ‘a rehearsal of his seminal 
discussion of apostrophe’ (Palmer, p. 238) – yet seem uninterested in connections between 
Culler as major figure in the lyric studies conversation and his previous existence as a translator 
and interpreter of Continental theory for an American audience, despite the fact that 
‘Apostrophe’ is where those two existences most closely touch.  
 
In a barnstormingly polemical book criticising Saussurean and post-Saussurean literary theory, 
Raymond Tallis writes again and again of that theory’s resistance to common sense, of positions 
which claim, for instance, that speech is the predominant mode of communication, that language 
is not a closed system, that intention is of key importance in the ways we make ourselves 
                                                        
3 See Daniel Albright, Lyricality in English Literature (Lincoln, NE, 1985). 
4 See – to cite only a very few – reviews by Elizabeth Helsinger (Critical Inquiry, 43.2 (2017), 590–2), Lisa M. 
Steinman (Wallace Stevens Journal, 40.1 (2016), 100–2), Marjorie Perloff (Nineteenth-Century Literature, 71.2 (2016), 256–




understood (to name but a few).5 Culler is at once praised and chided for his ability, as a ‘fellow-
travelling critic’, to ‘run with the hares of radical critical theory without losing touch with the 
hounds of common sense’. Tallis’s account presents a Culler who is excessively fond of the form 
of writing, ‘If it is true that [X], then [Y]’, where ‘X’ is a ‘claim that the average reader might 
object to only with moderate vigour’, and ‘Y’ the ‘view which Culler is expounding and which 
normally the reader would reject totally’; Tallis describes the difficulty of rejecting ‘something 
that is presented only tentatively’, and then a process whereby ‘the conditionals multiply and the 
moment of assessment and possible challenge is postponed for so long’ that objections ‘wither 
away’, at which point ‘the “ifs” disappear’, and the ‘Y’ claims ‘have by then achieved the kind of 
acceptance that comes from familiarity’ (Tallis, p. 22). This is a caricature, by nature hyperbolic,  
potentially unfair. But what we can confidently take from it – whether we are witnessing a dark 
art or a helpful service – is an account of a writer at pains to present difficult, radical, even mind-
bending ideas in such a way as to make them comprehensible and acceptable to readers unversed 
in the writings which form their origins.  
 
A similar account of the Culler of Theory of the Lyric would be wayward. In the dominant lyric 
studies conversation, the common sense position is that lyric exists: we read what we feel we can 
call ‘lyric poems’ all the time. Culler is still presenting us with complex ideas, but ones which no 
longer seem to go against the grain of common sense. His book appeals to readers across 
disciplines for its perceived ‘practical’ approach. It is a testament to the clarity of Culler’s style 
that readers do not tend to think they are reading literary theory, or its legacy, when reading 
Theory of the Lyric. But Culler’s book is nevertheless heavily grounded in deconstructionist 
thinking. We might write off ‘Apostrophe’s’ influence: claim, for instance, that in developing into 
Theory of the Lyric’s tree ‘Apostrophe’s’ seed shed its deconstructive husk. But in fact that 
development continued to accord with many of the counter-intuitive deconstructive tenets and 
narratives which Culler once made it his business to explain. The remainder of this chapter will 
attempt to illuminate these deconstructive influences, focussing in particular on a section of 
Theory of the Lyric which deals with the work of J. L. Austin and Jacques Derrida, and the latter’s 
word ‘iterability’. Culler’s command of numerous examples might make us suspect that his is an 
empirically achieved theory, and be confident of its practical use. But it remains, in fact, rooted 
in Theory; the attempt to offer an alternative mode of thinking about lyric needs to consider that 
                                                        
5 See Tallis, passim, especially pp. 13–99. Of course, the appeal to common sense in itself is hardly a fruitful mode of 
attack on a theory or set of theories which are avowedly radical, new, and run counter to prevailing ways of thinking. 




theory and its influence on Culler, as a means of showing the lack of, and consequent need for, 
that way of thinking: one which will be of real practical use for our reading of individual poems. 
 
Lyrics and pop songs 
 
Before examining the sources of one of Culler’s principle contentions in Theory of the Lyric, let me 
outline the work which such a theory enables Culler to do. That principle contention is that lyric 
poems exist not to be interpreted, but to be repeated, to get stuck in their readers’ heads, 
consisting as they do of a special kind of immediacy, built upon a uniquely lyric present tense, 
which creates a process of continual re-presencing, each and every time a lyric poem is read. So, 
for instance, we are told that ‘[t]he fundamental characteristic of lyric […] is not the description 
and interpretation of a past event but the iterative and iterable performance of an event in the 
lyric present, in the special “now”, of lyric articulation’; that the lyric’s ‘efficacy depends upon its 
success in making its words memorable, having them remembered’; and about ‘the principle of 
iterability – [that] lyrics are constructed for repetition’ (Culler, Theory, pp. 226, 130, 123). In an 
article on lyric language published the year before his book, Culler writes that ‘lyric seems 
constructed for reperformance, potentially ritualistic, with an always iterable now’.6 He goes on to 
conclude that it is  
 
crucial to our attempts to promote [lyric] pedagogically […] that we explore all of those 
aspects of lyric […] that make lyrics different from little short stories with fictional 
characters whose situations we seek to understand and more like those pop songs whose 
lyrics people learn by heart and repeat to themselves, and allow to structure their 
experience. (Culler, ‘Language of Lyric’, p. 176) 
 
The desire to effect a culture in which we read and think about lyric poems the way we currently 
listen to and think about pop songs pervades Culler’s recent lyric theory. It has many admirable 
aspects. Few people spending their lives reading and writing about poetry would disagree that 
the recent ‘diminution of interest in the lyric’ (Culler, Theory, p. 5) is a bad thing (although some, 
no doubt, would be more comfortable than others with a situation in which the reading of 
poetry is considered a craft, one which holds a difficulty which might approach that of its 
writing).7 Culler’s resistance to a (post-Theory) interpretative culture of ‘symptomatic readings 
which engage the work through an interpretive language’, in which the ‘goal is to discover a 
meaning’ consistent with the language and interpretative framework used to interpret it (Culler, 
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Theory, pp. 5–6), is similarly commendable, though its force is somewhat checked by the location 
of the desire for interpretation as ‘New Critical’ (that ‘New Critical assumption that poems exist 
to be interpreted’ (Culler, Theory, p. viii; see too p. 77)).  
 
But there is much that is problematic about Culler’s oft-repeated desire. Summarising in Theory of 
the Lyric all the ways which readers had at their disposal of appreciating poems before the 
twentieth century is said to have invented the interpretation of poetry, Culler declares that 
‘readers appreciated poems much as we do songs’, which 
 
[w]e listen to […] without assuming that we should develop interpretations: we take 
them to illuminate the world, and we sing them to others or to ourselves, point out what 
we like about them, compare them to other songs by the same and different artists, and 
generally develop considerable connoisseurship about songs without engaging in 
interpretation. (Culler, Theory, p. 5) 
 
This sentence initially looks reasonable and innocuous, making apparently sober claims, inviting 
us in with the authority of its first person plural. But unlike the use of ‘we’ we saw Cavell defend 
in my introduction – in which the word does not ‘“postulate” that “we”, you and I and he, say 
and want and imagine and feel and suffer together’, but is rather an invitation to ‘[l]ook and find 
out whether you can see what I see, wish to say what I wish to say’ – Culler’s ‘we’ concentrates a 
whole set of questions about how and why people listen to songs, and how and why they should 
read, into a corresponding set of assumptions, supposed to be generally true, for which ‘we’ 
provides the only evidence. ‘We’ does not include, for instance, the two young men who in 1985 
attempted suicide – one successfully – after hearing ‘subliminal messages like “try suicide”, “do 
it” and “let’s be dead” in [Judas Priest’s] cover of Spooky Tooth’s “Better by You, Better Than 
Me”’. The survivor, James Vance, sued Priest and their label for damages, citing ‘the band’s 
music as the reason they [tried to kill] themselves’; ‘[t]he suit went to trial in July, 1990’, writes 
Kory Grow, ‘and the prosecution played the song forwards, backwards and sped up in an 
attempt to prove the group had brainwashed these two young men’ into committing suicide.8 
There are many less extreme examples of interpretative communities for popular songs: the 
website songmeanings.com exists to provide a forum for listeners to debate the meanings of 
songs they enjoy, while any cursory glance through the Youtube comments section of a popular 
music video will discover plenty of interpretation. It is not clear, indeed, from Culler’s account 
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how songs might ‘illuminate the world’ if they are not interpreted in some way. One response to 
these counter-examples might be that they serve as evidence only of internet users applying their 
secondary-school-level models of reading poetry to the songs they listen to every day. If that is 
the case (which seems unlikely), then we might want to re-visit the idea that our existing models 
are stultifying and ‘inadequate’ (Culler, Theory, p. 4): it would be clear that they provoke thriving 
discussion. If it is not, then we might want to re-visit the claim that interpretation is a twentieth-
century invention, and start to pay greater attention to instances of poetic interpretation long 
before: Dante’s Vita Nuova, or Stephen Burt’s example of a piece of Thomas Warton’s prose, 
which, he suggests – with the implication of a curious reluctance – ‘we might have to call “close 
reading” avant la lettre’ (Burt, p. 434).  
 
As Joseph North so deftly showed in his discussion of Franco Moretti, there is an increasing gap 
between the academy’s method of scholarship and what one might clumsily call ‘regular reading’ 
– the reading undertaken for non-scholarly purposes, by non-academics and academics alike. 
Culler should be commended for noticing this, and wanting to narrow, or indeed close it. But in 
locating the origins of poetic interpretation, and thus when interest in the lyric started to fall off, 
with the ‘New Criticsm’, he misses the heart of the discussion, which should be the institutional 
culture of interpretation as it sprang up after the ‘New Critics’, and as it is presented in the work 
of – to name only a very few names – Stephen Best and Sharon Marcus, Rita Felski, and Toril 
Moi. The desire to turn lyric poems into pop songs – and even then, an idealised version of pop 
songs – is not a viable way to reduce this gap. We need a ‘realistic spirit’ of reading which does 
justice to the range and complexity of lyric poems, which recognises both that ostensibly simple 
poems can do complex things, and that there are many ostensibly complex lyric poems which 
have other things on their minds than making themselves memorable or easily set to melody. 
Not one which sets limits on what a lyric poem can mean or be – even when such limits are set 




Culler’s ‘principle of iterability’ borrows a term which first appeared in Derrida’s ‘Signature 
Event Context’ – one of the foundational essays of his early thought, and ‘one of the most 




primarily in association with the early Derrida’s theory of language ever since.9 That theory 
endeavours to problematise the notion, apparently central to Western philosophy since Plato, 
that the intention of an original speaker is a key aspect of the meaning of any utterance, to the 
extent that that philosophy has traditionally prioritised the spoken over the written (what 
Derrida, amongst other things, terms ‘logocentrism’). One of Derrida’s main claims is, on the 
contrary (though he does not entirely ignore intention), that any writing must be repeatable, even 
in the absence of its original author and receiver, and thus the ways in which Western philosophy 
has traditionally understood intention as of primary importance to an interpretive structure are 
both reversed and displaced.10 Étienne Bonnot de Condillac finds himself made an example of in 
this regard, as Derrida uses him to claim that Western philosophy in its entirety has always 
claimed that 
 
[i]f men write it is: (1) because they have to communicate; (2) because what they have to 
communicate is their ‘thought’, their ‘ideas’, their representations. Thought, as 
representation, precedes and governs communication, which transports the ‘idea’, the 
signified content; (3) because men are already in a state that allows them to communicate 
their thought to themselves and each other when, in a continuous manner, they invent 
the particular means of communication, writing.11 
 
My intention here is not to produce another polemical response to Derrida’s theory (of these, 
Raymond Tallis’s already-mentioned Not Saussure is probably the best).12 My aim is rather to 
show some of the extent to which this kind of broad conceptualisation lies behind Culler’s work, 
and thus to call attention to a gap in our lyric conversations, and the need for an alternative 
approach to fill it. It is possible to write about lyric poetry while giving in neither to the 
relaxations of a totalising historicism nor of a totalising theory (but nonetheless preserving less 
totalising forms of both).  
 
                                                        
9 J. A. Cuddon’s A Dictionary of Literary Terms and Literary Theory, 5th ed. (Oxford, 2013; first ed. 1977) mentions only 
Derrida’s use of the term in its entry (see pp. 373–4). Absent from the OED, ‘iterability’ remains something of a 
nonce word. Culler’s adoption of the term is, without doubt, a borrowing from Derrida (he alludes to ‘Signature 
Event Context’ in a brief discussion of Derrida’s ‘iterability’ on p. 126). 
10 ‘In such a typology, the category of intention will not disappear; it will have its place, but from that place it will no 
longer be able to govern the entire scene and system of utterance’; Jacques Derrida, ‘Signature Event Context’, trans. 
Samuel Weber and Jeffrey Mehlman, p. 18, in Limited Inc, pp. 1–23. In an ‘editor’s foreword’, Graff details how the 
essay began life as a conference paper in 1971; it first appeared in English translation in 1977 (Limited, p. vii). 
11 Limited, p. 5. The claim is here made at one remove, Derrida writing that ‘I do not believe that a single 
counterexample [to Condillac] can be found in the entire history of philosophy as such’ (Limited, p. 3). In Of 
Grammatology, Derrida states baldly that ‘all the Western methods of analysis, explication, reading, or interpretation’ 
have been produced within ‘the greatest totality – the concept of the epistémè and logocentric metaphysics’ 
(Grammatology, p. 46). 




Derrida’s theory draws much of its force from the fact that it is so totalising: the claim that this is 
entirely new thinking, and the entirety of Western culture has always thought otherwise, sweeps 
us into agreement and submission. It is worth combatting the extent of the claims made by 
Derrida here, while leaving the substance for others. The work of Peter Dews will help us to do 
this, someone who has written persuasively and with great subtlety of the similarities between 
aspects of Derrida’s thought and that of certain German Idealists, in particular Friedrich 
Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, and indeed of the ways in which a consideration of those 
philosophers might help to challenge certain deconstructive assumptions.13 For Schelling (to 
simplify and summarise Dews’s own summary), there are two competing wills – a ‘will which 
wills nothing’ and a ‘determinate will which wills something’ – whose conflict cannot be resolved 
through uniting them, since such a union would inevitably give rise to another conflict, that 
between the two wills as a single unity and the two wills as separate, in opposition. Each will is a 
whole in itself, and thus each has the same claim to be the whole, the essence of things. Dews 
puts this ‘in deconstructive terms’: ‘the coherence and stability of the meaning of the text turns 
out to be merely another supplement, a further mark in the chain of “re-marks”’, and this leads 
to ‘an incessant “rotary movement” [rotatorische Bewegung], which is unable to attain a stable state 
of “being”’ (Limits, p. 131). There is no escape from this rotary movement, this ‘vortex or merry-
go-round of ontological possibilities’ which ‘becomes ever more frantic, culminating in what 
[Schelling] terms a “wild, self-dismembering madness, which is still the innermost trait of all 
things”’.14 The madness of the rotary movement can, however, be repressed, in the forms of 
time and space, in which the conflict between the wills is mollified by being spread across past, 
present and future. What this means is that ‘the rotary movement must be consigned to an 
absolute past, a past “prior” to time, if the world is to begin’, and thus ‘timeless logical torment is 
transformed into the opaque singularity, the stubborn “iterability” divided against itself, which 
lies at the heart of nature, and upon which strata of intentionality and meaning have always-
                                                        
13 See Peter Dews, Logics of Disintegration, pp. 19–25 and ‘Deconstruction and German Idealism: A Response to 
Rodolphe Gasché’s The Tain of the Mirror’, in The Limits of Disenchantment: Essays in Contemporary European Philosophy 
(London, 1995), pp. 115–48. Other thinkers have made similar claims, of course: Dews begins one essay on the 
subject with an account of the thought of David Wood, who, despite being a great champion of Derrida, ‘has 
difficulty […] in defining deconstruction as anything other than the continuation of a well-established tradition in 
Western philosophy, perhaps even of the central post-Kantian tradition’ (Limits, p. 115), and thus whose ‘defence of 
deconstruction seems ultimately to amount to no more than the claim that deconstruction represents the most 
intensely self-reflexive form of contemporary philosophical activity’. The problem with this ‘more sober account of 
the philosophical lineage of deconstruction’ is that it problematises, if not invalidates, the enlisting of deconstruction 
‘by certain versions of postmodernist theory to mount a full-scale assault on the dualistic and hierarchical structures 
which are assumed to be essential to philosophical reason’. It is only if deconstruction is in some sense ‘qualitatively 
distinct from the corpus of Western philosophy’ that such enlisting is legitimate (Limits, p. 116). 
14 Limits, p. 132. Schelling is quoted from ‘Die Weltalter. Erstes Buch. Die Vergangheit. Druck I’ (1811), p. 255, in 




already been superimposed’ (Limits, p. 134). Schelling implies a conflict between ‘genuine 
differences, in the form of the opening up of a world stretched between the incommensurable 
dimensions of past, present and future’ and ‘the “pseudo-difference” of the rotary movement’; 
and thus ‘Schelling’s account of the rotary movement implies a critique of those who would view 
iterability, supplementarity, or even dissemination as representing some kind of emancipatory 
open-endedness, rather than a dismally repetitive closure’ (Limits, p. 135). 
 
Dews’s reading of Schelling helps us both to challenge Derrida’s totalising claims about Western 
philosophy and to begin to question the applicability and relevance of the concept of ‘iterability’ 
to lyric poetry. Culler refers to ‘Signature Event Context’ in a brief paragraph of Theory of the 
Lyric, amidst a wider discussion of ‘the performative’, attending in particular to J. L. Austin’s How 
to Do Things with Words. Culler’s initial version of Austin’s description is quickly found wanting on 
the grounds that it is ‘narrowly drawn’: it cannot account for the ‘link of the concept of 
performative language to the creative power of language and to the problem of origination’, 
whereas Derrida’s more widely drawn version can, as it asserts that ‘we act through language in 
singular yet iterable ways all the time’, which ‘may originate or inaugurate, create something new’ 
(Culler, Theory, p. 126). The first point to draw from this is that Culler takes from Derrida the 
very ‘emancipatory open-endedness’ of iterability which Dews’s account of Schelling calls into 
question: we should be sceptical of an iterability which fosters perpetual creativity and new-ness, 
rather than a dismal repetition. The second, even more important point lies in the nature of 
Culler’s handling of Derrida here. Theory of the Lyric’s paragraph presents a ‘Signature Event 
Context’ which subtly extends Austin’s apparent theory of language to account for a wider range 
of instances, ‘makes explicit’ what is already there, but simply not drawn out. This is hardly 
consistent with Derrida’s overarching claims about the entirety of the Western philosophical 
tradition, and its errors, which Austin’s work is presumed to fit: as David Gorman puts it, 
‘Derrida is interested solely, and reductively, in the fact that Austin’s lectures can be shown to fit 
a certain pattern already established by Derrida as exemplified in the whole tradition of Western 
thought about language and representation’.15 No one who attends to the Searle-Derrida debate 
– neutral or partisan – can be under the impression that its stakes are simply the differences 
between more or less explicit accounts of the same phenomena. These are radically different 
approaches to language, entirely different worlds.  
 
                                                        
15 David Gorman, ‘The Use and Abuse of Speech-Act Theory in Criticism’, Poetics Today, 20.1 (1999), 93–119, p. 




Yet Culler’s crucial section on ‘performative and performance’ arrives at what might seem to be 
a reasonable synthesis of aspects of Austin and Derrida’s positions. This deserves interrogation. 
We will now read this section in detail, considering the role of Austin and Derrida – the latter 
ostensibly confined to just two brief moments – in the claims it ultimately makes. The section 
promises an investigation of ‘the performative character of lyric: ritual that seeks to make 
something happen’. Culler turns to Austin right away, relating how he ‘distinguished performative 
utterances, which accomplish the action to which they refer, from constative utterances, which 
make true or false statements’. ‘[C]ritics have found the idea of performative language valuable 
for characterising literary discourse’ because ‘literary criticism involves attending to what literary 
language does as much as to what it says’. But ‘Austin’s theory raises more problems than it 
solves’, and ‘requires modification if it is to be truly useful’, since, Culler argues, if we treat ‘all 
literary discourse’ as ‘performative by convention’, we risk obscuring the more specific use of the 
term ‘performative’, to indicate ‘works or parts of works’ which ‘seem successfully to enact what 
they delineate’ (Culler, Theory, pp. 125–7). This point is strong, and I’ll return to it in a moment: 
both because several of the poems discussed in my final chapter look to ‘enact’ in this way, and 
also because it will lead us to say something further of the general character of ‘iterability’. But 
Culler’s other reasons for rejecting Austin’s perceived account – in particular that it leads to a 
poetic confusion between felicity and infelicity (when something goes wrong) – strike with less 
force because he leaves it so late to acknowledge the fact that Austin went on to ‘modif[y]’ that 
account (Culler, Theory, p. 129). As Gorman makes clear, the account of performativity which 
Culler takes to be ‘Austin’s theory of performative utterance’ (Culler, Theory, pp. 128–9) was 
always ‘hypothetical’, and refuted about halfway through the lecture series which made up How to 
Do Things with Words, before the introduction of ‘quite a different distinction, between 
locutionary and illocutionary acts’, and the addition of perlocutionary ones (Gorman, p. 97). It is 
technically correct to describe the performative/constative distinction as ‘Austin’s theory’, but 
not in the context in which Culler uses the phrase. Theory of the Lyric’s section on performativity 
moves towards a conclusion by stating that 
 
[r]estricting the notion of the performative to illocutionary effects, effects achieved in 
saying something in particular, we can discuss directly what Austin calls perlocutionary 
effects, without worrying about ‘felicity’ or the general structure of Austin’s theory of 
language. What sorts of effects do poems have? (Culler, Theory, p. 130) 
 
This acts as if Culler has selected one aspect of Austin’s theory – separate from its ‘general 
structure’ – which can be successfully put in the service of a theory of lyric. In fact, Culler’s 




which is actually proffered, and thus makes up the ‘general structure’ from which Culler claims 
to deviate. The essential proposal of this section of Theory of the Lyric seems at this stage to be 
that lyric poetry tends to be made up of the illocutionary and perlocutionary act: the former 
which ‘has a certain force in saying something’, the latter ‘which is the achieving of certain 
effects by saying something’ (and thus is without the conditions of felicity which worry Culler, 
since the effects achieved are not necessarily related to the speaker’s intention).16 We can 
maintain a focus on the first (rarer) act, while considering the effects achieved by the second, 
which are co-substantial with the effects of lyric poetry. This seems to me to be straightforwardly 
consistent with Austin’s account, and indeed a rather neat way of handling the matter. But 
having reached this point, Culler almost immediately pulls back: 
 
the poem’s efficacy is not to be given by virtue of the poem’s formulations but depends 
on the ways in which its performance is received. It is far better – certainly more accurate 
– to think of a poem as performance, which may or may not be efficacious, rather than 
as a performative, which is supposed to bring about, by convention, that of which it 
speaks. (Culler, Theory, pp. 130–1)  
 
Culler’s definition of ‘a performative’ seems to have retreated to illocutionary acts alone. 
‘Illocutionary acts are conventional acts: perlocutionary acts are not conventional’, says Austin 
(Austin, p. 120); but here all performatives occur ‘by convention’. What I ‘bring about or achieve 
by saying something’ (Austin, p. 108) may have nothing to do with what I intend, or that of 
which I have spoken; ‘[s]peech acts, like actions in general, can produce side effects that the 
actor did not foresee’.17 If I say, ‘There is a cat over there’, and you are frightened, then I have 
frightened you without speaking of fear, without knowing, perhaps, that you have a phobia of 
cats. Having adeptly, in the end, handled Austin’s account of illocutionary and perlocutionary 
acts, Culler backtracks, sacrificing the latter for the term ‘performance’, a word which blends well 
with the kinds of effects which Culler sees the lyric as producing: making itself memorable ‘as it 
acts through repeated readings’ (Culler, Theory, p. 131).  
 
The trajectory of ‘Performative and Performance’ sees Culler invoke Austin’s own rejected 
theory of language in order to reject it himself (with the help of a brief yet tempered invocation 
of ‘Signature Event Context’), before rescuing one apparently excresent distinction from what is 
                                                        
16 J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words: The William James Lectures delivered at Harvard University in 1955 (Oxford, 
1962), p. 120. On the relationship between intention and perlocutionary acts, see, for instance, p. 106: ‘the 
perlocutionary act may include what in a way are consequences, as when we say “By doing x I was doing y”: we do 
bring in a greater or less stretch of “consequences” always, some of which may be “unintentional”’. 




said to be the main structure of Austin’s theory – that between illocutionary and perlocutionary 
acts – which enables a theoretical focus on the kinds of effects lyric poems bring about. At this 
point, Austin ceases to be useful for the section, which now returns to Derrida; albeit a different 
Derrida from the author of ‘Signature Event Context’.18 ‘Che cos’è la poesia’ (1988) is the essay 
to which Culler now turns, one which ‘approaches poetry […] as what strives to be memorable, 
to live in memory’ (Culler, Theory, p. 130): 
 
‘The poetic’, Derrida writes, ‘would be what you desire to learn but from the other, 
thanks to the other, and under dictation from the other, by heart, imparare a memoria’. The 
poem addresses you – ‘learn me by heart, copy out, watch over and preserve me’. The 
lyric, by its formal patterning and mode of address, asks to be learned by heart, even if 
that seldom happens; its efficacy depends upon its success in making its words 
memorable, having them remembered. And Derrida’s text calls ‘poem’ not just that 
which asks to be learned by heart but ‘that which learns or teaches us the heart, which 
invents the heart’.19 
 
What is not immediately clear here is that Culler’s penultimate sentence has momentarily ceased 
to be a summary of Derrida’s argument and has instead become Culler’s own development of it. 
The only point in ‘Che cos’è’ at which Derrida mentions the formal characteristics of poetry 
occurs when he describes its necessary brevity: ‘a poem must be brief, elliptical by vocation, 
whatever may be its objective or apparent expanse’ (Kamuf, p. 225). Timothy Clark, no doubt 
aware of the rather large hinge in this sentence, is quick to acknowledge that some of Derrida’s 
‘statements on the poetic might seem merely false’ (in what way is The Iliad brief?), and explains 
that he ‘is not engaged in a kind of inductive argument familiar in works of literary history, viz. 
defining his object by characteristics shared by known instances of it’.20 Derrida’s essay is self-
consciously at play: having been asked to answer in a short piece of prose the question, ‘what is 
poetry?’, he begins, ‘[i]n order to respond to such a question – in two words, right? – you are asked 
to know how to renounce knowledge’ (Kamuf, p. 223). In looking for characteristics of lyric 
which support Derrida’s characterisation, Culler radically alters the critical task. He is suddenly 
looking to build a practically useful, all-encompassing theory through the pursuit of inductive 
evidence which might support a theory which is playful and provocative, something to think 
with and against, but surely not one which Derrida seriously considers to be the final word on 
poetry. The crucial point – that it is lyric poems’ ‘formal patterning and mode of address’ which 
                                                        
18 For one thread of the debate as to the differences (or lack thereof) between the early and late Derrida, see 
Deconstruction and Pragmatism, ed. Chantal Mouffe (London, 1996), pp. 13–46. 
19 Culler, Theory, p. 130, and Jacques Derrida, ‘Che cos’è la poesia?’, p. 230, in A Derrida Reader, ed. Peggy Kamuf 
(New York, 1991), pp. 221–37.  
20 Timothy Clark, ‘By Heart: A Reading of Derrida’s “Che cos’è la poesia?” through Keats and Celan’, Oxford Literary 




lead them to be especially iterable, and thus memorable in the manner Derrida describes – has 
not been derived inductively, but has instead been derived from the brief ‘Che cos’è’, and 
supposed to be its natural extension, even though it says nothing of formal patterning or 
apostrophe itself. And what has not been investigated in this step is the fact that the phrase 
‘especially iterable’, according to Derrida’s use of ‘iterability’ in ‘Signature Event Context’, does 
not make sense. Culler employs Derrida’s term for an aspect of the fundamental nature of all 
writing in the role of referring to one kind of writing in particular. Derrida is clear – in his 
clearest explanation of iterability – that it is a phenomenon common across writing’s spectrum: 
 
In order for my ‘written communication’ to retain its function as writing, i.e., its 
readability, it must remain readable despite the absolute disappearance of any receiver, 
determined in general. My communication must be repeatable – iterable – in the absolute 
absence of the receiver or of any empirically determinable collectivity of receivers. Such 
iterability – (iter, again, probably comes from itara, other [sic] in Sanskrit, and everything 
that follows can be read as the working out of the logic that ties repetition to alterity) 
structures the mark of writing itself, no matter what particular type of writing is involved 
(whether pictographical, hieroglyphic, ideographic, phonetic, alphabetic, to cite the old 
categories). A writing that is not structurally readable – iterable – beyond the death of the 
addressee would not be writing. (Limited, p. 7)  
 
‘[N]o matter what particular type of writing is involved’: there are no degrees of iterability, for 
Derrida. It makes no sense, in his terms, to claim that lyric language, as Culler does, can mark a 
moment in particular as ‘iterable utterance’ (Culler, Theory, p. 290), since ‘iterability’ is simply the 
condition of all utterances.21 In these theoretical terms, lyric poems are no more iterable than any 
other form of writing. There are lyric poems, to be sure, which are, or contain moments which 
are, especially memorable, catchy; there are, too, lyric poems which have other aims and effects 
than inscribing themselves in their readers’ memories. If ‘iterability’ is to be a useful term for our 
discussions about lyric, then – to repeat Culler’s argument about the too-broad ‘performativity’ – 
we would do better to confine it to those poems of the former kind, while freeing space for an 
investigation of the many other effects which lyric poems can have. That is, to take it out of a 




                                                        
21 Culler gives his most concise summary of his conception of lyric form and language as designed for iterability in 
an interview with Francesco Giusti: ‘what is particularly important in the lyric is not the representation of a past 
event but its evocation in the lyric present, and this involves a fundamental iterability, which, as you say, is already 
manifested in various aspects of lyric form, such as sound patterning and rhythm’; 






I take the word ‘encounter’ from Paul Celan, whose account of poetry in ‘The Meridian’ finds 
itself both influential to, and modified in, ‘Che cos’è la poesia?’, and thus, too, Theory of the Lyric.22 
Celan’s account, attentive to hybridities and ambiguities, is applicable to a much greater variety 
of poems than either of the theories which succeed it. The word ‘encounter’, for Celan, stresses 
encounters of various kinds: with the absent other which a poem addresses (always with the 
sense that such an encounter may not in reality occur), between writer and reader, between a 
poem and its reader.23 ‘The poem is lonely’, Celan writes, ‘[i]t is lonely and en route. Its author 
remains added to it’; ‘[b]ut doesn’t the poem therefore already at its inception stand in the 
encounter – in the mystery of the encounter?’ (Celan, p. 9). Timothy Clark – who rightly stresses the 
importance of Celan’s thought to Derrida’s in ‘Che cos’è’ – glosses these words well: 
 
The poetic event has a very peculiar, ‘open’ temporality: it is both the encounter towards 
which the poem directs itself, as apostrophe, and that which, insofar as the poem’s 
elliptical but determinate identity stems from being thus en route, already occurs as the 
force of the poem’s inception. (Clark, p. 64) 
 
It is worth remarking on the proximity of these thoughts to the kind of apostrophic doubleness I 
attempted to describe in the previous chapter (which gets lost on the path from Celan, through 
Derrida, to Culler). When it comes to the lyric present, again Culler’s (and to some extent, 
Derrida’s) thinking goes along with Celan’s up to a point, and then leaves off:  
 
But the addressed which through naming has, as it were, become a you, brings its 
otherness into this present. Even in this here and now of the poem – for the poem itself, 
we know, has only this one, unique, momentary present – even in this immediacy and 
nearness it lets the most essential aspect of the other speak: its time. (Celan, p. 9) 
 
The poem for Celan is not just a triumph of presentness but a complex interplay of tenses, 
presences and absences, which are present in that complexity at each moment it has an 
                                                        
22 Culler makes explicit reference to Celan’s account in a (mis-)description of the work of Mark Payne. Culler takes 
Payne’s thoughts on lyric encounters to be saying only that lyrics can take something which has already been 
thought and dress it up in ear-catching fashion. In fact, Payne says that lyric poems can offer us thoughts which 
didn’t previously seem thinkable (and so there might be some thoughts which are only thinkable through the lyric 
medium). See Culler, Theory, p. 122, and Mark Payne, ‘Ideas in Lyric Communication: Pindar and Paul Celan’, Modern 
Philology, 105.1 (2007), 5–20, p. 14.  
23 See, respectively, from amongst Celan’s draft materials for the speech, ‘[t]he thought lies close that the encounter 
of those who are absent may not occur’ (p. 136), ‘[t]he one writing and the one understanding poems remain 
complementary in relation to each other’ (p. 135), ‘[n]o poem opens up for the one who, when approaching the 
poem, is not ready for the encounter; with so-called texts’ (p. 139), in Paul Celan, The Meridian: Final Version – Drafts 




encounter with a reader, an encounter which cannot be repeated, because the players in that 
encounter are constantly changing: ‘the poem is, because it is the poem, unique, unrepeatable’ 
(Celan, p. 140). This element, of the changing encounter, the mutability of self and character, 
Culler’s emphasis on repeatable poems misses. A cartoon view of character goes hand in hand 
with a cartoon view of poem: a person is only an ear and a poem is only an earworm. Derrida’s 
own kind of cartoon in ‘Che cos’è’ – the roadside hedgehog, the poem as vulnerable beast which 
is run over by all the theoretical and philosophical vehicles which have sought to adapt it to their 
own ends – misses this point in its own way, as it describes ‘your’ (here, for once, 
uncomplicatedly, the reader’s) desire 
 
to guard from oblivion this thing which in the same stroke exposes itself to death and 
protects itself – in a word, the address, the retreat of the hérisson, like an animal on the 
autoroute rolled up in a ball. One would like to take it in one’s hands, undertake to learn 
it and understand it, to keep it for oneself, near oneself. (Kamuf, p. 229) 
  
This kind of conceptualisation sacrifices the variety of encounter which one can have with a 
poem at the altar of a resistance to theory, philosophy, poetics: you want to save the vulnerable, 
wounded little poem from misrepresentation (‘no poem that does not open itself like a wound’ 
(Kamuf, p. 233)). But such a sacrifice only lets such generalising tendencies back in, since it 
ignores all those poems – real examples – for which ‘wound’ is not right, which are not 
vulnerable, and all those readers – real examples – who feel other urges when reading a poem 
than to take it in their hands and protect it. For Derrida appears blind to the possibility of 
approaching a poem without any theoretical framework or assumption, and blind therefore to 
the fact that, once we stop approaching poems in a ‘theoretical spirit’, they cease to be vulnerable 












Chapter four: a ‘realistic spirit’ 
 
Models, methods, and spirits 
 
My previous two chapters aimed to demonstrate the deficiencies inherent in the drive to theorise 
or model lyric poetry. My introduction looked to Toril Moi in calling that drive a ‘theoretical 
spirit’, a useful label insofar that it can hold together modes of reading with divergent ‘thematic 
interests and political investments’ (Moi, p. 178), and one which we saw justified by work 
performed in that spirit itself, such as Derrida’s grouping together of all Western philosophy 
under a particular attitude to exemplarity. We saw that introduction call for a greater prominence 
to be given to a different kind of spirit, one with a different attitude towards exemplarity, in 
which an example is not, remembering Richard Stamp’s phrasing, an ‘illustration of a pre-
established universal concept’, not something which might gather together with other examples 
to establish a general concept which might then serve as a better mode of explanation, but that 
explanation itself. One person takes an example to get him, to use Cavell’s words, to ‘prove 
something, test something, against himself’ – not to test it against a general theory. Moi, as we 
saw, borrowed a phrase from Cora Diamond for this kind of attitude: a ‘realistic spirit’, a 
particular attitude towards reality, the paying of ‘certain kinds of attention to reality: to detail and 
particularity’; ‘the willingness to look and see’ (Diamond, p. 40, Moi, p. 63). This kind of 
attention takes time: chapter five will take only a small handful of examples in its 15000 words. 
William Empson, to whose early work this chapter will soon take as an important instance of the 
critical spirit for which it is arguing, acknowledges in Some Versions of Pastoral that ‘once started 
on an example I follow it without regard to the unity of the book’: paying attention to an 
example will take as long as it will take.1 Wittgenstein repeatedly asked us to read him slowly, to 
resist the ‘physical need’ which we might have ‘when at work: “Let’s have done with it now”’ (CV, 
p. 86e). These statements might provoke a wry smile in the 21st-century academic, beset by the 
constant pressure to publish and the rigours of publishers’ regulations. For this realistic spirit, 
this attitude to exemplarity to gain real traction in the academy, we would need to see significant 
change. An afterword will gesture more fully towards these institutional concerns. This chapter is 
aimed at providing a fuller account of the spirit and attitude for which I have been arguing, and 
at exploring, initially, its relation to recent criticism that claims to have taken a ‘postcritical’ turn. 
 
                                                        




‘Why “spirit”?’, someone might object; ‘I can follow and to some extent agree with your 
criticisms of theoretical accounts of lyric poetry. But what you’re proposing instead is too vague: 
give me a method, a model, an alternative theory’. To my imagined interlocutor, a critical method 
is preferable because it can be concisely defined, briefly assimilated, and reliably replicated; a 
critical spirit can only be exemplified, takes some time to teach, and will create no work which is 
the same as the last. My interlocutor concludes that I persist with the term ‘spirit’ because I have 
deemed the advantage of it and other words such as ‘mood’ and ‘attitude’ – that they provide us 
with a vocabulary which can hold together discrepant specificities of method, model, and theory 
– to outweigh the disadvantage – that such width of definition makes it difficult to propose a 
clear and concise account of an alternative mode of critical writing. Or, less charitably, that – 
recalling the Wittgenstein of Philosophical Investigations §71 – there is ‘some reason’ that I have 
been unwilling or ‘unable to formulate’ a methodological account: a commitment to mysticism, 
perhaps, or simple laziness. What my interlocutor misses is that the very point of using words 
such as ‘spirit’, ‘mood’, and ‘attitude’ is that they gesture towards something which is not 
reducible to a ‘method’, ‘theory’, or ‘model’. Describing a critical spirit, with recourse to example, 
is not a step before the outlining of a method which we have for some reason been unable to 
take; it is not a self-confessed argumentative flaw, a hole into which the critic talks herself after 
weighing up the advantages and disadvantages of different terms. ‘[L]iterary criticism’, writes 
Toril Moi (with ‘criticism’ being the operative word), ‘has no method other than reading’ (Moi, p. 
5). The aim has never been to propose a competing method, to propose a new theoretical model 
of criticism or poetry. It is to foster an atmosphere for criticism and critics to continue to 
embark on their own paths of individuation, paths which intersect with individual texts. 
 
It is the aim of this chapter to flesh out what that might mean, and to argue for it rigorously. 
Before I do that, it’s worth raising two points. The first is the objection that we always read 
according to some pre-conceived model, and so no matter the extent to which I have managed 
to convince my reader of some of the deficiencies of the theoretical spirit, the feeling may 
remain that this approach is the best we’ve got. Beyond Paul Alpers’s final defence of Jonathan 
Culler’s theory, that his account of apostrophe appears to work for poems, is a further final 
defence, which can be made from Culler’s contention that ‘[i]f students are not presented with 
an adequate model of the lyric, they will read according to whatever inadequate models they have 
previously assimilated’ (Culler, Theory, p. 4). If we have conceded that students will always read 
according to some model, then the claim that all models will in fact be profoundly ‘inadequate’ 




full of talk of ‘the least bad Brexit’). But there is no need to make that concession. The statement 
that students need a model which they can apply to literary texts underestimates both students 
and literary texts: the former’s capacity to pay attention, and the latter’s capacity to compel, 
direct, and reward it. It is possible to replace a narrow way of looking with a different way of 
looking – a width of attention – rather than another, supposedly less damaging, narrow way of 
looking. The argument in support of this will become more substantial as the chapter proceeds. 
In the first instance, we will need to return to the concerns raised at the end of chapter one by 
Culler’s piece of newspaper prose, to re-visit old debates about the category of literature. For to 
argue for a change in the attention we pay to literary texts we need to begin by re-opening the 
discussion about what literary texts might be, and in what ways they might direct and reward us 
as we attend to them.  
 
The second issue is the extent to which this thesis aligns itself with the work of Felski and similar 
critics (including Toril Moi), extracts from whose work are gathered together in the 2017 volume 
Critique and Postcritique, who broadly argue for a move into the ‘postcritical’.2 In addressing this, 
I’ll briefly consider the arguments of two opponents to their project. The first is Bruce Robbins, 
who has become a prolific and somewhat fractious reviewer of much recent criticism which has 
sought to ask questions of the dominant paradigm in literary studies – be it critique or 
scholarship.3 His review of The Limits of Critique is worth some sustained attention here.4 
Although Felski devotes the final chapter of her book to the ‘stars [which] will guide our path’ if 
we ‘abstain from critique’ (a mood of suspicious reading), Robbins’s acid review of her book 
takes Felski’s perceived ‘faultfinding’ as a licence to engage in fault-finding of its own, which 
happens at the expense of engagement with Felski’s proposed alternative critical mood.5 That 
proposal is at one point condensed into three brief bullet-points – that we need a different 
understanding of history and period boundaries, an idea of literary texts as ‘nonhuman actors’, 
and thus a ‘notion of postcritical reading’ (Felski, p. 154) – and so it cannot be decided to be 
exclusively Felski’s fault that Robbins devotes no time to a discussion of her alternative proposal. 
‘In a book less given over to faultfinding, Felski might have paid more heed to [the] question’ of 
what would happen were her project to succeed, says Robbins (Robbins, p. 372); in a review less 
                                                        
2 See Critique and Postcritique, ed. Elizabeth S. Anker and Rita Felski (Durham, NC, 2017). As we’ll see, specifically in 
relation to Eric Hayot’s contribution, there are disagreements within this volume; I do not mean to do its 
contributors a disservice by portraying it as a coherent critical manifesto. 
3 See, for instance, ‘Discipline and Parse: The Politics of Close Reading’, Los Angeles Review of Books, May 14th, 2017, 
and his swipe at Critique and Postcritique in ‘Reading Bad’, review of Merve Emre, Paraliterary: The Making of Bad Readers 
in Postwar America (Chicago, 2017), Los Angeles Review of Books, January 21st, 2018. 
4 See Bruce Robbins, ‘Not So Well Attached’, PMLA, 132.2 (2017), 371–6. 




given over to fault-finding, Robbins might have paid more heed to what that project is, and the 
sustained moments at which Felski ‘sketche[s] out some possible paths for literary and cultural 
studies’.6 The claims made, too, for the potential coming to fruition of Felski’s vision are 
somewhat overblown: at one point Robbins imagines that, were ‘Felski and her allies […] to get 
their wish and make criticism less critical’, there would be less political ‘opposition’ to disturbing 
events such as the 2003 Iraq war (Robbins, p. 372). We can, I think, leave to one side the 
question of the extent to which literary critics and scholars should feel an obligation to attempt 
to intervene in a country’s foreign policy, and of the extent to which it might be a delusion to 
think that their ‘opposition’ might have any effect on that policy. It is enough to acknowledge 
that the claim that Felski wants to ‘make criticism less critical’ is a travesty of her position, 
concocted with a simple bit of wordplay. ‘Critique’, as Felski repeatedly makes clear, is not 
‘opposition’ or negative criticism tout court but a ‘specific genre of writing’, not disagreement but 
a ‘specific kind of disagreement’: ‘the hardening of disagreement into a given repertoire of 
argumentative moves and interpretative methods’ (Felski, p. 187).  
 
The most effective arguments against Felski’s work come not from staunch defenders of the 
critique she criticises, who, in Robbins’s case, are often reduced to tendentiousness, if not 
traducement, but from those whom one might more reasonably expect to be her allies. Susan 
Wolfson, at the end of her introduction to 2018’s Romantic Shades and Shadows, turns back to 
Cleanth Brooks, describing a ‘critical attention to “the pressure of context”’ and ‘a plat of 
language that is “warped and bent […] deflected away from a positive straightforward 
formulation”’. ‘Such attention’, Wolfson writes with a side-swipe at Felski, ‘notwithstanding the 
story often transmitted, isn’t just so much “chitchat about irony, paradox, and ambiguity”. It is 
the care for thick verbal structure, and for the agencies of construction, that distinguishes literary 
aesthetics from informational communication’.7 Wolfson’s argument against Felski here, which 
she expands in an endnote, is that, while her critique of ‘critique’ – that is, ‘the we-know-better 
mode of militant, suspicious revelatory “critique” levelled at unwitting texts’ – is welcome, 
‘phases of her own critique [are] too often flaunted in this same mode’: she deals in a ‘conceited 
cartoon’ of the ‘New Criticism’ (as well as a ‘long surpassed view of “romantic”’) (Wolfson, p. 
205n.).8 What Wolfson’s criticism implies is that Felski’s positive project will remain 
                                                        
6 Felski, p. 182. See pp. 151–85 for a discussion of her preferred direction for literary studies. 
7 Susan J. Wolfson, Romantic Shades and Shadows (Baltimore, 2018), pp. 36–7, and Brooks, pp. 210–11.  
8 The argument that Felski is mired in the very mood she is attempting to end is a common one. Eric Hayot argues 
that the move to group together the last four decades or so of literary studies under the term ‘critique’ lends ‘the 
critique of critique […] much of its rhetorical and hermeneutic force’; while this ‘feels like a major step forward’, it 




unsatisfactory as long as it continues to deal in such ‘New Critical’ caricatures, invented by the 
very mood of critique she seeks to change. Such conceited cartoons keep outside of the literary 
studies walls the entire paradigm of criticism. Not only do they leave Felski unable to 
acknowledge or seek any help from critics who came before critique (‘New Critics’ or otherwise), 
but they also leave her with a project which cannot help but sound hollow. Felski adopts the 
term ‘postcritical reading’, praising its ‘vagueness’, which allows it ‘to serve as a placeholder for 
emerging ideas and barely glimpsed possibilities’ (Felski, p. 173). But the term is not so vague as 
to welcome in once-glimpsed possibilities of which we might now have lost sight, ideas which lie 
dormant. Like Sharon Marcus’s term, ‘just reading’ (which Moi’s contention that ‘literary 
criticism has no method other than reading’ recalls), the apparent breadth of ‘postcritical’ 
narrows when we consider its use. Wolfson has it in for ‘just reading’, too: ‘What just seems not 
to mean is “judiciously curious”’, she writes, as she argues that Marcus’s term leaves little room 
for critical judgement, for the ways surface and depth, absence and presence, interact in texts, 
which are replete with nuance and agency (Wolfson, pp. 196–7). The apparent vagueness of 
words to describe ways of doing literary studies besides scholarship and critique is a necessity if 
we are to talk of moods and spirits, but will rightly attract hostility, from all sides, when such 
vagueness in fact disguises a more narrow underbelly, and when any particular term becomes a 
mantra which might be seen to protect its user from further description. The meaning of a word 
is its use: we need to keep terms such as ‘postcritical’, ‘just reading’, ‘realistic spirit’ rigorously 
attached to the practices of criticism and exemplification towards which they gesture. The more 
they are airily and fashionably tossed about, the more they will be treated as a passing whim of 
critical fashion. 
 
I write ‘besides scholarship and critique’. This is not what Felski is after: she wants us to ‘abstain 
from critique’ altogether (Felski, p. 151). This thesis’s second major difference from Felski’s 
project is its desire to argue for a critical spirit which can exist side-by-side with the currently-
dominant, theoretical one. As my introduction made clear, a theoretical spirit can often be useful; 
it depends on the language game we are playing. The danger is that a book such as The Limits of 
Critique ends up repeating the moves we saw played by a book such as Structuralist Poetics: aiming 
for a higher level of critical self-consciousness as it reduces the work of many literary scholars to 
                                                        
from which [the critique of critique] sees itself as having escaped’ (Eric Hayot, ‘Then and Now’, p. 287, in Anker, 
pp. 279–95). Felski herself is alive to this argument (something Hayot misses): ‘The critique of critique only draws us 
further into a suspicious mindset, as we find ourselves caught in an endless regress of sceptical questioning. Perhaps 
we can get the fly out of the fly bottle by choosing to redescribe rather than refute the hermeneutics of suspicion’ 




an elaborate game. It is only natural that this kind of move provokes hostility, hostility which 
then extends to the work of other critics with more measured arguments to make. Bruce 
Robbins summarily reads Joseph North’s Literary Criticism as ‘a defence of “criticism” and an 
attack on “scholarship”’, a conclusion which must have had other influences than the argument 
of North’s book itself.9 North sees the recently dominating ‘scholarly’ paradigm as right-wing, 
and wants to see the reinstatement of a parallel paradigm which can be more interventionist. 
This is neither an attack on scholarship tout court – praised at many moments in North’s book 
before its perceived turn to the right – nor a defence of ‘criticism’ per se, since North is so hard 
on so much work performed within the critical paradigm (the ‘New Critics’ and their perceived 
co-opting of close reading).10 A collective decision by critics such as Critique and Postcritique’s 
contributors that what is preferable is not a radical overhaul of the status quo but the re-
introduction of a concurrent arrangement of competing and co-operating paradigms would bleed 
the discussion dry of hostility and move it onto more productive territory (it would certainly 
make it harder to forgive Robbins his total misreading of North’s project).  
 
‘Re-introduction’ need not be a version of the ‘disciplinary habit’ of ‘[j]ustifying a present-day 
mission by going back to past greatness’, as Robbins describes North’s ‘claiming’ of I. A. 
Richards (another misreading: North repeatedly makes reference to Richards’s shortcomings, 
and rejects the idea of a simple ‘return’ to him).11 Susan Wolfson is not simply saying that 
Cleanth Brooks had it all worked out. The aim would be not so much to rescue individual critics 
from the literary studies dustbin (although there may be some value in that) but to restore a 
similar atmosphere to that in which they once worked, in which critical attention to individual 
texts for the sake of that attention and its subsequent testing by fellow academics and readers 
would be respected as much as scholarly attention to cultural and historical phenomena.12 That, 





                                                        
9 ‘Discipline and Parse’, unpaginated. 
10 In a conclusion, North also makes clear that ‘a place for criticism proper within the literary institutions’ would not 
necessarily be a ‘welcome development’, because it is possible to imagine ‘a centrist or even right-wing version’ of 
such a project (North, pp. 209–10). 
11 ‘Discipline and Parse’, unpaginated. See North, pp. 33–4. 
12 For an example of such criticism, which wants to rescue aspects of disparaged or ignored critics, see Helen 






A ‘realistic spirit’ is best described with recourse to examples. I take Empson as my main critical 
example not to attempt to ‘claim’ him, or to ‘rescue’ or ‘recuperate’ his work. It stands on its 
own, and needs no help from me. Indeed, an advantage of turning to him here is the odd 
manner in which he has, by and large, escaped the ‘New Critical’ caricaturists’ brush, despite the 
phenomenon North describes whereby ‘many students and scholars, particularly in the United 
States, have […] the impression that the work of the early critical revolution was reasonably 
contiguous with that of the New Critics, rather than opposed to it in central respects’ (North, p. 
40). Structuralist Poetics, at more than one moment to boot, lavishes praise upon Empson and his 
‘self-awareness’ and ‘brilliance’, which makes ‘his work invaluable to students of poetics’.13 You 
won’t find the same treatment given to Brooks (whose ‘fail[ed]’ account of poetic language is 
briefly refuted on p. 163), Richards (unmentioned), or any other writer amongst the ‘New Critics’ 
and their preceding critical revolutionaries. Empson has remained at one remove from the ‘New 
Critical’ cartoon. It is hard to imagine a similar book to Michael Wood’s brief and insightful On 
Empson (2017) being written of another writer from that group; certainly not without substantial 
justification.14 But Wood gets straight to the point, as we are about to see, as he locates Empson 
as at once a genius and an unfollowable curiosity, someone who we can only admire and gaze at 
from afar. Aside from the brilliance of his writing, on which everyone seems to agree, he serves 
as a particularly interesting example insofar that he will help us to investigate our assumptions 
about what literary criticism can do and be. Wood begins with the following moment from 
Empson’s Seven Types of Ambiguity, describing it as ‘scarcely recognisable as criticism’. Let’s test 
that claim against the moment he quotes: 
 
 The speech begins 
 
  If it were done when ’tis done, then ’twere well 
  It were done quickly: if the assassination 
  Could trammel up the consequence, and catch 
  With his surcease success… 
 
Empson takes us through the passage [from Macbeth] with great spirit, commenting on 
every line and its spinning, hissing meanings, and then alights on a single word: 
                                                        
13 Structuralist Poetics, pp. 126, 150. Empson’s work has also been of interest to other scholars trained in literary 
theory. See, in particular, Christopher Norris’s long ‘Introduction: Empson as literary theorist: from Ambiguity to 
Complex Words and beyond’, in William Empson: The Critical Achievement, ed. Christopher Norris and Nigel Mapp 
(Cambridge, 1993), pp. 1–120, and also Neil Hertz’s ‘More lurid figures: de Man reading Empson’, pp. 213–42, in 
the same volume. 





  And catch, the single little flat word among these monsters, names an action; 
it is a mark of human inadequacy to deal with these matters of statecraft, a child 
snatching at the moon as she rides thunder-clouds. The meanings cannot all be 
remembered at once, however often you read them [sic: all Empson editions 
have ‘it’]; it remains the incantation of a murderer, dishevelled and fumbling 
among the powers of darkness. 
 
It is an act of alert critical reading to spot the action word among the proliferating 
concepts, especially since it names only an imaginary act; and generous to suggest that 
Macbeth, crazed and ambitious as he is, even as he contemplates the killing of his king, 
can still represent a more ordinary human disarray among matters that are too large, too 
consequential for us. Alert too to see that Shakespeare represents this case not only 
dramatically but also through his character’s choice of an individual word. But then to 
call the other words monsters, to identify the small verb as a child, and to introduce the 
moon and the thunderclouds, is to create a whole separate piece of verbal theatre, and to 
produce something scarcely recognisable as criticism. And when at the end of the 
quotation Empson widens his frame, returning to Macbeth’s full, anxious meditation, he 
continues the same double practice. He turns our failure to grasp all the meanings into an 
achieved Shakespearean effect and not a readerly shortcoming, and he finds a figure of 
speech for the character and the situation. The word becomes a whole passage, the child 
becomes a fumbling and dishevelled magician, and the moon and thunderclouds become 




I see the Macbeth passage not as a model – who could follow it? – but as a spectacular 
instance of what criticism can do, of how personal and imaginative it may be while 
remaining very close to the text. If it doesn’t look like much of the criticism we know, it 
is because it isn’t. (Wood, p. 5) 
 
In disagreeing with Wood’s description of Empson as unfollowable, I am, of course, not about 
to suggest we all begin to infuse our critical writing with thunder-clouds. I don’t see the Macbeth 
passage as a ‘model’ either. But it is writing which is very definitely criticism, performed in the 
spirit of the paying of a certain form of attention to words, a spirit which is shareable and 
replicable. The outcome of Wood’s opening example is his statement that the ‘Empson I would 
like to conjure up in this book is primarily a writer’, whose ‘work seems everywhere and nowhere 
in [the] crossfire’ of contemporary debates about surface and distant reading (Wood, pp. 5, 22). 
As we attend closely to Wood’s reading of Empson’s analysis, I want to suggest that this 
conclusion need not be made; that Empson’s Macbeth passage is not, or not simply, the product 
of an isolated writer’s creative genius but a familiar mode of writing from within the critical 
                                                        
15 Wood, pp. 2–3. Wood quotes Empson from Seven Types of Ambiguity (New York, 1966) – here p. 50. I will be 




paradigm. Wood’s placing of Empson demonstrates just how removed from literary studies that 
paradigm has become: a thoroughgoing act of literary criticism has become ‘scarcely 
recognisable’ to the discipline as it now stands. But, following on from that phrase ‘conjure up’, 
we can separate Empson’s current disciplinary strangeness from a broader kind of oddness 
which, I will argue, is here Wood’s invention. Wood’s project is to push Empson further away 
from literary studies, so that we might look at him as a curious hermit, imparting inadvertent 
wisdom from afar; we should, instead, be looking to reincorporate the critical spirit he 
exemplifies into the ways we do literary criticism today. 
 
Let’s attend closely, then, to some of Wood’s slight over-emphases. There is a subtle criticism of 
Empson’s practice sandwiched between Wood’s two commendations for alertness: it is 
‘generous’ – that is, too strained – to suggest that Macbeth, despite contemplating killing a king, 
is still representing an ‘ordinary human disarray’. Perhaps Wood has misread ‘statecraft’ as 
‘stagecraft’, since Empson’s point is not about ‘us’ or ‘ordinary’ humanity as distinct from 
Macbeth, but a complete ‘human inadequacy’ to deal satisfactorily with the managing of the 
affairs of a state. The separation between drama and word choice rings oddly, too, carried 
forward into the odd phrase ‘verbal theatre’ – it is not quite clear, if one were to strip Macbeth’s 
words away, what ‘drama’ would remain. ‘[V]erbal theatre’ might mean that Empson’s criticism 
creates effects which are in some sense similar to those of the play, that it is writing which enacts 
as well as describes, or describes by enacting; indeed I think that this is what Empson’s writing 
does do here. Thus to call it ‘separate’ from the play is not right: the writing exists alongside it, 
attempting to enhance our understanding and appreciation of it (one could test this point by 
imagining Empson’s words divorced from their context (that is, an analysis of lines from 
Macbeth), and then wondering what value or theatre they would have). Empson’s main point, to 
paraphrase, is that, amongst all these long and sometimes obscure words, replete with multiple 
senses, echoes of others, comes an everyday monosyllable, promising something solid and 
tangible only to fade into an abstract object, ‘success’; the effect of this word is something like 
gazing up at the summit of a tall building with no means of ascent – having a ladder thrown at 
you – climbing a couple of rungs – and then having it taken away. Or – another possible way of 
reading the child and the thunder-clouds – like gazing up at the summit of a tall building with no 
means of ascent, seeing something that has scaled a couple of floors, and imagining then that the 
summit is reachable.16  
                                                        
16 There is also the sense that a thunder-cloud, in super-imposing itself on the moon, still visible through it, 
somehow makes the moon feel closer by association – a sense my ladder alternative could not get (perhaps why 




There may be a fashion for imagining superhuman powers of retention and knowledge amongst 
those attending the original Shakespearean stage, but it would be a stretch even so to assert that 
an audience member could simultaneously hold in mind all the meanings over the four lines 
which Empson carefully teases out.17 So the assertion that Empson ‘turns our failure to grasp all 
the meanings into an achieved Shakespearean effect and not a readerly shortcoming’ is again 
giving Empson too much credit, or rather, giving him credit for something he has not done; he 
has noticed, but not – like an alchemist, or a magician – ‘turn[ed]’. Empson never says that one 
cannot ‘grasp’ all the meanings – indeed that is something he has perhaps just done – but rather 
that one cannot remember them all at once, hold them in the mind simultaneously (unless one 
extends the mind and writes them down on the page), no matter how many times one reads, let 
alone hears in the theatre. Later on in Seven Types, he provides historical justification for this 
achieved Shakespearean effect, turning to ‘one of the famous cruces in Macbeth’ and the word 
‘dis-eate’: 
 
you may say that Shakespeare actually intended, by putting down something a little 
removed from any of the approximate homonyms [so ‘dis-eate’ as opposed to ‘disseat’, 
‘disease’, ‘disseizes’, ‘defeat’], to set the reader groping about their network. One must 
consider, before dismissing this […] idea as absurd, that the Elizabethans minded very 
little about spelling and punctuation; that this must have given them an attitude to the 
written page entirely different from ours (the reader must continually have been left to 
grope for the right word); that from the comparative slowness, of reading as of speaking, 
that this entailed, he was prepared to assimilate words with a completeness which is now 
lost; that only our snobbish oddity of spelling imposes on us the notion that one 
mechanical word, to be snapped up by the eye, must have been intended; and that it is 
Shakespeare’s normal method to use a newish, apparently irrelevant word, which spreads 
the attention thus attracted over a wide map of the ways in which it may be justified. (ST, 
pp. 83–4)  
 
Empson’s opposition between ‘spread[ing] the attention […] over a wide map’ and ‘snapp[ing] 
up by the eye’ is a crucial difference between the realistic and theoretical spirits. The end of this 
chapter will be devoted to a description of this aspect of the former, a criticism performed with a 
wide and sustained attention, and of the fruits it may bear. In the immediate case of Wood, he 
would have done well to have brought a less narrow attention to Empson’s passage. Somewhat 
ironically, his prose builds to a climax which makes imaginative steps not entirely unlike Empson 
with his thunder-clouds, demonstrating that this unfollowable, scarcely-recognisable curiosity is 
                                                        
17 On this fashion see Eric Griffiths: ‘in some respects writing of the 1590s is easier to understand now than it was 
then, because many of the period’s lexical innovations have since entered the language and grown familiar to us – 
conscious mind, addicted to theory, negotiation – whereas they were more troublesome then. This is worth bearing 
in mind when scholars tell you that “Shakespeare’s audience would instantly have recognised…” some allusion to 




not in fact so curious. The manner in which ‘the child becomes a fumbling and dishevelled 
magician’ is not at all clear, since the child is the word ‘catch’, and the magician – though there is 
no magician in Empson’s text – Macbeth; Wood strives for an imagistic consistency which is not 
there, in order to see what he wants to see: Empson the curiosity, the freak of nature, the 
unreplicable genius. He makes Empson’s writing look stranger than it is. Empson’s Macbeth 
passage is brilliant and astute, but it is also ordinary, recognisable as literary criticism, and 
followable. Its apparently oddest moment – the image of the child riding thunder-clouds 
snatching at the moon – does something quite familiar in Empson’s work and in the work of 
critics whom we might describe as writing in an Empsonian tradition; indeed, it is something of a 
recurring motif of such work, even a trademark. That is the turn to a physical effect as a means 
of getting across how a verbal effect can make us feel. Here is Eric Griffiths alluding to a mid-
twentieth-century domesticity while talking of Shakespeare: 
 
Folio never indents like this, nor does it need to break Caesar’s ‘Nay then’ across two 
lines because ten syllables have run out, like tenpence in a gas-meter… 
 
In the early folios and quartos, the typographic verse-line comes and goes. At the start of 
scenes, for instance, it often takes the speakers a while to warm up into decasyllables, as 
if they were old radios with valves slow to kindle…18 
 
And then a more straightforward example, in the same spirit, from Christopher Ricks: 
 
There is pain in the lines, but the pain we feel is that of contemplating the pain felt by a 
mother as she searches for her daughter; we are – painfully – not allowed to pretend to 
ourselves that we share Ceres’ pain.19 
 
Such a way of writing is not an attempt at explanation by comparison, since none of these critics 
are prepared to simplify the experience of attending to an object or utterance – be it a poem or a 
radio, or a mother’s pain – so far as to extract some kind of essence from it. Here is Wittgenstein 
in The Brown Book: 
 
It has sometimes been said that what music conveys to us are feelings of joyfulness, 
melancholy, triumph, etc., etc. and what repels us in this account is that it seems to say 
that music is an instrument for producing in us sequences of feelings. And from this one 
might gather that any other means of producing such feelings would do for us instead of 
music. – To such an account we are tempted to reply ‘Music conveys to us itself!’. 
                                                        
18 Both from Eric Griffiths, ‘Lines and Grooves: Shakespeare to Tennyson’, pp. 140, 141.  




It is similar with such expressions as ‘Each of these colour patterns impresses one’. We 
feel we wish to guard against the idea that a colour pattern is a means to producing in us 
a certain impression – the colour pattern being like a drug and we interested merely in 
the effect this drug produces. – We wish to avoid any form of expression which would 
seem to refer to an effect produced by an object on a subject. (BB, p. 178) 
 
Empson’s appeal to child and thunder-clouds is made in the spirit of turning to example rather 
than extraction of an essential component; it does not claim to know precisely – or at least to be 
able to put into words – the essential experience of reading ‘catch’, but instead offers us an 
example of an experience which seems to produce a similar effect, and asks us to weigh up the 
similarity and the difference. Critics, whatever else they do, talk in and about language, a proper 
attention to which will never find essences or the plain terms for which we might wish. So those 
who do not attempt to talk about a word as if it contained within it a ‘real artichoke [we could 
find] by stripping it of the leaves’ are not being deliberately obtuse, or indeed gnomically 
imaginative, when they talk of moons and thunder-clouds, conjure further examples rather than 
getting straight to a point (BB, p. 125). The point cannot be expressed in other terms. Empson’s 
clouds and darknesses are not decorative excrescences but the meat and drink of a criticism with 
example at its heart. 
 
And such a criticism is aware and confident of the amount of potential meaning to be found in a 
literary example. The oddness Wood sees in the introduction of the moon and thunder-clouds 
further dissipates when we realise the origins of the particular comparison Empson chooses. The 
‘separateness’ of Empson’s image is overstated: later in Macbeth, Hecate, met by the three 
Witches, tells them that 
 
Upon the corner of the moon 
There hangs a vap’rous drop profound; 
I’ll catch it ere it come to ground.20 
 
It is Shakespeare’s play which sets in motion Empson’s association of ‘catch’ with ‘moon’, and, 
one step further as the single drop turns to raindrops, with thunder-clouds. In his introduction 
to a volume of essays exploring Empson’s criticism and poetry, Matthew Bevis describes how 
the criticism ‘establishes kinship with the life of the character – and the life of the writing – by 
entering into and inhabiting the spirit it describes’; Empson’s own writing is often ‘in tune with 
                                                        




the consciousness and the style he is observing’.21 This ‘tuning in’ to the style of the object of 
criticism Bevis describes as ‘founded on what [Virginia] Woolf termed “the power which adds 
the supreme flavour to existence – the power of taking hold of experience, of turning it round, 
slowly, in the light”’; it produces criticism which ‘has waited a moment to know its own mind as 
well as that of another’, and which ‘encourages us to do the same’.22 Empson’s image invites us 
to turn to Hecate’s words again, as it also invites us to attend to Macbeth as a play in which words 
repeated across scenes share potentially meaningful relations. Shakespeare’s play, Empson’s 
criticism shows us, rewards a slow and wide attention, revealing new meanings to the reader, the 
critic, the audience, the longer it is dwelt upon, the more times it is returned to.  
 
A realistic spirit, from the ground up: justifying ‘literature’ 
 
But does that meaning really come from the play, or simply from the mind of the person 
attending to it? An affirmative response to the latter clause is implicit in Geoffrey Hartman’s 
1980 polemic against practical criticism, as he writes that a text’s ‘limits’, for a student trained in 
such a way, are ‘really the student’s own’.23 It is time to re-visit the debate about the category of 
literature which raged around the time Hartman was dismissing practical criticism, and with 
which we are already, after chapter one’s reading of Culler’s snippet of newspaper prose, 
somewhat familiar. The meaning, I want to answer, comes from both text and reader, the result 
of a fruitful encounter between agents which can only happen if the reader brings a wide 
attention to what she reads.24 This answer needs justification, and further description. This 
section aims at the former, the next, the chapter’s last, at the latter. To justify my answer, we 
need to attend to the question of just what it is a reader is paying attention to in her encounter 
with a literary text. As we’ve seen, the category of literature came to be questioned by the 
revolution in literary studies which followed the ‘New Criticism’, as the scholarly paradigm came 
to dominate the discipline. Whereas critics had often brought a wide attention to literary texts, 
reading them for the sake of that reading and of the enhancement of their reading faculties, 
scholars found themselves analysing texts in order to produce knowledge about culture and 
history.25 This resulted in a narrowing of the attention paid to literary texts, which became tools 
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(Oxford, 2007), pp. 1–20.  
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23 Geoffrey Hartman, ‘A Short History of Practical Criticism’, p. 285, in Criticism in the Wilderness (New Haven, 1980), 
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for cultural and historical analysis. It’s a general claim we can bring into more useful focus by 
considering two similar moments from near the start of two different books, both published in 
the 1980s, by two very different writers: Terry Eagleton and Eric Griffiths. They are each 
interested in these moments in apparently mundane examples of language use, in discussions 
which are of relevance to the category of literature. But as we shall see, whereas Griffiths sees his 
library sign as a ‘plain instance for comment’, comment which can then be taken forth into the 
consideration of more complicated, literary examples (in this case the subtitle of a Coleridge 
poem), Eagleton sees his escalator sign as an example which troubles any inherent hierarchy of 
instances of uses of language (Printed Voice, p. 13). Distinctions between ‘plain’ and elaborate 
examples are simply invented by listeners or readers, with the result that examples themselves are 
deemed less important than the ways listeners and readers invent them. First considering 
Eagleton’s arguments, and the assumptions he makes in order to propose them, we will then 
turn to Griffiths for an alternative mode of thinking, one which will help to shape a fuller 
account of the realistic spirit for which this thesis is arguing. 
 
Eagleton takes the example of ‘Dogs must be carried on the escalator’ to make us aware that 
‘there is no kind of writing which cannot, given sufficient ingenuity, be read as estranging’.26 The 
aim, in an introduction which asks and seeks to trouble the question, ‘what is literature?’, is to 
trouble the perceived ‘Formalist’ claim that ‘the literary work [is] a more or less arbitrary 
assemblage of “devices”’, devices which achieve an ‘“estranging” or “defamiliarising” effect’ 
(Eagleton, p. 3). We can read the escalator sign in such a way as to make it strange: interpreting it 
to mean that if you want to travel on the escalator, you’re going to have to find yourself a dog 
(‘[m]any apparently straightforward notices contain such ambiguities’, we are told); and also, as 
with Structuralist Poetics’ example of newspaper prose, making fine technical points about how 
individual words and rhythms of the sentence contribute to various meanings – the ‘rich 
allusiveness of “carried”’, and its ‘suggestive resonances of helping lame dogs through life’ 
(Eagleton, p. 6). Eagleton acknowledges that making the sign strange in these ways ‘may well be 
a fruitless sort of pursuit’. But ‘it is not significantly more fruitless than claiming to hear the cut 
and thrust of the rapiers in some poetic description of a duel, and it at least has the advantage of 
suggesting that “literature” may be at least as much a question of what people do to writing as of 
what writing does to them’ (Eagleton, p. 6). We’re now asked to consider another way of reading 
the escalator sign: ‘a late-night drunk doubled over the escalator handrail who reads the notice 
with laborious attentiveness for several minutes [who] then mutters to himself “How true!”’ 
                                                        




(Eagleton, p. 6). This appears to be the kind of mundane example which so irked Derrida in the 
Searle debate. But it ends up going nowhere, as Eagleton ties himself in a knot. All of this, he 
retreats, is not to say that ‘literature is just what people whimsically choose to call literature’ 
(Eagleton, p. 14). This is a strange concession as Eagleton’s argument relies on the assumption 
that we are happy to imagine circumstances in which an escalator notice might be called 
literature, for the purpose of thinking about what literature is. The example of the escalator 
notice and the drunkard, in Eagleton’s account, is supposed to be relevant to how we might 
think about literature because we are asked to take seriously a person whimsically and drunkenly 
reading the notice as literature. For as long as we are asking ‘what is literature?’, we can, it seems, 
arbitrarily give the label of ‘literature’ to whatever we want; once we’ve stopped asking that 
question, our freedoms are restricted. Suddenly we are thinking in the terms of ‘historically 
variable […] value-judgements’, with ‘a close relation to social ideologies’; ‘literature’ gets defined 
by ‘certain social groups’, a by-product of their tastes and assumptions as they ‘exercise and 
maintain power over others’ (Eagleton, p. 14). We do have grounds, then, on which we can 
decide what is and is not literature; but these are grounds which are necessarily problematic, 
since they are the creation of the powerful, linked to the ideologies which help them maintain 
their power over the powerless. The early example of the escalator sign, by emphasising and 
exaggerating the arbitrariness of any categorisation of the literary, helps to push us away from an 
interest in literature itself to an interest in those doing the categorising. Eagleton’s introduction 
has talked itself into a position in which ‘literature’ is a mutable category determined by 
structures of power; it is those structures which have become the ultimate object of literary 
study, as examples of literature slip out of the discussion in favour of generalisations about how 
people have thought about literature. The suggestion ‘that “literature” may be at least as much a 
question of what people do to writing as of what writing does to them’ reveals the full extent of 
the weight it placed on ‘at least’: really, for Eagleton here, literature is wholly how it is variously 
invented by various powerful social groups at various times. The individual work of literature 
ceases to matter, along with the individual’s response. The introduction ends with ‘literature’ in 
scare quotes; in fourteen pages, Eagleton has turned literature into ‘literature’.  
 
The assumptions which make this move possible are many. The ‘Russian formalists’, as they are 
so labelled on Literary Theory’s second page, might seem an odd group to begin this distinctly 
English introduction to literary theory by refuting. That ‘the Formalists’ – from the third page 
onwards – lose the adjective and gain a capital only increases the sense of oddness. The first 




‘Russian formalists’ – defined as the fact that ‘the literary work [i]s a more or less arbitrary 
assemblage of “devices”’ – is continuous with all possible and historical objections to the 
theoretical, literature-as-‘literature’ account.27 That I. A. Richards, the only English-language 
critic whose work is referenced in the introduction at any length, makes an appearance only on 
its penultimate page – once the argument has been won – should strike us as odd. Eric 
Griffiths’s characteristically fractious sideswipe at Helen Vendler – two critics one might find 
described as ‘formalist’ – in an essay on Peter Robinson, that ‘[p]oems, anyway, do not have 
“internal features” in a sense strong enough to bring comfort to flanellers such as Helen Vendler 
who […] claim that “the referentiality of language in a poem is more inward than outward”’, 
should alert us both to the dangers of deciding that ‘the Formalists’ are a definable choir who 
sing from the same hymn-sheet and to the erroneousness of the view that all definitions of 
literature must have recourse to its perceived internal features and ‘devices’.28  
 
Another assumption is that it is possible to find non-ambiguous writing, one which is latent in 
the assertion that ‘[m]any apparently straightforward notices contain such ambiguities’. 
Griffiths’s account – to which we will now turn – argues instead that all writing is ambiguous, 
which modulates any challenge to ‘literature’ posed by the potentially comic ambiguity of ‘Dogs 
must be carried on the escalator’, and its character as example. Griffiths’s own example, which 
comes near the beginning of The Printed Voice of Victorian Poetry, is also a sign, not by an escalator 
but one which ‘stands in the Cambridge University Library’, and which reads ‘PLEASE talk 
QUIETLY’ (Printed Voice, p. 13). The most obvious double sense here is almost identical to 
Eagleton’s sign: it seems that we can, in theory, read this as either ‘if you must talk, do it quietly’ 
or ‘you must talk at all times, quietly’, as we could read ‘Dogs must be carried on the escalator’ as 
either ‘if you have a dog, carry it’ or ‘you must carry a dog if you wish to use the escalator’. But 
the similarities between the examples, as they are taken, end here. Eagleton is interested in 
describing how we might read his sign, and stops at the level of possibility. Griffiths is interested 
in how we do read it, as he moves from ‘plain instance’ to a more complex, literary example. ‘[I]t 
                                                        
27 Victor Erlich asserts that the Russian formalists ‘argued persuasively that poetic language and figurative language 
were not coextensive entities’, which renders somewhat impotent Eagleton’s snappy objection that ‘there is more 
metaphor in Manchester than there is in Marvell’ (Eagleton, p. 5); ‘Russian Formalism’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 
34.4 (1973), 627–38, p. 629. Erlich’s article provides a useful test for many of Eagleton’s broad-brush claims about 
the Russian formalists. 
28 Eric Griffiths, ‘Blanks, misgivings’, p. 64. For a discussion of some of the many forms of formalism, see Heather 
Dubrow’s useful foreword to New Formalisms and Literary Theory, ed. Verena Theile and Linda Tredennick (New 
York, 2013), pp. vii–xviii. For examples of Griffiths and Vendler being called ‘formalists’, see, respectively, Simon 
Jarvis, ‘For a Poetics of Verse’, PMLA, 125.4 (2010), 931–5, p. 932, who implores his readers to stop considering 
Griffiths’s Printed Voice of Victorian Poetry a ‘formalist’ study, and Frank Lentricchia, Ariel and the Police: Michel Foucault, 




is always possible (and often pointless) to think up ambiguities’, writes Griffiths, ‘because it is 
impossible to notate speech unambiguously in writing, in any system of writing’; that is, to ‘notate 
in such a way that, when reasons are given for doubting what a written sign means, the writing can 
always settle all such doubts’ (Printed Voice, p. 17). Such doubts can only be settled, if they can, by 
finding ‘an appropriate setting for [a piece of writing] in a context of intentionality’, which ‘will 
not [necessarily] involve the intentions of any particular individual’ (Printed Voice, p. 14). In the 
case of the library sign, this is possible, and easy. We can imagine competing contexts of 
intentionality, but we know that only one is more than imaginary: 
 
Some attempt has been made in the library to write clearly what is meant: the smaller 
characters of ‘talk’, the emphatic capitals of ‘PLEASE’ and ‘QUIETLY’, employ familiar 
graphic conventions to indicate that the important point is volume control. Yet all this 
polite ingenuity cannot of itself prevent a determinedly fertile interpreter from taking the 
sign as not discouraging talk but asking for it. Such an interpreter might suggest that the 
sign should be read as a message from a shy sub-librarian, avid of conversation but wary 
of superiors: ‘PLEASE’ would then be an intimate supplication, ‘talk’, an urgent whisper, 
and ‘QUIETLY’ a note of warning, a written glance over the shoulder in fear of being 
caught. Nothing in the text precludes this interpretation, but our being conversant with 
what library authorities generally permit, and what sub-librarians generally dare, puts it 
out of the question. (Printed Voice, pp. 13–4) 
 
A person who saw the library sign and proceeded to spend the rest of his time in the building 
gently muttering under his breath would (of course) be thought of as quite mad. Eagleton’s 
example of the drunkard reading his escalator notice focusses on unlimited possibilities of 
reading while ignoring distinctly limited possibilities of reading right. Those limits might, and 
often do, change when we move from the plain instance of a sign to more elaborate instances 
such as poems. Following this line, we can go much further in the attempt to distinguish 
literature from non-literature than Eagleton allows. There is a qualitative difference between 
Griffiths’s library sign and the subtitle to the Coleridge poem he goes on to quote – ‘A Poem 
which affects not to be Poetry’ (is this ‘A Poem which affects not-to-be-Poetry’ or ‘A Poem 
which affects-not to be Poetry’?) – insofar that ‘an appropriate setting’ is up for debate, is 
‘genuinely in doubt’: ‘We may on reflection come to feel confident that all that happens in his 
subtitle is a slip of attention rather than a deliberate sign of the writer’s predicament, but the 
reflection engages us with genuine questions of understanding Coleridge rather than only with 
abstract scepticism about what his meaning was or what the meaning of any particular sign might 





There are complex questions of intentionality involved here which trouble another of Eagleton’s 
assumptions, that ‘it is not significantly more fruitless’ to claim that we hear in the word 
‘escalator’, as it is used in his sign, the rolling of the machine itself ‘than claiming to hear the cut 
and thrust of the rapiers in some poetic description of a duel’. Considering the different contexts 
of intentionality which surround and permeate these two examples reveals that we are not 
dealing with an issue of degrees of ‘fruitfulness’ but what we can call a qualitative difference. The 
issue turns on the question of whom I can expect to be interested in my fine points about 
auditory mimesis. Outside of a discussion attempting to query and trouble the nature of 
literature, there are few contexts in which I can hope to be taken seriously if I analyse the sign 
‘Dogs must be carried on the escalator’ in the manner of a poem, waxing lyrical about the 
‘allusiveness of “carried”’ (even then, my hope may be misplaced). A piece of writing such as a 
notice placed by an escalator is not one in which accidents of sense and sound are thought 
usually to matter; they are thought to be accidents of no consequence to what we know to be the 
functional meaning. A poem, meanwhile, is a form of writing in which such accidents – of 
sound, of word order, of multiple meaning, of allusiveness, and so on – are thought to be of 
potential significance. They can cease to be accidents, and become meant, aspects of writing for 
the discussion of which we can legitimately expect to find an audience. That everything in a 
poem is potentially meant means we do well to approach it with a wide and generous attention. 
What ‘meant’ means is complex, and attempting to get clear about it does not need to involve 
the attempt to work out what was going through an author’s mind at an imagined, usually 
singular, moment of composition, or the usual and platitudinous retreat from such an attempt, 
that intention can be both ‘conscious’ and ‘unconscious’. Discussing a line from The Merchant of 
Venice, ‘How sweet the moonlight sleeps upon this bank’, Shelley shows Byron many 
‘coincidences’ of sound which inform and enhance its meaning. ‘Heavens!’, responds Byron; ‘do 
you imagine, my dear Shelley, that Shakespeare had any thing of the kind in his head when he 
struck off that pretty line?’. ‘I don’t say’, Shelley responds, ‘that a poet must necessarily be 
conscious of all this, no more than a lady is conscious of every graceful movement. But I do say 
that they all depend upon reason, in which they live and move, and have their being’.29 Shelley’s 
response, in proceeding to ‘reason’ rather than ‘unconscious’ and in the comparison to the 
graceful lady, anticipates many of Stanley Cavell’s thoughts on intention. ‘[W]hat is the origin’, 
Cavell asks, ‘of the idea that intentions must be conscious? It is not clear what that means, nor 
that it means anything at all, apart from a contrast with unconscious intentions; and it is not clear 
what that means’ (Cavell, p. 233). Cavell has just taken the example of a film by Federico Fellini, 
                                                        




as he imagines a situation in which the director is not aware of a connection to the story of 
Philomel in his film La Strada: 
 
I say he [Fellini] had better think about it once I point out the connection; but obviously 
he may refuse to, and he can refuse because this is not a moral context, there is no new 
practical consequence forthcoming. But there are consequences: if he doesn’t see the 
relevance, I am shaken in my trust in him as an artist. (Cavell, p. 232) 
 
If Fellini does take the connection seriously, it does not mean we must say that he has intended 
it – although the set of responses which might prompt us to say that he has is broad, and 
includes, to quote Cavell’s examples, ‘Of course! That’s just the feeling I had about my character 
when I was making the picture. Odd the story never occurred to me’, and ‘How ironic. I had 
tried to translate that story into a modern setting several times with no success. Here, without 
realising it, I actually did it’ (Cavell, p. 232). But we see that he has acknowledged that the ‘artist 
is responsible for everything that happens in his work – and not just in the sense that it is done, 
but in the sense that it is meant’: 
 
To say that works of art are intentional objects is not to say that each bit of them, as it 
were, is separately intended; any more than to say a human action is intentional is to say 
that each physical concomitant of it is separately intended – the noise, the grass crushed 
where I have stood, that branch broken by the bullet, my sharp intake of breath before 
the shot, and the eye-blink after… But all these things I have done, and any may become 
relevant. (Cavell, pp. 236–7)  
 
All this forms part of Cavell’s response to Wimsatt and Beardsley’s contention, in ‘The 
Intentional Fallacy’, that ‘[p]oetry succeeds because all or most of what is said or implied is 
relevant; what is irrelevant has been excluded, like lumps from pudding and “bugs” from 
machinery’ (Wimsatt, p. 469). A poem cannot exclude what is irrelevant; rather, it takes 
responsibility for the fact that any of it ‘may become relevant’. That is to say, a poem is a form of 
writing which can make the thinking up of ambiguities fruitful rather than fruitless; in which 
‘thinking up’ becomes ‘thinking on’. Here is a distinction we can make between Eagleton’s 
‘escalator’ and his poetic rapiers which acknowledges that while there is not some consistent 
difference between the literary and the non-literary which lies ‘in’ a piece of writing, in its 
language, hearing the sound of a duel in a poem is something quite different to hearing the 
rolling of machinery in a sign. For reading poetry is not simply an issue of the attention we pay, 





Asking anyone about his intentions is asking whether he is meeting his responsibilities, 
asking an explanation of his conduct. […] In art, [the right to ask] has to be earned, 
through the talent of understanding, the skill of commitment, and truthfulness to one’s 
response – the ways the artist earned his initial right to our attention. If we have earned 
the right to question it, the object will answer; otherwise not. There is poetic justice. 
(Cavell, p. 237) 
 
Of course, thinking in this way does not give us a hard-and-fast, always applicable distinction 
between literature and non-literature: such a theoretical distinction is not possible. But a realistic 
spirit is not put off by such impossibilities, by blurred concepts. There will always be ‘various 
tussles between the “poetical” and the “plain”’, as there were for Wordsworth and Coleridge in 
Griffiths’s account (Printed Voice, p. 16). Such tussles are not theoretical but practical, decisions 




A crux on which Cavell, usually so astute, does not dwell is the potentially confused temporality 
in the phrase ‘the ways the artist earned his initial right to our attention’. It seems we must in the 
first place pay attention to enable the artist to earn her right to it, and in turn to modulate it in 
the individual ways which her work will demand. It is not clear that that right is thus properly 
described as ‘initial’. The initial attention we pay to literary texts is a spirit of attention on which 
we decide, one which must be open to being directed and affected by what is read. It must 
therefore be a form of attention which is wide, in some sense distracted, or open to being 
distracted; one which can hold in play multiple meanings, effects, directions, and so on, in a 
piece of writing, one which can acknowledge, to borrow a useful example from Michael Wood’s 
reading of Empson, that a word in a literary text, such as ‘Rooky’ in Macbeth, does not necessarily 
‘mean, as the earlier editors say, murky or dusky or damp or misty or steamy or gloomy, or having 
to do with rooks. It means all of these things’ (Wood, p. 47). It is an attention which refrains 
from a too-quick deliberateness, from knowing at once and with certainty what it is looking for, 
and thus placing limits on the scope of what is looked at, or even inventing what it sees. For the 
early Freud, invention is one of the ‘danger[s] which is inseparable from the exercise of 
deliberate attention’: 
 
For as soon as anyone deliberately concentrates his attention to a certain degree, he 
begins to select from the material before him; one point will be fixed in his mind with 
particular clearness and some other will be correspondingly disregarded, and in making 
this selection he will be following his expectations or inclinations. This, however, is 




he is in danger of never finding anything but what he already knows; and if he follows his 
inclinations he will certainly falsify what he may perceive.30 
 
I take this example from a 2017 lecture by Adam Phillips, entitled ‘On Inattention’, in which he 
tantalisingly referred to the possibility of a kind of ‘distracted close reading’, with a typically 
throwaway sentence, replete with possibilities.31 The early Freud – before he became a 
committed essentialist (Phillips’s very useful distinction) – is a far cry from the later one whose 
techniques of suspicious reading, as some would have it, partially inspired the genesis of literary 
theory.32 Here is a Freud who ‘became preoccupied […] by what our ways of looking stopped us 
seeing’, to quote Phillips’s spoken words; who believed that ‘inattention’, rather recalling Proust, 
‘makes access to the past possible’; who knew that ‘if someone makes a slip of the tongue, they 
can correct themselves or be corrected, or they can be heard as saying these two things at once. 
Correction restores the status quo, keeps things as they were. It forecloses a more open future’. 
Freud’s interest in the forms of inattention he might pay to a patient free-associating (that is, 
paying her own kind of inattention) has much to say to the ways in which we might initially 
attend to literary texts. The analyst, ‘[t]o put it in a formula’, ‘must turn his own unconscious like 
a receptive organ towards the transmitting unconscious of the patient. He must adjust himself to 
the patient as a telephone receiver to the transmitting microphone’.33 
 
I am advocating here the paying of a similar kind of attention to literary texts, that critics might 
turn themselves towards poems openly, seeking nothing, ready to be surprised; that the 
encounter between poem and critic become a kind of meeting of minds, out from which who 
knows quite what will spring. This is, in a sense, a re-description of practical criticism, as it was 
born to be: a kind of via negativa of literary study. I. A. Richards tells us how not to read, but rarely 
how to do it. Indeed, he hints at the (unrealised) possibility of a ‘correct reading’ only in relation 
to what he considers four bad poems, poems composed of ‘stock responses’, of meanings and 
cadences ‘irrevocably familiar to anyone with any acquaintance with English poetry’, which is a 
familiarity which is ‘not of the kind which passages of great poetry ever acquire’ (Richards, p. 
244). The job of the critic is to get her stock responses out of the way, and then see what 
                                                        
30 Sigmund Freud, ‘Recommendations to Physicians Practising Psycho-analysis’, pp. 112, in The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. and trans. James Strachey (London, 2001; first published 1958), vol. 
12, pp. 111–20.  
31 Adam Phillips, ‘On Inattention’ (7th June, 2017), Cambridge University lecture. 
32 On suspicious reading, see Felski, pp. 14–51. On Freud’s influence on literary studies, see, for instance, Henk de 
Berg, Freud’s Theory and Its Use in Literary and Cultural Studies: An Introduction (Rochester, NY, 2003). 
33 Freud, vol. 12, p. 115. I take this example from Moustapha Safouan, Jacques Lacan and the Question of Analytic 




happens. This speaks to the work of Marion Milner, who writes of a distinction between a 
‘narrow’ and a ‘wide’ attention, the former ‘select[ing] what serves its immediate interests and 
ignor[ing] the rest’, a ‘questing beast’, the latter seeming ‘to occur when the questing purposes 
were held in leash’, when, ‘since one wanted nothing, there was no need to select one item to 
look at rather than another, so it became possible to look at the whole at once’ (Milner, p. 106). 
To be prepared to pay this kind of attention is to be willing to be surprised, to be prepared for 
‘the possibility of the new’, as Phillips puts it. To be prepared for ‘the object [to which one 
attends] to have more of a life of its own’. To let go of our initial impulse to do something to a 
text and let it do something to us.  
 
This may seem to place readers in a position of vulnerability, to ask them to ‘make criticism less 
critical’, as Bruce Robbins had it. But, firstly, a literary criticism performed in this realistic spirit, 
with a wide attention capable of doing justice to individual example, need not be ‘uncritical’ in 
the sense Robbins wants to preserve. Such a spirit of reading remains grounded in the encounter 
between reader and text: the effect is not a loss of readerly agency – a world in which texts can 
impose their dangerous ideas on unthinking readers – but the gain of a textual one, with the 
result that the two agencies can converse, and indeed tussle. As Felski reminds us, through Paul 
Ricoeur, interpreting is a matter of ‘exposing ourselves to a text as well as imposing ourselves on 
a text’ (Felski, p. 34). Secondly, the aim, as I have tried to make clear throughout, is not to 
suggest a replacement for but a viable alternative to the theoretical spirit prevalent in literary 
studies, one which can exist with it, side by side. A final example from Cavell on intention might 
help to get this clearer: 
 
Suppose someone noticed that Babe Ruth, just before swinging at a pitch, bent his knees 
in a particular way. Obviously he may not be aware that he does this, but does it follow 
that it is not done intentionally? If there is reason to believe that bending his knees is an 
essential part of what makes him good at batting – an explanation of how he does it – I 
find I want to say that he does it intentionally; he means to. I would not say this about 
the way he habitually tugs at his cap before gripping the bat, unless it were shown that 
this was connected with the way he then grips it – e.g., he has some secret substance in 
the bill of the cap, or it serves to fix his fingers in some special position. Nor would I say 
this about some action which hindered a performance – the way, for example, one of his 
team mates drops his shoulder as he swings; he may invariably do this, and be perfectly 
aware of it, and working hard to get over it: it is unintentional, he doesn’t mean to. 
(Cavell, pp. 234–5) 
 
Part of reading a poem is trying to get at what it is trying to say and do, which may not always be 




may be, attends to what that poem is trying to do and how it goes about it. And in this context a 
critic can begin to distinguish between a poem’s bent knees and its cap-tugs, its cap-tugs and 
(occasionally, if it is not so good a poem) its shoulder-drops. The majority of literary criticism 
over the last four decades, to borrow Felski’s timescale (Felski, p. 3), has prioritised looking for 
drops of the shoulder – instances where a poem makes a mistake, fails to achieve its aims – at 
the expense of attending to bendings of knees or tugs of caps. There is value in looking for the 
former: batsmen – to extend Cavell’s example – can be bribed to drop their shoulders, after all. 
There is a place for the theoretical spirit in literary studies; what we need is a better balance with 
a realistic one. It’s time to pay an equal attention to knee-bends as shoulder-drops, to restore to 








An argument for a different attitude to critical exemplification which did not take any examples 
of its own would seem odd, perhaps even insincere. Nevertheless, or indeed, it has been a 
common criticism of recent works that have sought to express dissatisfactions with prevailing 
modes of thinking within literary studies that they do not offer viable alternatives, that they don’t 
in fact discuss literature, are simply engaged in fault-finding.1 I have thus decided to devote my 
final chapter predominantly to readings of poems, actual lyric examples. The aim, to recall my 
introduction, is neither to build nor to demonstrate a competing ‘theory’ of lyric. I only take 
three main examples in this chapter, with Wittgenstein’s repeated injunction to read and do 
philosophy slowly in mind. One of the tasks of philosophers, he wrote, is to go on thinking in the 
face of ‘a physical need to tell themselves when at work: “Let’s have done with it now”’ (CV, p. 
86e). ‘This is how philosophers should greet each other: “Take your time!”’ (CV, p. 91e). At a 
similar place in Culture and Value, Wittgenstein asks, 
 
How are we taught the word ‘God’ (its use, that is)? I cannot give an exhaustive 
systematic description. But I can as it were make contributions towards the description; I 
can say something about it & perhaps assemble a sort of collection of examples. (CV, p. 
94e) 
 
We can begin to make contributions here towards something like a ‘collection of examples’, the 
production of which will take time, and will never be exhaustive, as Wittgenstein’s ‘perhaps’ and 
‘sort of’ imply. A collection of examples would not be a simple substitute for a theory; its bounds 
would be uncertain. Wittgenstein, again, on melodies: 
 
The melodies of different composers can be approached by applying the principle: every 
species of tree is a ‘tree’ in a different sense of the word. I.e. Don’t let yourself be misled 
by our saying they are all melodies. They are steps along a path that leads from 
something you would not call a melody to something else that you again would not call 
one. (CV, p. 54e) 
 
                                                        
1 V. Johsua Adams, as we saw in my introduction, describes Toril Moi’s Revolution of the Ordinary as envisaging ‘a 
literary studies without literature’; Bruce Robbins sees Rita Felski’s Limits of Critique as overly devoted to negative 
criticism at the expense of constructive suggestion, stating that ‘[f]aultfinding […] is what Felski’s book spends most 




Concepts have edges which, to borrow a phrase from a Veronica Forrest-Thomson poem, are 
‘furred like geranium leaves’ (Forrest-Thomson, p. 17). Contributions towards a collection of 
lyric examples cannot confine themselves to ‘a series of hypercanonical lyrics’ (Culler, Theory, p. 
6), but need to be drawn from a broad range, one which may extend beyond what we might 
usually call lyric. For this reason, I take here both a ‘hypercanonical’ poem of Wordsworth’s and 
a less familiar epigram of Leonidas of Tarentum, along with a much anthologised, though little-
written-about medieval lyric.  
 
The rationale for beginning with these particular examples, as opposed to others, has naturally 
been partially decided by the arguments and preoccupations of the earlier parts of this thesis. 
Wordsworth’s ‘The Two April Mornings’, for instance, will help us to think further about 
repetition in a lyric context. I have also chosen examples which find themselves on the front line, 
so to speak, of the kind of tussles between scholarship and criticism for which my last chapter 
ended by calling. A sustained attention to ‘A god, and yet a man?’, the medieval poem I take as 
my first example, invites a productive conversation with recent evaluations of the literary value 
of medieval lyric; Leonidas’ epigram, my third, which contains at its heart an interpretative crux, 
calls into question the apparently apodictic truths that the interpretation of poetry is a recent 
invention of the critical institution and that the lyric is always an event, not, on occasion, an 
object. Amongst what follows, then, in addition to individual readings of three main poems, will 







Example one: ‘A god, and yet a man?’ and literary value 
 
Reading a medieval short poem closely, paying it sustained attention, as we are about to do, is 
not something which recent scholars of the medieval lyric always encourage. Ardis Butterfield, 
soon to publish the new Norton anthology of medieval lyric, argues in a 2015 article that the 
‘large, sprawling state’ of medieval lyric ‘wards off close reading’; that we need a ‘strategy of flat 
description […] rather than interpretation’, one which will deal better with the ‘morass of Marian 
cliché’ which makes up medieval lyric’s corpus.1 This kind of work is a reaction against supposed 
‘New Critical “lionising”’: ‘[i]t is not too much of an exaggeration’, says Butterfield, ‘to say that 
medieval lyric was invented as a category of medieval writing to satisfy the predilections of 
“practical criticism”’. ‘New Critical approaches to the medieval lyric’, we are told, ‘shaped it in 
their own image as short, concise, ambiguous, intense and rich in meaning’.2 This chapter’s third 
example will contest the argument that features such as ambiguity and ‘richness’ are inventions 
of a certain kind of critical attention, absent from the poems to which that attention is paid. But 
for now, we will focus in particular on Butterfield’s characterisation – a ‘morass of Marian cliché’ 
– and the distinction between description and interpretation. It’s a distinction which has gained 
much traction in literary studies in recent years, originating as a sociological term with Louis 
Quéré in the early 1990s.3 But Butterfield’s opposition between ‘flat description’ and 
interpretation deserves interrogation. Am I about to interpret ‘A god, and yet a man?’, or am I 
about to describe it, describe the way it works and means? It may depend on whether you think I 
am right; one critic’s description is another’s interpretation. The terms come together in the 
negative: if I offer a wrong description of something, I have misinterpreted it. They are not 
always easy words to separate.  
 
I. A. Richards, in Practical Criticism, describes ‘navigation’ – ‘the art of knowing where we are 
wherever, as mental travellers, we may go’ – as ‘the main subject of [his] book’. What poetry 
‘communicates and how it does so and the worth of what is communicated form the subject-
matter of criticism’, which is ‘very largely, though not wholly, an exercise in navigation’ 
(Richards, p. 11). Remembering Richards, Sharon Best and Stephen Marcus remind us that 
                                                        
1 Ardis Butterfield, ‘Why Medieval Lyric’, ELH, 82.2 (2015), 319–43, p. 328. She alludes here to Heather Love, 
‘Close but not Deep’. 
2 Butterfield, p. 325. ‘Lionising’ is from Jackson, p. 39. A similar – though not quite so bold – argument is made by 
Culler at the start of The Pursuit of Signs: see pp. 3–5.  
3 Louis Quéré, ‘Le Tournant descriptif en sociologie’, Current Sociology, 40.139 (1992), 130–65. For an account of the 
term’s recent history, see Love, pp. 376, 389n., and Odile Piriou, ‘Le nouveau tournant de la sociologie en France 




‘[s]ince most readers have trouble construing the sensuous form and literal sense of poetry, 
simply paraphrasing a text or understanding its verbal meaning is a demanding “craft”’ (Best and 
Marcus, p. 10). ‘Description’ is not as simple as ‘interpretation’ is abstruse. In the controversial 
issue of Representations which Best and Marcus introduce, Christopher Nealon argues that literary 
description might involve describing the ways in which texts interpret themselves.4 This 
suggestion both displays another way in which the distinction between the critical terms blurs 
and indicates that we might do well to think further about another dichotomy of which 
Butterfield and Love are fond: surface and depth. If we read self-interpreting texts, where do 
their surfaces end and their depths begin? Butterfield herself appears confused, as she asserts 
both that there might be found ‘a way of reading laterally that involves reading deeply’ and that 
‘it would be good to try to moderate any notion of flatness with one of depth, if that didn’t 
negate the attempt’ (Butterfield, pp. 335–6). We would do well to bear in mind Alexander 
Nehamas’ helpful contribution to the surface/depth debate here, which states that 
‘[i]nterpretation isn’t a geological project. Depth is a metaphor, less an indication of the location 
of what we understand and more of the quality of the understanding we are able, sometimes, to 
reach: the deeper it is, the more it encompasses’.5 For Nehamas, too, ‘what counts as description 
and what as interpretation, depends in each case on how well we and our audience know a work 
of art and on our purposes on that particular occasion’ (Nehamas, p. 123). This leads us back to 
a discussion of what our purposes are: recalling my first chapter and Joseph North’s distinction, 
are we scholars, historians, or are we critics? And can we not be, in our own ways, both? 
Butterfield’s essay, so certain that everything to do with the ‘New Criticism’ needs discarding, 
cannot see why someone would want to read medieval short poetry for any reason other than 
the development of a scholarly account, as accurate and general as possible (it is a ‘morass of 
Marian cliché’, after all: why would anyone but a scholar want to read it?). Criticism, meanwhile, 
is interested in individual works which are rewarding, since individual poems – given we are not 
computers – are what we tend actually to read, and it is they which help us develop our faculties 
of reading and judgement.  
 
A harmony between both approaches, or paradigms (as North called them), is needed, perhaps 
especially in the study of medieval lyric, which has found itself in a difficult period over the last 
three or so decades, divorced from the critical paradigm: since 1990, only two major anthologies 
                                                        
4 Christopher Nealon, ‘Reading on the Left’, Representations, 108.1 (2009), 22–50. 




of the medieval lyric have been published.6 Rosemary Greentree, introducing her 2001 annotated 
bibliography of the Middle English lyric and short poem, comes to a conclusion which echoes T. 
S. Eliot’s sentiment, fifty years earlier, that the word ‘lyric’ is no longer of any practical use: 
‘[m]ore information could be supplied [to the reader] by using “ME short poem” with a 
distinguishing adjective’.7 Butterfield’s desire to argue the case for medieval lyric is necessary and 
admirable, but it is not helped by its reliance on caricature, its entering into a version of the 
literary critical game once described by Stanley Fish, the blanket assertion that the way things 
were done in the past was wrong and the way we’re going to do things now is right.8 Not all mid-
twentieth-century anthologisers were ‘lionisers’, confident of their ‘lyric’ inventions; as Greentree 
reveals, there is plenty of precedent in medieval scholarship for her dismissal of the lyric term. 
Rossell Hope Robbins diverges from Carleton Brown’s anthologising methodology by 
substituting ‘the wider term, “poem” for the too-narrow “lyric”’; R. T. Davies, in another 
collection, states, ‘[b]y a “lyric” is meant simply a shorter poem’.9 Similarly, coming now towards 
the specific example of ‘A god, and yet a man?’, Julia Boffey’s relatively recent focus on the 
compositional and manuscript context of lyrics, which ‘were often frequently used as fillers in 
manuscripts, copied to occupy what would otherwise have been blank space at the end of a 
gathering or a whole work’, recalls Rosemary Woolf’s 1968 attention to ‘manuscripts of any kind 
which might contain one or two lyrics as a “fill-up”, to prevent the waste of leaving expensive 
parchment blank’. As a result, Boffey claims that ‘perhaps the most “informal” way to copy a 
text is to add it in some inviting blank space in an existing book or document, registering it in 
response to a quick impulse rather than copying it according to some carefully conceived plan’, 
while Woolf argues that  
 
Middle English religious lyrics give the impression that the author never looked at them 
with a satisfaction in poetic achievement, but fixed his mind on the one hand on his 
subject-matter, and on the other on the ordinary layman who would use the poem. Yet 
from this unself-conscious, ‘unpoetical’ approach, poetry sprang.10 
                                                        
6 Thomas G. Duncan, Medieval English Lyrics and Carols (Cambridge, 2013), and John C. Hirsh, Medieval Lyric: Middle 
English Lyrics, Ballads, and Carols (Oxford, 2004). Notably, neither of these anthologies feel able to leave the word 
‘lyric’ by itself. 
7 Rosemary Greentree, The Middle English Lyric and Short Poem (Woodbridge, 2001), p. 37. Eliot’s assertion is in The 
Three Voices of Poetry (Cambridge, 1954), pp. 15–16.  
8 Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretative Comments (Cambridge, MA, 1980), p. 353: I am 
recalling his idea of the ‘external-internal’ move, ‘performed when a critic dismisses his predecessors for being 
insufficiently literary (“but that has nothing to do with its qualities as a poem”)’. The anti-‘New Critical’ players 
instead dismiss their predecessors on the grounds that they were too literary, and not historical enough. 
9 Rossell Hope Robbins, Historical Poems of the XIVth and XVth Centuries (New York, 1959), p. vii, in Greentree, p. 8; 
R. T. Davies, Medieval English Lyrics: A Critical Anthology (London, 1987), p. 46, in Greentree, p. 9. 
10 Julia Boffey, ‘Middle English Lyrics and Manuscripts’, pp. 2, 17, in A Companion to Middle English Lyric, ed. Thomas 
G. Duncan (Woodbridge, 2005), pp. 1–18; Rosemary Woolf, The English Religious Lyric in the Middle Ages (Oxford, 




Woolf’s approach seems far from ‘lionising’, one which exclusively invents and gives us rich and 
receptive lyrical gems; neither approach has an interest in the ways medieval lyrics might react to, 
and think self-consciously about their compositional situations.  
 
The value of ‘A god, and yet a man?’, I am about to suggest, would be missed by Boffey and 
Woolf’s one-dimensional account of marginal space as it would by Butterfield’s unimaginative 
account of cliché; this is a poem which uses both the space and the other words which surround 
it to effect its aims, rises above cliché and in so doing employs it to its own advantage. I will now 
quote its text, providing a brief initial reading, before reproducing its manuscript context and 
embarking on a longer description of its workings. The aim is to offer a sustained reading of the 
poem as a contribution to a collection of lyric examples, while arguing for a renewed attention to 
the literary value of the medieval lyric, through making a particular case for the missed value of 
this one. 
 
A god, and yet a man? 
a mayde, and yet a mother? 
witt wonders what witt can 
conceave – this or the other? 
 
A god, and Can he die? 
a dead man, can he live? 
what witt can well replie? 
what reason reason give? 
 
God truth it selfe doth teach it: 
mans witt sinks too far under 
By reasons power to reach it: 
Beleeve and leave to wonder11  
 
The poem’s opening speaks with an arresting immediacy; there is no time for a main verb in its 
first two clauses. We are bombarded with questions for which we infer in the final stanza that 
there are no answers, or at least those which our ‘wit’ might understand. But the lack of main 
verb also underlines the familiarity of these questions, of Christianity’s unresolvable paradoxes; 
the easy, comprehensible immediacy of the first two stanzas is in fact somewhat illusory. To 
what does the phrase ‘this or the other?’ refer? Back, perhaps, to ‘conceave’, encouraging a 
reading which takes into account the pun on Christ’s conception? Does it state some common 
inability to cope with two conflicting ideas at once, a reliance on dichotomy, on the choice of 
                                                        
11 Text transcribed from MS Rawlinson B. 332, Bodleian (catalogue number 11670). Cartulary of St. Albans Abbey: 




one thing or the other? It seems just to be floating in space, tied down only by the dash which 
precedes it. There is a sense in the poem in which the paradoxes set up cannot be resolved 
because they cannot be properly expressed. The erratic phrasing of the first two questions is 
compounded by that of the first two of the second stanza, where the commas play similar roles 
to the earlier dash, articulating a space and connection which the poem does not, perhaps cannot 
verbally express. It is this space from which it springs and into which it folds itself again. The 
juxtaposition of the two homonyms of ‘reason’ might serve as a reminder of language’s final 
ineffectuality, and, ironically, of reason’s own failure to venture into divine territory. Though the 
poem invokes the powers of ‘wit’ and ‘reason’ seven times, they are invocations doomed from its 
conception. Better for its reader to ‘[b]eleeve and leave to wonder’, return to the blank space – 
the poem’s raw material, which seeps through it at every available opportunity, urgently implores 






























































Opening up MS Rawlinson B 332 – a register of abbots – one finds a flyleaf covered in different 
verses, different languages, different hands. Arguing that these verses’ approach to the blank 
space in which they find themselves is ‘carefully conceived’ might seem something of a tall order. 
But ‘covered’ – consider the neatness with which each pen adds to the accumulating ink – might 
be too strong. There is an odd respect shown to marginal space – note the inversion of those 
words on the left-hand side of the leaf – which might suggest it was right to question Boffey’s 
notion of a ‘quick impulse’. Our poem, indeed, is the only text on the page (apart from a vertical 
phrase to the left) which strays into the margins; ‘[b]eleeve and leave to wonder’, implores the 
final line, crucially unpunctuated, open-ended, sending its reader out into the flyleaf’s (almost) 
undefiled pocket of marginal space, plunging him into the divine. And yet – and here is a major 
problem – more than text lies in those margins. What seems to be another hand’s care-free 
flourish underlines the poem, appears to rob it of all the sensitivity with which it dances around 
the paradoxes of divinity. The addition switches the emphasis of ‘[b]eleeve and leave to wonder’ 
from the mystical tentativeness of the final noun to the second verb; in drawing a line under the 
poem, the pen’s owner leaves it behind. It is a testament, perhaps, to the lyric’s active effect and 
affect on its reader that one particularly resistant onlooker attempted to counteract its power, 
deface its final, carefully conceived descent into blank space. But too much hangs on that 
qualifying ‘perhaps’. Difference in hand does not imply difference in agenda; the flourish’s 
perpetrator might well be reading the poem in the right way (the lyric does become less neat in 
appearance as it progresses – note those blotches, ink spillages, the slightly slanting gap between 
penultimate and final line – which might suggest a quickening hand, might problematise a subtle 
spatial reading).12 Carleton Brown’s suggested title (in whose edition the poem was first 
anthologised), ‘The Divine Paradox’, seems to want to confine the poem to a literary or 
philosophical trope (the poem is not entirely unique, as we shall see, has some perhaps-less-
lyrical forebears).13 Theodore Silverstein adopts an even more reductionist approach, lending his 
version of the lyric the subtitle, ‘[a] ‘witty’ poem on the paradoxes of Christian faith’, suggesting 
that the poem’s tone is light, playful, punning, for which the correct response might be – far 
from induced meditation – to pun in turn (‘witty’).14 Only Maxwell S. Luria and Richard L. 
Hoffman, who use the first line of the poem as the title of a chapter of their anthology, implicitly 
approach a more significant, serious reading of ‘A god, and yet a man’, although it is unclear 
                                                        
12 I am indebted to Richard Beadle for his comments in conversation on the increasing compositional hurriedness of 
the poem. 
13 Religious Lyrics of the XVth Century, ed. Carleton Brown (Oxford, 1939), p. 187. 




whether they saw it in manuscript.15 Certainly, no attempt is made in that anthology to justify any 
decision to re-read the tone of the poem with recourse to its original form. That attempt will in a 
moment be made. A point I want to stress first, however, is this: in rejecting a caricatured 
version of our critical predecessors, we both ignore the work such criticism did, and the work it 
did not do. If we decide that mid-twentieth-century medieval lyric criticism dealt in invented 
practical criticism studies, and conclude that poems worthy of the sustained attention paid by 
close reading constitute a ‘tiny minority’ of lyrics (Butterfield, p. 328), we decide against an 
investigation of whether or not that minority might in fact be so tiny. If the old criticism, which 
was so desperate for the right kind of critical objects that it even went so far as to invent them, 
couldn’t find all that many medieval lyrics which reward sustained attention, then the present 
criticism can take it for granted that there simply aren’t that many. But the supposed ‘New 
Critical “lionisers”’ saw ‘A god, and yet a man?’ as light and ‘witty’, missed its self-conscious 
attention to its own workings. This is a poem which is replete with Incarnational clichés; that 
does not mean it fits comfortably into Butterfield’s ‘morass’. Accurate descriptions of how many 
more poems might be missed by the decision to deny medieval lyrics the kind of agency which 
allowed them not simply to present clichés, but to adapt them for various ends?  
 
Immediately closest to the English lyric – one word coming so near to it, indeed, that a little 









Nexus ovem binam per spinam pendet equinam  
Laesus surgit equus, pendet utrumque pecus.  
Adque molendinum portatur pondus ovinum  
Et spargendo focum se cremat atque locum.  
Cum nil supererat, quis modo damna ferat? 
 
[A fastening, by means of a thorn [or thorn bush], strings up in a pair a sheep and a 
horse. The horse, annoyed, rears up, and the sheep becomes suspended from its skin. 
                                                        
15 ‘These volumes [of Brown, Robbins and G. L. Brook] have […] indispensably provided us with the texts offered 




The sheep’s weight is then carried to the mill-house, and by throwing itself about to 
shrug the sheep off the horse sets fire to the hearth, and then the whole place. When 
nothing remains, how might one of them be held to account?]16 
 
It is easy from these leonines – a verse form, where the last word before the caesura rhymes with 
the final word of the line, which F. J. E. Raby once described as housing some of the worst 
examples of medieval hexameters – to see why Brown and Silverstein adopt the stances that they 
do.17 The jauntiness of that thrice-chime of ‘binam’, ‘spinam’, ‘equinam’ seems a world away 
from our interpretation of the tone of ‘A god, and yet a man?’; thus, perhaps, the latter poem 
became huddled by those anthologisers, unable to reconcile the two vastly differing poetic aims, 
under the same tonal umbrella. And yet there is more in common between the adjacent poems 
than might initially be apparent. The tangential touch of their subjects – a God combined with a 
man, a sheep combined with a horse – might seem wholly incidental were it not for the fact that 
Brown himself identifies a poem on which ‘A god, and yet a man?’ shows ‘verbal dependence’, 
which is itself a translation of a Latin leonine verse: 
 
Hoc mens ipsa stupet quod non sua ratio cernet 
Quo modo virgo pia genetrix sit sancta Maria 
Ac Deus almus homo sed credat ratio miro   
Namque fides superest cum perfida ratio subsit. 
 
[The mind itself is stupefied by that which its own reason cannot discern; 
How the holy, pious Virgin Mary might be a mother, 
And nourishing God a man, but let reason believe by wonder 
For faith remains when faithless reason is under.] 
 
Witte hath wondir that resoun ne telle kan, 
How maidene is modir, and God is man. 
Leve thy resoun and bileve in the wondir, 
For feith is aboven and reson is undir.18  
  
The differences between these two verses, existing side by side in the same manuscript (Sloane 
MS. 3534), could be teased out: the Latin’s interest in the piling up of adjectives to describe 
Mary, in the way that not one of ‘virgo’, ‘pia’ or ‘sancta’ can hope to counterbalance or resolve 
that jarring, overriding ‘genetrix’, is not carried across to the Middle English’s favouring of 
binary contrast; the vernacular poem favours full, regular rhyme, whilst the sound of the Latin’s 
final line breaks apart, sonically enacting how faith and reason are not on the same plane. And 
                                                        
16 My (loose but literal where possible) translation. 
17 F. J. E. Raby, A History of Secular Latin Poetry in the Middle Ages, 2 vols (Oxford, 1957; first published 1934), 1.228, 
2.1, in The Princeton Encylcopedia of Poetry & Poetics ed. Roland Greene, Fourth Edition (New York, 2012), p. 796. 




yet the essentially anapaestic base of the translated poem (‘maidene is modir, and’, ‘feith is 
aboven and’), its anachronistically nursery-rhyme-like rhythm, make it a relatively close tonal 
analogue of the Latin leonines it translates. Silverstein’s ‘witty’ might be better applied here; ‘A 
god, and yet a man?’ might mark a culmination of a process of ‘dewitticising’ (which might be 
the same as lyricising). Brown quotes another poem, from Harley MS. 541, a halfway house 
between ‘Witte hath wondir’ and ‘A god, and yet a man?’: 
 
Wytte hath wonder how reson telle can [sic] 
That mayd is mother and God is man, 
Oure noble sacrament, yn thre thinges on. 
In this leeve reson, beleve thou the wonder – 
There feith is lord, reson gothe under! (Brown, XVth, p. 186) 
 
Note the fading into the background of the jaunty metrical spine, the added line unbalancing the 
quatrain, struggling to rhyme, the abandoning of the Latin’s (untranslatable) spatial pun for ‘feith 
is lord’, a move away from an easy-sounding mystical faith towards The Cloud of Unknowing’s 
‘trauayle’ (for that phrase undercuts itself, acknowledges that faith might be lord but it is not 
Lord; there is far to go and much to do before then).19 Brown’s phrase ‘verbal dependence’ well 
notices the verbal similarity between ‘Witte hath wondir’ and ‘A god, and yet a man?’, but fails to 
account for the fact that the latter poem might be, far from dependent, a grown-up child which 
has flown its ‘witty’ nest. This current of simultaneous similarity and difference between the lyric 






An intricate, hybrid mark of separation and continuation; note how the thick-inked bar, carefully 
overlaid with gold leaf, symmetrically intersects ‘ferat’s’ early question mark, or punctus 
interrogativus, whose appearance of pointing towards the adjacent poem is not entirely thwarted by 
the intersection.20 Something has been taken, something has been left behind; the two poems are 
simultaneously of and not of the same kind. It is no coincidence that the hand which 
superimposes the gold bar forms a cross: symbol of intersection of God and man. 
                                                        
19 The Cloud of Unknowing and The Book of Privy Counselling, ed. Phyllis Hodson (London, 1944), p. 16. 




My argument here is that ‘A god, and yet a man?’ is an Incarnation poem whose every fibre 
throbs with the implications of the words it deploys; it is not just a ‘witty’ paradoxical trope but 
an articulation of a mostly incomprehensible phenomenon of dual existence which the lyric 
employs formally to effect its final semantic imploration. God and man are condensed into an 
energetic, transformative space, as symbolised by that gold cross, in which serious meditation 
and flippant verse exercise (although the two do not have to be mutually exclusive) can exist side 
by side. It is a space, then, which plays out its own formal incarnation; a space of dual character. 
Those inverted words in the margins of the flyleaf, ‘sacrum pingue dabo nec macrum sacrificabo’ 
[I will offer a fat sacrificial offering and I will not sacrifice a lean one], form a symbol, like the 
gold cross, of this duality. The phrase seems to recall the biblical story of Cain and Abel, and a 
little digging reveals that this is one half of a Lyon verse, where ‘each entire word […] is bodily 
reversed in its position in the sentence [forming] a new sentence, which is very generally an 
answer to the original one’, attributed to Politian, an Italian poet (1454–1494) almost exactly 
contemporary with MS Rawlinson B 332.21 The vertical line, then, is incomplete, quotes only the 
words of Abel, who ‘brought of the firstlings of his flock and of the fat thereof’; Cain’s words 
are merely implied, exist somewhere in the blank space of the flyleaf’s margin, which becomes 
both empty and full, nothingness and divine.22 ‘Heven and erthe’, indeed, ‘in lytyl space’: 
 
Thow semest whyte. and art red. 
Thow art fleche. and semest bred. 
Þe farest myracle þat euer was. 
To schew god and man. in so lytyl space. 
The bred is flesche in owre credence. 
Þe wyne is blode, with oute dowtance.23 
 
There is theological precedent for such a condensation of human and divine into something so 
small as a flyleaf in the Eucharistic bread and wine, a subject not unknown to medieval poetry.24 
The lyric workings of ‘A god, and yet a man?’ might seek to divert the poem’s reader into a 
smaller version of the larger apparent paradoxes with which it deals – a smaller version which, as 
the easy assurance of the above poem’s final phrase might suggest, can be better understood. 
                                                        
21 Henry Benjamin Wheatley, Of Anagrams: A Monograph Treating of their History from the Earliest Ages to the Present 
Time… (London, 1862), p. 13. 
22 Genesis 4:4; The Bible, p. 4.  
23 Printed in J. T. Rhodes, ‘The Body of Christ in English Eucharistic Devotion, c. 1500 – c. 1620’, p. 394, in New 
Science Out of Old Books: Studies in Manuscripts and Early Printed Books in Honour of A. I. Doyle, ed. Richard Beadle and A. 
J. Pipier (Aldershot, 1995), pp. 388–419. ‘Heven and erthe in lytyl space’ is from ‘Ther is no rose of swych vertu’, 
printed in Douglas Gray, Themes and Images in the Medieval English Religious Lyric (London, 1972). 
24 See also, for example, three variant texts of ‘Hyt semes quite, and is red’ in Rossell Hope Robbins, ‘Popular 




‘Beleeve and leave to wonder’ might be no more than a diversion into a space in which reason 
can again prevail. But then note the above final rhyme of ‘dowtance’ with ‘credence’, a sonic 
union which, ignorant of that ‘with oute’, suggests some perpetual revolution between faith and 
doubt, something darker than the poem is prepared superficially to admit. The playing out of 
such contradictions in ‘lytyl space’ might not necessarily make them any easier to resolve. The 
case might well be the opposite. Jacqueline Tasioulas, indeed, states that for ‘God made Man to 
have existed as an embryo […] emerges as the most difficult aspect of humanity to reconcile 
with Incarnation’; not least for Thomas Aquinas, who courts controversy in answer to the 
question of whether Christ’s body was immediately animated.25 ‘[I]n primo instanti conceptionis 
corpus Christi esset animatum animi rationali’ [in the first instant of conception Christ’s body 
must needs have been animated by a rational soul]: Aquinas rejects both the Platonic, pluralist 
idea of three distinct souls ‘located in various parts of the body’ (Tasioulas, p. 34) and Albert the 
Great’s narrative of a progressively developing soul according to his theory of the unicity of 
substantial form, elsewhere expounded: 
 
Nihil […] est simpliciter unum nisi per formam unam per quam habet res esse; ab eodem 
enim habet res quod sit ens et quod sit una. Etcideo ea quae denominantur a diversis 
formis non sunt unum simpliciter[.]26 
 
[nothing is essentially one except through one form, through which something exists, 
since existence and oneness are cut from the same cloth; and so things which are 
categorised by various forms are not essentially one.] 
 
The notion, according to these words, that the blank space of the flyleaf of MS Rawlinson B 332 
might have two substantial forms – nothingness and divinity – becomes a theological 
impossibility. In such an atmosphere of minute uncertainty with regard to ‘lytyl space’, a reading 
of ‘A god, and yet a man?’ which suggests it attempts to resolve the contradictions it poses 
through a process of their miniaturisation makes no sense.   
 
But perhaps to attempt to make a final, complete ‘reading’ of this poem – which is essentially an 
act of writing – is to do exactly the opposite of what the poem urges, to join the hand which 
                                                        
25 Jacqueline Tasioulas, ‘“Heaven and Earth in Little Space”: The Foetal Existence of Christ in Medieval Literature 
and Thought’, Medium Aevum, LXXVI (2007), 24–45, p. 45. Aquinas’s doctrine of the unicity of substantial form was 
‘much contested during his lifetime and after his death’; John F. Wippel, ‘Metaphysics’, p. 112, in The Cambridge 
Companion to Aquinas, ed. Norman Kretzmann and E. Stump (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 83–127. 
26 St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae: Vol. 52, The Childhood of Christ (3a. 31–37), ed. and trans. Roland Potter O.P. 
(Cambridge, 2006), pp. 62–3 (3a. 33, 2), and Summa Theologiae: Vol. 11 (1a. 75–83), ed. and trans. Timothy Suttor 




drew the flourish.27 Reading lyric within a critical paradigm need have no desire for such a 
completion, which might be finally the same as Woolf’s explicit attempting to wrest control from 
autonomous poetry. There might be a difference – although Aquinas would disagree – between 
understanding and experiencing, as seen in Julian of Norwich’s distinction between ‘truthe’ and 
‘feling’: ‘[t]here was no comfort nor none ease to me but feith, hope and charite, and these I had 
in truthe, but litil in feling’.28 When the reader of ‘A god, and yet a man?’ is shepherded forth into 
marginal space by ‘[b]eleeve and leave to wonder’, it might be a shepherding which revisits the 
poem’s opening contradiction, but no longer phrases it as a question; the lyric answers its barrage 
of questions by removing the need for answers. Its reader, as that of the Cloud is implored to do, 
is led to experience the truth of the Incarnation through a phenomenological passage into a minute 
version of that truth, the urge to understand it removed.29 Does this then mean – despite the 
gold cross, the half Lyon verse, the marginal dances, all the ways in which MS Rawlinson B 332’s 
flyleaf encourages a sensitive, double understanding of its blank space – that the blank duality 
discussed, at the heart of ‘lyric’s’ rescue, is no more than tenuously metaphorical? The Cloud 
might make that question a nonsense: 
 
For when I sey derknes, I mene a lackyng of knowyng; as alle þat þing þat þou knowest 
not, or elles þat þou hast forȝeten, it is derk to þee, for þou seest it not wiþ þi goostly 
iȝe. & for þis skile it is not clepid a cloude of þe eire, bot a cloude of vnknowyng, þat is 
bitwix þee & þi God. (Cloud, p. 23) 
 
‘For when I sey derknes’ – the Cloud-author neatly mutates his original term ‘cloud’ into ‘derknes’ 
in order to make his metaphor work. In their analysis of the place of metaphor and the figurative 
in everyday life, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson provide the example of ‘the foot of a 
mountain’ to demonstrate an instance of a metaphor, ‘a mountain is a person’, which has only 
one ‘used part’. We do not, as they argue, speak of a mountain’s ‘head, shoulders or trunk’ (Lakoff 
and Johnson, p. 54). For the Cloud-author the ‘used part’ of his cloud is darkness, and yet it is a 
part itself dark, needing to be teased out to the extent that ‘derknes’ entirely subsumes, replaces 
‘cloud’, leaves the latter irrelevant – and metaphor with it. Metaphor breaks down, the cloud 
becomes what the Cloud-author elsewhere, translating the Mystical Theology of Pseudo-Dionysius 
the Areopagite, calls ‘godliche derknes’: nothingness and God, absence and presence experienced 
                                                        
27 Recalling Simon Jarvis, ‘[d]oing a reading is of course really doing a certain quite peculiar form of writing’, in 
‘Archaist-Innovators: The Couplet from Churchill to Browning’, p. 40, in A Companion to Romantic Poetry, ed. Charles 
Mahoney (Oxford, 2011), pp. 25–43.  
28 Aquinas’s concept of phantasmata teaches that the soul learns only from sensory experience when it is on earth. See 
Summa Theologiae: Vol. 12 (1a. 84–89), ed. and trans. Paul T. Durbin (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 136–42 (1a. 89, 1). Julian 
of Norwich, A Revelation of Love, ed. Marion Glasscoe (Exeter, 1976), p. 23. 




simultaneously.30 Heaven and earth – as the image of the heavenly cloud vaporously recalls the 
earthly ‘vanitas’ of Ecclesiastes – become one.31 A truth which cannot be proved with recourse 
to subject-matter is shown to be true through the workings of form. A reading of ‘A god, and yet 
a man?’ which separates the two, purely takes into account the former, ignores the poem’s own 
formal agency, its crucial existence as poem, is simply deficient. It is an inaccurate description, 
and a misinterpretation. 
 
As a counterweight to Ardis Butterfield’s description of medieval lyric as a ‘morass of Marian 
cliché’ – and if this section has shown that some of it isn’t it has also shown that some of it is – 
we need more imaginative descriptions, which do justice to the greater literary value of many 
medieval lyric poems which cannot thus be subsumed. One possible description might be found 
in Alan of Lille, writing here on the grammar of the Incarnation: 
 
exceptivam actionem 
   verbum Patris excipit, 
dum deludit rationem, 
   dum naturam decipit. 
Casualem dictionem 
   substantivum recipit; 
actioque passionem 
   in hoc verbo concipit. 
        in hac Verbi copula 
        stupet omnis regula.32 
 
[The Word of the Father performs an action that introduces an exception, when it mocks 
reason, when it deceives nature. A substantive receives a declinable name. In this Word 
active conceives passive. In this joining of the Word, every rule is confounded.] 
 
This might too be an account of lyric, where ‘stupet omnis regula’ also, where nouns 
simultaneously become both subject and object – ‘what reason reason give?’.33 Conceiving 
happens between activity and passivity, in the space between two words. Lyric thinking can be 
more than grammatical: a space untouched by grammar can be minutely isolated and held up to 
be experienced by a poem which is particularly conscious of that blank space which gave it birth, 
                                                        
30 Deonise Hid Divinite, ed. Phyllis Hodgson (London, 1955), p. 3. 
31 Jerome, who ‘in effect […] standardised the interpretation of Ecclesiastes for over a thousand years’ (Craig G. 
Bartholomew, Ecclesiastes, (Michigan, 2009), p. 28)) states that ‘vanitas’ is a translation of ἀτµων – ‘a faint breeze that 
quickly dissolves’ – which in turn is a translation of the Hebrew abal (‘smoky vapour’) (Jerome, p. 36). 
32 Literary Works of Alan of Lille, ed. and trans. Winthrop Wetherbee (Cambridge, MA, 2013), pp. 536–7.  
33 Recalling Alexandre Leupin, ‘[g]rammar cannot grasp Christ incarnate; he is both divine subject and complement 
of the human object’, in Fiction and Incarnation: Rhetoric, Theology, and Literature in the Middle Ages, trans. David Laatsch 




for which the gaps between words become just as significant as words themselves. Lyric as mode 
of thinking is persistently aware of the incarnational space in, around, and from which it exists; 
through such awareness it becomes able to catch the divine conceiving which Alan of Lille’s 
grammar, and non-lyric language, miss, to revolve into that conception, to make it an integral 
part of itself. Not only might a neglect for the potential complexity and value of medieval lyric 
ignore the subtle workings of so carefully conceived a poem as ‘A god, and yet a man?’, but it 
might also neglect a crucial mode of living with a process whose full understanding was often 
‘untenable’ (Tasioulas, p. 45); to ignore ‘A god, and yet a man?’s’ lyric thinking would be to 
ignore a fundamental mode by which the mechanics of Incarnation became, if not 
comprehensible, then resolvable, revolvable, somehow visible. The medieval lyric, far from being 
a dead, too-broad genre, a morass of cliché, shows itself to be uniquely capable of a crucial mode 
of thinking which demands, if it is to continue to be properly examined and appreciated, that we 
pay sustained critical attention to individual poems.  
 
Because my argument here has implied that, along with ‘A god, and yet a man?’, there are more 
complex and valuable medieval lyric poems for which the ‘morass of Marian cliché’ description 
will not do, here is one further poem, more briefly, before the section ends: 
 
Louerd, thu clepedest me 
And ich nagt ne answarede thee 
Bute wordes scloe and sclepie: 
“Thole yet! Thole a litel!” 
Bute “yet” and “yet” was endelis, 
And “thole a litel” a long wey is.34 
 
Keeping our distance from this poem – glancing over it in the scholarly attempt to produce 
knowledge or data – will show it, in Butterfield’s terms, as a little monument of cliché: a classic 
account of man’s sinfulness, his distance from God, an attempt to humble oneself before the 
Lord. And that’s only if we get so far as seeing these words as a poem: were it not for Luria and 
Hoffman’s ‘New Critical “lionising”’, as, following Carleton Brown, they lineate a poem which 
appears as prose in its extant manuscript context, keeping distance might not reveal this as a 
poem at all, might pass over it completely.35 ‘Louerd, thu clepedest me’ becomes just three lines 
of prose in the five-hundred-page collection of 14th-century sermons that is New College Oxford 
88. The mode of attention which the poem demands and pulls us into, as vernacular poetry 
                                                        
34 Luria and Hoffman, p. 92.  




unexpectedly erupts from Latin prose, is something which Butterfield’s approach does not 
appear to consider, which sees the turning of sentences such as ‘Louerd, thu clepedest me’ into 
‘lyrics’ as invention, as ‘choos[ing] to see certain sequences of lines as something separate and 
separable’ (Butterfield, p. 323). This ignores the fact that these sentences are distinctly separate 
from the text which surrounds them. Rather than inventing a poem where there was none, the 
decision to lineate can be productively seen as an attempt to find an experiential equivalent to 
the passage from dense Latin sermon to brief, patterned, vernacular sentences. That experience, 
relegated to those who can read differently handwritten medieval Latin with unbroken fluency, is 
lost to the vast majority of us, even academics. I might be able to produce a photo of a 
manuscript page and claim that this is how ‘Louerd, thu clepedest me’ really appeared, but I 
won’t be able to make my reader see or read it as medieval readers read and saw it. Faithfulness 
























If we do inhabit ‘Louerd thu clepedest me’, give it our full attention (and consider it worthy of 
that attention), it reveals itself as something other than clump of a clichéd morass.36 These lines 
have an intriguing (t)hole at their heart. Who is speaking and being spoken to here?37 ‘[I]ch’ has 
no evident body, as ‘sclepie’ is transferred onto what might be unsounded words. Both ‘ich’ and 
‘Louerd’ become absences, as the poem withdraws from them as it continues, cannot summon 
them again: they have not even the force to keep hold of the command to ‘[t]hole’, which 
functions simultaneously as ‘ich’ telling himself, ‘Louerd’ telling ‘ich’, and ‘ich’ telling God. 
Voices combine into a spatial void which is soon joined by the temporal: ‘yet’ is both in the past 
(‘was’; slightly-too-largely written in the manuscript, suggesting the poem or its copyist was aware 
of the crux here) and at once ‘endelis’. Who is speaking, hearing these words; when were they 
spoken, are they spoken, will they be? Or, to express it in terms which anticipate my next 
section, what is this poem’s present? ‘[L]itel’ and ‘endelis’ abruptly scuppered rhyme only for 
‘long wey is’ to bring it back, in half, ghosted, held in orbit. ‘Louerd, thu clepedst me’ suspends 
itself at a point it does not know where or when, half there and half gone. At once there is faith 
and doubt, the man who could endure if only he were stronger, the God who never endures long 
enough to raise man up, appears and is gone in a flash. The moment while the moment lasts. But 
there is too something beyond hope and despair, as the poem holds itself or is held in a space 
and time at once between and within the absence of a subject, a body, a god. 
 
‘Louerd, thu clepedest me’ suggests that the idea that the poem is invariably an event in the lyric 
‘now’ might need some modulation. What is this poem’s ‘now’? To press this contention further, 
we will now turn to a lyric poem which contains a character with his own ideas about the passage 
of time, on which the poem, too, dwells. To appreciate and make sense of Wordsworth’s ‘The 
Two April Mornings’, as it contemplates various moments in time and the similarities and 
differences between them, we need to retain an open mind with regard to what a ‘lyric present’ 





                                                        
36 The lines as they appear in New College Oxford 88, folio 179, verso. 
37 This question is answered, in Luria and Hoffman’s text, by their colon, an editorial addition which, contrary to the 
‘New Critical’ stereotype, removes rather than generates ambiguity. Punctuation marks in the poem’s manuscript 
form function almost as line endings’ ghosts: certainly, the dot after ‘sclepie’ does not tie down sense as a colon 
does. On this point, Butterfield is right: ‘a line ending is negotiated into written form by medieval poets rather than 




Example two: ‘The Two April Mornings’ and repetition  
 
We walk’d along, while bright and red 
Uprose the morning sun, 
And Mathew stopp’d, he look’d, and said, 
‘The will of God be done!’ 
 
A village Schoolmaster was he, 
With hair of glittering grey; 
As blithe a man as you could see 
On a spring holiday. 
 
And on that morning, through the grass, 
And by the steaming rills, 
We travell’d merrily to pass 
A day among the hills. 
 
‘Our work,’ said I, ‘was well begun; 
Then, from thy breast what thought, 
Beneath so beautiful a sun, 
So sad a sigh has brought?’ 
 
A second time did Mathew stop, 
And fixing still his eye 
Upon the eastern mountain-top 
To me he made reply. 
 
‘Yon cloud with that long purple cleft 
Brings fresh into my mind 
A day like this which I have left 
Full thirty years behind. 
 
And on that slope of springing corn 
The self-same crimson hue 
Fell from the sky that April morn, 
The same which now I view! 
 
With rod and line my silent sport 
I plied by Derwent’s wave, 
And, coming to the church, stopp’d short 
Beside my Daughter’s grave. 
 
Nine summers had she scarcely seen, 
The pride of all the vale; 
And then she sang!—she would have been 
A very nightingale.— 
 
Six feet in earth my Emma lay, 
And yet I lov’d her more, 
For so it seem’d, than till that day 
I e’er had lov’d before. 
 
And, turning from her grave, I met 
Beside the church-yard Yew 
A blooming Girl, whose hair was wet 
With points of morning dew. 
 
A basket on her head she bare, 
Her brow was smooth and white, 
To see a Child so very fair, 
It was a pure delight! 
 
No fountain from its rocky cave 
E’er tripp’d with foot so free, 
She seem’d as happy as a wave 
That dances on the sea. 
 
There came from me a sigh of pain 
Which I could ill confine; 
I look’d at her and look’d again; 
—And did not wish her mine.’ 
 
Mathew is in his grave, yet now 
Methinks I see him stand, 
As at that moment, with his bough 
Of wilding in his hand.——38 
In the third chapter of this thesis, we considered Jonathan Culler’s idea that we should think of 
lyric poems ‘more like those pop songs whose lyrics people learn by heart and repeat to 
themselves, and allow to structure their experience’ (Culler, ‘Language of Lyric’, p. 176); to which 
we listen ‘without assuming that we should develop interpretations: we take them to illuminate 
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the world, and we sing them to others or to ourselves, point out what we like about them, 
compare them to other songs by the same and different artists, and generally develop 
considerable connoisseurship about songs without engaging in interpretation’ (Culler, Theory, p. 
5). In this section, we’ll be thinking with Wordsworth and ‘The Two April Mornings’ in order to 
examine, in practice, the assumptions and limitations of such a view, where it is productive and 
where it is not. Poems, I’ll be claiming as we read Wordsworth’s poem, are often interested in 
interrogating the phenomenon of repeating, in questioning what the present moment is and can 
be; if we have decided that all lyric poems are ‘constructed for repetition’ (Culler, Theory, p. 123), 
we may have also committed them to a certain attitude towards the past and present, and their 
value. ‘The Two April Mornings’ takes place across three moments of time: Mathew’s original 
‘sigh of pain’ as he encounters the ‘blooming Girl’; his later sigh, prompted by his recalling and 
re-living that encounter; the final stanza’s potential gazing at Mathew, now dead. This stanza, if 
we read according to Culler’s lyric model, is all important: it is the moment at which ‘a narrative 
in the past manages to suggest value for the present’, the moment of enunciative triumph, an 
example of the truth that the time of lyric is the ‘time of enunciation’, which demonstrates ‘the 
lyric attempt to be itself an event rather than the representation of an event’, one which can thus 
be endlessly repeated and re-performed (Culler, Theory, pp. 283, 294). That Wordsworth appears 
to have added the final stanza some time after the main period of composition, since it first 
appears in Dorothy’s fair copy, added in his own hand (see Wordsworth, p. 214fn.), suggests this 
is overstated. This is a poem which has an ambivalent attitude towards repetition, might not be 
sure of the value to be found in the past, nor of the separating lines between past and present, 
and thus those which might separate one event from another.  
 
There are some clues as to ‘The Two April Mornings’’ purposes in Wordsworth’s ‘Preface’ to 
Lyrical Ballads, where it is at one point explicitly mentioned as an example of the poet’s ‘general 
purpose’, part of which is ‘to attempt to sketch characters under the influence of less 
impassioned feelings’.39 One of the things we learnt in our reading of Veronica Forrest-
Thomson’s ‘Sonnet’ was that what a poet says the aims of her poetry to be is by no means always 
the same as what they are, whether that be because of performative misdirection or a lack of 
retrospective insight into one’s own practice and habits of composition. But a brief consideration 
of the ‘Preface’ will certainly be worthwhile here, not least because of what Wordsworth has to 
say in it about repetition and pleasure, which might not initially look too dissimilar to Culler’s 
thoughts in Theory. At another point in the ‘Preface’, Wordsworth writes that, ‘of two 
                                                        




descriptions, either of passions, manners, or characters, each of them equally well executed, the 
one in prose and the other in verse, the verse will be read a hundred times where the prose is 
read once’.40 Is this not an account of the iterability of poetry quite similar to Culler’s? The 
answer is no, because repeated reading, for Wordsworth, is a by-product, not the end goal, of 
lyric composition. We read verse again and again because of ‘a complex feeling of delight’, 
produced, in a process to which we cannot properly attend, by a combination of 
 
the music of harmonious metrical language, the sense of difficulty overcome, and the 
blind association of pleasure which has been previously received from works of rhyme or 
metre of the same or similar construction, an indistinct perception perpetually renewed 
of language closely resembling that of real life and yet, in the circumstance of metre, 
differing from it so widely. (Wordsworth, ‘Preface’, p. 83) 
 
The principal effect of metre upon which Wordsworth dwells in the ‘Preface’ is the tempering of 
pain, which it achieves through a tendency ‘to divest language in a certain degree of its reality, 
and thus to throw a sort of half consciousness of unsubstantial experience over the whole 
composition’. It is because of this that ‘more pathetic situations and sentiments […] may be 
endured in metrical composition’; that good poetry ‘never act[s] upon us as pathetic beyond the 
bounds of pleasure’ (Wordsworth, ‘Preface’, p. 81). (Pleasure is a word which abounds in the 
‘Preface’, which at one point sums up ‘[t]he end of Poetry’ as ‘to produce excitement in co-
existence with an overbalance of pleasure’ (Wordsworth, ‘Preface’, p. 80); I’ll mention the 
degrees of pleasure which Wordsworth imagines at the end of the section.) The implication is 
that poetry might successfully deal with a greater range of human emotion and passion than 
prose. This is contentious; it also seems to leave many of the possibilities of the wonderfully-
expressed ‘half consciousness of unsubstantial experience’ unexplored. But what is of primary 
importance for our immediate purposes here is to note that Wordsworth speaks of a complexity 
which rewards a regular return to poems, not of a simplicity which facilitates or compels their 
memorisation.  
 
I am starting to press a distinction between voluntary re-reading and involuntary memorisation – 
the poem as earworm we saw in chapter three – because a similar distinction is crucial to the 
argument of the ‘Preface’, and to our reading of ‘The Two April Mornings’. Famously describing 
how poetry ‘takes its origin from emotion recollected in tranquillity’, Wordsworth writes, 
 
                                                        




the emotion is contemplated till by a species of reaction the tranquillity gradually 
disappears, and an emotion, kindred to that which was before the subject of 
contemplation, is gradually produced, and does itself actually exist in the mind. In this 
mood successful composition generally begins, and in a mood similar to this it is carried 
on; but the emotion, of whatever kind and in whatever degree, from various causes is 
qualified by various pleasures, so that in describing any passions whatsoever, which are 
voluntarily described, the mind will upon the whole be in a state of enjoyment. 
(Wordsworth, ‘Preface’, p. 82) 
 
There are two moments towards the end of the sentence which indicate that Wordsworth is not 
making the blanket claim that all emotion, pain or pleasure, recollected and re-lived, is finally 
enjoyable. ‘[U]pon the whole’ seems to mean ‘taking into account the whole mind’, and not 
‘usually’; but there is an ambiguity which suggests a certain degree of leeway (what of, in 
Mathew’s case, something as painful as losing a daughter?). ‘[V]oluntarily described’, meanwhile, 
discards from the proposition the whole gamut of involuntary recollection, of which 
Wordsworth, in the ‘Preface’ at least, does not speak. As we read the poem I began this section 
by quoting, we’ll examine both pleasurable and painful involuntary recollection, along with the 
possibility that some voluntary reflection may never become enjoyable. ‘The Two April 
Mornings’, I want to suggest, whatever else it may be, is a meditation on the value of 
recollection. To properly respond to it, we cannot be working with a model of lyric which 
proposes that such a value has already been decided; we need at least a more complex and 
sensitive understanding of the ways in which poems might manage to ‘suggest a value for the 
present’, and may need even to entertain the possibility that some poems may suggest no value at 
all. 
 
To begin to understand Mathew in ‘The Two April Mornings’, we might first attend to its kind 
of companion piece or brother, ‘The Fountain: A Conversation’.41 There, Mathew hears the 
same sound as one from his past, that of a fountain’s gurgling (‘For the same sound is in my ears 
/ Which in those days I heard’), and is prompted to acknowledge the separation between his 
current and past selves. The Mathew of ‘The Two April Mornings’, meanwhile, is prompted to 
see the continuity. ‘The Fountain’s’ stream represents time’s incessant flow; the Mathew of ‘The 
Two April Mornings’ at first seems to think himself above that flow.42 ‘A day like this which I 
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42 ‘The Fountain’ ‘will murmur on a thousand years, / And flow as now it flows’. It is possible to argue that the 
polyptoton here calls that into question, as difference is built into the expression of constancy. We might think that 
the Mathew of ‘The Fountain’ gives in too wholly to the power of time, ignores the fact that streams can flow at 
different rates, flood, at times, even, stop completely: ‘Time passed. But time flows in many streams. Like a river, an 
inner stream of time will flow rapidly at some places and sluggishly at others, or perhaps even stand hopelessly 




have left / Full thirty years behind’: it is not time which has left behind Mathew, but Mathew 
who has left behind time. Time has been reduced to another part of Mathew’s subjective 
experience, something over which he thinks himself to have control; it is merely an extension of 
his mind, as Augustine nearly wrote in the Confessions. Time, there, is at one point described as a 
‘distentio’: at once an extension of myself, and also a spasm, distortion, fit, something which 
pulses through me, unexpectedly, uncontrollably, like the death of a loved one, like the death of 
myself.43 In the course of the poem Mathew re-learns both senses, as the past irrupts, in colour, 
into his present: thirty years on, he finds himself in front of ‘The self-same crimson hue / […] 
The same which now I view’ on a day when 
 
There came from me a sigh of pain 
 Which I could ill confine; 
 I look’d at her and look’d again; 
 —And did not wish her mine. 
 
This ‘sigh of pain’, of course, recalls the ‘sigh’, noticed by Mathew’s companion, which prompts 
their conversation. Mathew’s old sigh comes just as the poem’s interest in the ‘blooming Girl’ 
reaches its height: we wonder as to the extent of the equivalence, whether this might not even, 
miraculously, turn out to be Emma herself. Mathew, perhaps, wondered the same, as he ‘look’d 
at her and look’d again’, without pausing even for a comma, trying to invest the girl with some 
resemblance, to find in her some iteration of his own daughter. But he fails, and gives up the 
attempt to repeat the past, to change the decisive temporal event of his daughter’s death. He 
cannot assert his control over that event, but he can – so he thinks – assert control over his own 
passage through time, relegating that event to a past he has ‘left behind’. But the past won’t stay 
where it is, blends with the present, and Mathew sighs again as he is reminded of, and re-lives, 
his old pain. 
 
The way a sense-impression brings about a fusion of past and present in ‘The Two April 
Mornings’ anticipates the large-scale meditations on that phenomenon in Marcel Proust’s In 
Search of Lost Time. Proust has his own antecedents: 
 
                                                        
way for all human beings; every human being flows through time in a different way’ (Yasunari Kawabata, Beauty and 
Sadness, trans. Howard S. Hibbett (London, 2001), p. 110). 
43 ‘[V]ideo igitur tempus quandam esse distentionem. sed video? an videre mihi videor?’ (and so I see that time is a 
certain extension (or distortion). But do I see it? Or do I only seem to myself to perceive it?); Augustine, Confessions: 
Books 9–13, ed. and trans. Carolyn J.-B. Hammond (London, 2016), p. 238 (11.23.30), my translation. For the senses 
of ‘distentio’ see Gerard O’Daly, ‘Time as distentio and St. Augustine’s Exegesis of Philippians 3:12–14’, Revue des 




Is it not from a sensation of the same sort as that of the madeleine that the finest part of 
[Chateaubriand’s] Mémoires d’outre-tombe depends: ‘Yesterday in the evening I was walking 
alone… I was roused from my reflections by the twittering of a thrush perched in the 
highest branch of a birch tree. Instantly, the magical sound made my father’s estate 
reappear before my eyes; I forgot the catastrophes I had just witnessed, and, transported 
suddenly into the past, saw once again the countryside where so often I heard the 
thrush’s piping song’.44 
 
Chateaubriand’s twittering thrush takes him away from his present grief into past contentment; 
Mathew’s ‘long purple cleft’ takes him away from present contentment into past grief. ‘[C]left’ is 
an interesting word here to take as a critical metaphor, referring as it can both to ‘a space made 
by cleaving, splitting, or separation of parts’ and to ‘one of the pieces formed by cleaving’; each 
part of the cloud and the space between them, each moment of time – past and present – and 
the indeterminate space within which the two come together, a space of ‘something extra-
temporal’, as Proust’s narrator describes it.45 The novel describes how he, in the process of 
contemplating ‘dismal thoughts’, found himself ‘tripping up against the unevenly laid paving-
stones’ of the Guermantes’s courtyard, at which point all his ‘discouragement vanished’ (Proust, 
6, p. 174). This final sense-impression of the novel prompts Marcel to write at greatest length 
about the ‘varied impressions of well-being’ he has experienced, ‘the sound of the spoon on the 
plate, the uneven flagstones, the taste of the madeleine’, and to conclude that they all 
 
had something in common, which I was experiencing in the present moment and at the 
same time in a moment far away, so that the past was made to encroach upon the 
present and make me uncertain about which of the two I was in; the truth was that the 
being within me who was enjoying this impression was enjoying it because of something 
shared between a day in the past and the present moment, something extra-temporal, 
and this being only appeared when, through one of these moments of identity between 
the present and the past, it was able to find itself in the only milieu in which it could live 
and enjoy the essence of things, that is to say outside of time. This explained why my 
anxieties on the subject of my death had ceased the moment when I unconsciously 
recognised the taste of the little madeleine, since at that very moment the being that I 
had been was an extra-temporal being, and consequently unconcerned with the 
vicissitudes of the future. […] This being had only ever come to me, only ever 
manifested itself to me on the occasions, outside of action and immediate pleasure, when 
the miracle of an analogy had made me escape from the present. It alone had the power 
to make me find the old days again, the lost time, in the face of which the efforts of my 
memory and my intellect always failed. (Proust, 6, pp. 179–80) 
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Just before this quotation, we are told that ‘the only true paradise is a paradise that we have lost’ 
(Proust, 6, p. 179). Proust is interested in the past for its ability to bring us towards paradise as it 
bursts through us once again, to turn us into ‘extra-temporal being[s]’. Its content, each part of 
the cleft cloud, seems, in a sense, irrelevant; even pain is welcomed: 
 
the greater part of our memory exists outside us, in a dampish breeze, in the musty air of 
a bedroom or the smell of autumn’s first fires, things through which we can retrieve any 
part of us that the reasoning mind, having no use for it, disdained, the last vestige of the 
past, the best of it, the part which, after all our tears seem to have dried, can make us 
weep again. Outside us? Inside us, more like, but stored away from our mind’s eye, in 
that abeyance of memory which may last for ever. It is only because we have forgotten 
that we can now and then return to the person we once were, envisage things as that 
person did, be hurt again, because we are not ourselves any more, but someone else who 
once loved something that we no longer care about.46 
 
Proust’s narrator is writing here of the loss of love and a lover, Gilberte; the involuntary 
recollection of which is pleasurable because he is no longer himself. The kind of distance from 
one’s pain which enables it to return with a sweetness is not one which Mathew is able to 
achieve; but then he has lost a daughter, not a lover, and has not changed. The purple cleft 
appears, and Mathew is not shown ‘something extra-temporal’, but is once again reminded of the 
harsh reality of the past, from which he cannot escape. 
 
For Proust, involuntary recollection holds the key to the past, to paradise (voluntary recollection, 
indeed, is quite useless). Other writers have presented different accounts. In the Japanese 
novelist Kenzaburō Ōe’s The Silent Cry, a set of Proustian impressions do bring about a passage 
into an indeterminate, timeless space, but it is far from Proust’s paradise: 
 
As I bent down over the spring to drink from it directly, I had a sudden sense of 
certainty: certainty that everything – the small round pebbles, greyish blue and vermilion 
and white, lying at the bottom of water whose brightness seemed still to harbour the 
midday light; the fine sand that swirled upwards, clouding it ever so slightly; and the faint 
shiver that ran over the surface of the water – was just as I’d seen it twenty years before; 
a certainty, born of longing yet to myself, at least, utterly convincing, that the water now 
welling up so ceaselessly was exactly the same water that had welled up and flowed away 
in those days. And the same certainty developed directly into a feeling that the ‘I’ 
bending down there now was not the child who had once bent his bare knees there, that 
there was no continuity, no consistency between the two ‘I’s’, that the ‘I’ now bending 
down there was a remote stranger. The present ‘I’ had lost all true identity. Nothing, 
either within me or without, offered any hope of recovery.47 
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Here impressions of the past send The Silent Cry’s narrator falling into an animal space, where, 
having lost his identity, he is ‘no better than a rat’ (Ōe, p. 58). The past can overwhelm us; it 
depends on where we locate our identity, how we conceive of ourselves, that decides if that 
overwhelming is welcome, as it is for Marcel and Chateaubriand, or a cause of sadness and 
despair, as it is for Ōe’s narrator and Mathew.  
 
The ‘I’ of ‘The Two April Mornings’ positions himself somewhere between these two attitudes, 
as he grapples with his own changing self: 
 
“Our work,” said I, “was well begun; 
Then, from thy breast what thought, 
Beneath so beautiful a sun, 
So sad a sigh has brought?” 
 
There is a flavour to these lines of a kind shared in part by some you or I might have composed 
long ago in a classroom exercise, prioritising rhyme, wrenching syntax to fit form. Of course, it 
would be fanciful to imagine Mathew the village schoolmaster admonishing the speaking ‘I’ for 
his strained verse; metre has been ‘superadded’ to the poem’s naturalism (Wordsworth, ‘Preface’, 
p. 70). It is, however, concerned, even unnerved by questions of a different sort of 
representation: how do I represent words I once spoke, which were not spoken quite by me 
(since, recalling Proust’s description, I am not myself any more)? How do I remember them and 
how do I get behind them, iterate them, speak them ‘now’? The answer is clumsily (and it is this 
self-consciousness, in case I am supposed to have just called Wordsworth’s writing childish, 
which justifies, or sets this stanza apart from, the classroom verse which seems to be its kin). 
These questions are at the heart of the poem, as it here pauses from its narrative to set up an 
interrogation of the relationship between the speaking ‘I’ and the writing ‘I’ which comes back 
into its final stanza, having been nearly forgotten. Mathew, of course, need not stop twice; the 
poem might easily have launched straight into his anecdote. But ‘The Two April Mornings’ is 
deeply interested in how to represent itself, and how another might represent it. Consider its 
penultimate stanza: 
 
 No fountain from its rocky cave 
E’er tripp’d with foot so free, 
She seem’d as happy as a wave 





‘Grave’ haunts here, cannot be kept at bay, suggested both by the rhyme of ‘cave’ and ‘wave’ and 
the lines from The Winter’s Tale to which Mathew alludes: 
 
   What you do,  
 Still betters what is done. […] 
When you do dance, I wish you 
 A wave o’th Sea, that you might ever do  
 Nothing but that: move still, still so: 
 And owne no other Function.48  
 
Florizel (dressed as the shepherd Doricles) speaks these words to Perdita (dressed as the Queen 
of the Feast) with the last word he has previously spoken being ‘corpse’ (Perdita makes a long 
speech about the kinds of flowers with which she and others would ‘strew [Florizel] o’re, and 
ore’, to which he responds, ‘[w]hat? like a Coarse?’).49 So when Florizel tells Perdita, ‘When you 
speak, sweet, / I’d have you do it ever’, there is an irony which consists in the fact that he has 
just expressed a kind of dissatisfaction with her actual words, indeed has interrupted her, and 
prevented her from speaking on. Florizel loves his youthful love, loving the idea, it seems, and 
not the person. In summoning these lines Mathew marks himself off: some of his stated 
rejection of the ‘blooming Girl’ consists in his lack of desire to find an analogue for his dead 
daughter in some generalised or idealised version of her. Mathew remembers the particularity of 
his love where Florizel is blind to his, wanting only to preserve his idea of Perdita, as his own 
lines talk themselves into functionlessness, as an endlessly iterative wave. 
 
I am of course reading Mathew as a character here, the schoolmaster, capable of knowing and 
quoting his Shakespeare. If the resemblance to Florizel’s lines is not a coincidence, and we are 
averse to reading Wordsworth’s poem as pulling off a kind of ‘cheap trick of theatrical lighting 
effected by [Wordsworth] without his character’s knowledge’, then we need to read him as such, 
wary though we might be of letting lyric come too close to drama.50 Wordsworth was not wary 
of such proximity as his final two stanzas incorporate three separate Shakespearean allusions, the 
last two occurring in the poem’s final four lines, which make a kind of response to Mathew: 
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Mathew is in his grave, yet now 
Methinks I see him stand, 
As at that moment, with his bough 
Of wilding in his hand.—— 
 
The first five words recall Macbeth’s announcement of Duncan’s death – ‘Duncane is in his grave: 
/ After lifes fitfull Fever, he sleepes well’ – while the last recall Lorenzo’s lines from The Merchant 
of Venice: 
 
In such a night 
 Stood Dido with a Willow in her hand 
 Upon the wilde sea bankes, and waft her Love 
 To come againe to Carthage.51 
 
The first allusion adds a third competing emphasis to the opening words. ‘Grave’ has finally 
arrived, pressed into appearance by rhyme and by Florizel’s lines, and we might stress it as the 
tension releases; ‘his’ draws us towards itself too, since we know, though never hear, that Emma 
is in her own ‘grave’, so now Mathew is in his one; ‘Mathew’ is the only word which diverges 
from Macbeth’s lines (not Duncan, but Mathew). We cannot be sure how we should voice this 
line, just as the poem is not quite sure how to position itself in relation to Mathew, calls upon 
others for help. Lorenzo’s Dido, pathetically waving her branch, is superimposed atop a less 
melodramatic Mathew, with his bough not of willow but wilding, which bears an uncertain 
resemblance to the fishing ‘rod’ of Mathew’s anecdote. ‘Methinks’, ‘[a]s’: the poem asks us to 
compare its final equivalence to Mathew’s ‘self-same’ moment, and isn’t itself sure of the extent 
of the approximation. ‘As’ might be ‘like’; but then it has a sparseness which suggests it could 
also be some contracted version of ‘the same as’. ‘The same, but not the same’, perhaps.52  
 
In response to Mathew’s Florizel, who bids Perdita to ‘move still, still so’, his companion 
summons another Shakespearean moment which seems as if it might go on indefinitely, until 
another enters: ‘I would out-night you did no body come’, says Jessica, at the end of her 
exchange with Lorenzo at the start of the first scene of the fifth act of The Merchant of Venice: ‘But 
harke, I heare the footing of a man’.53 The poem ends unsure of how its past narrative might 
manage ‘to suggest value for the present’; unsure of where it stands in relation to that past. The 
‘pleasure’ we take in reading the poem is not an ‘idle pleasure’ (Wordsworth, ‘Preface’, p. 73); it 
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consists in joining with the poem’s own lack of certainty, with its own attempts to comprehend 
the perplexity and obscurity of the passage of time, and, as Wordsworth writes in the ‘Preface’, 
‘to follow the fluxes and refluxes of the mind when agitated by the great and simple affections of 
our nature’ (Wordsworth, ‘Preface’, p. 63). Any account of poetry must not compromise its 
ability to speak of and to the whole range of such human experience, which includes Ōe’s 
narrator as it does Proust’s, includes those for whom ‘value for the present’ is sometimes 































Example three: Leonidas, ambiguity, object 
 
My final example aims to interrogate the claim that lyric need be a performable ‘event’. One of 
the key assertions made by ‘Apostrophe’ was that the individual moments and objects with 
which a poem deals ‘resist being organised into events that can be narrated for they are inserted 
in the poem as elements of the event which the poem is attempting to be’. It is a claim which is 
stated more baldly in Theory of the Lyric, for which lyrics ‘strive to be an event in the special 
temporality of the lyric present’. We can think of ‘event’ as a rather direct replacement for the 
word ‘object’, as Timothy Clark, in his article on Derrida’s ‘Che cos’è la poesia?’, puts it 
succinctly, calling attention, too, to the relevance of the distinction to interpretation: ‘[t]he poetic 
is not primarily an object of critical interpretation but an event in language considered as a 
matter of love and desire’ (Clark, p. 44). Derrida and deconstruction, as I’ll discuss in a moment, 
had their influence on the move from ‘object’ to ‘event’. But so did two other main factors. As 
we saw in my first chapter, Joseph North has described a process by which the perceived ‘New 
Critical’ version of the critical paradigm and project came in the latter parts of the twentieth 
century to be seen as the only one. One of the consequences of this was that the notion of text 
as object became inseparable from what North describes as a ‘neo-Kantian aesthetics’, that is, 
one which ‘assumes an “art object” that is self-enclosed, free from instrumental and contextual 
concerns, divorced from authorial intention, and cast in religious terms’. North takes the 
example of a New Historicist response to the aesthetic, in which ‘the critique of the aesthetic in 
general is actually a critique of idealist aesthetics in particular: specifically, the neo-Kantian 
aesthetics of the New Criticism, here offered, perhaps necessarily, in something of a caricatured 
form’.54 Again, as we saw in chapter one, critics differ as to the extent of the caricature’s 
accuracy: it is not necessarily as clear as North is happy to concede that the ‘New Critics’ really 
did see the text as quite the hallowed, independent and separate object consistent with that 
caricature. The retired Cleanth Brooks reminded William J. Spurlin, in interview, of his belief 
that ‘the text […] is not some kind of sanctified object outside of any relation to the world’ 
(Spurlin, p. 375). But North’s argument here is a very useful one for any attempt to re-introduce 
some version of the claim that we can consider a poem as an object. In 2000, twenty-five years 
after Raymond Williams’s ‘critique of the aesthetic’, ‘an attempt to confront powerful 
conservative forces active in the culture around him’, the stakes have changed, and the New 
Historicist attack on the ‘aesthetic object’ is made under very different conditions. The 
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‘significance of the target has been reduced’: there was no real manner in which ‘aesthetic 
positions of this New Critical or pseudo-New Critical kind [were] still a threat to the discipline in 
2000’, or, indeed, in the preceding two decades (North, pp. 98–9). North helpfully suggests that 
a full and varied discussion of the relevance of aesthetic and objective visions of the poem is 
being hindered on illegitimate grounds, and the wider project of his book aims to contribute to 
that discussion. 
 
A second aspect contributing to the preference for the word ‘event’ over ‘object’ has been the 
dominant emphasis on the performed and performable character of lyric poetry, especially since 
W. R. Johnson’s The Idea of Lyric (1982).55 Although, as we have seen, Jonathan Culler departs 
from Johnson’s account in a crucial regard – arguing for the significance of indirect rather than 
direct address, transmuting an empirical performance into a primarily discursive one – his theory 
owes much to Johnson, as it describes an uncomplicated lyrical lineage beginning with the 
classical lyric of Sappho, made up of poems which deal in ‘universal emotions’ and make them 
‘singable’ (Johnson, p. 4). The position that lyric is solely a performance, I will argue, whether 
empirical or discursive, misses an important lyric tributary which gives us historical grounding 
for the ‘poem as object’ position: the epitaph, and the epigram. In a brief history of Western 
European lyric, Johnson makes no mention of either form: 
 
Thanks in part to Catullus, but mostly thanks to Horace, [the] typical ancient lyric form is 
handed down to Western Europe in its literary perfections, even after the ruin of the 
Greek lyric that inspired it and that it managed in some sense to re-create and in some 
sense to preserve. When Pierre de Ronsard and Ben Jonson began their own re-creations 
of lyric, it is to this Latin re-creation that they inevitably turn, just at the moment of that 
spectacular lyric flowering when medieval song is wedded to classical literary lyric. 
(Johnson, p. 4) 
 
This somewhat quixotic account, with its overblown talk of ‘perfections’ and ‘spectacular lyric 
flowerings’, appears to be committing early on the sin against which Johnson later warns, of 
imagining ‘that the entire ghost [of] Greek lyric itself [might be] totally retrieved’; [i]t is the 
reader, then, who must remember, when I forget, that the Greek lyric, whatever the reader may 
find out about it in these pages, is essentially inaccessible to us’ (Johnson, p. 26). It is difficult to 
see how this fundamental inaccessibility squares with the romanticised account of relatively 
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uncomplicated historical continuity which Johnson wants to present. His account might be 
improved by turning to another of the influences which contributed to that ‘flowering’: the 
epigram. David Lindley describes how 
 
during the Renaissance, as Alastair Fowler in Kinds of Literature and Rosalie Colie in The 
Resources of Kind have demonstrated, the epigrammatic mode had considerable effect upon 
lyric poetry, especially upon the sonnet. In part this is attributable to the rediscovery of 
the manuscripts of The Greek Anthology, which contained epigrams of love, tempering the 
assumptions of epigram’s bitterness. But at the same time the epigrammatic modulation 
of lyric occurred precisely because it offered something that poets were disposed to use – 
a way of transforming the repetitive and paratactic structures characteristic of song lyric 
in the direction of wit and logical development.56 
 
David Lindley’s Critical Idiom on lyric, from which I take the above words, is measured in the way 
it avoids both the ‘myth-making nostalgia’ of Johnson’s account and the totalising tendencies of 
Culler’s: ‘There can be no doubt that lyrics frequently do concentrate on single moments of 
heightened awareness or feeling, but thus to circumscribe the lyric would exclude many poems 
that are unambiguously narrative, and furthermore runs the risk of simplifying the struggle that 
many lyrics enact’ (Lindley, pp. 22, 3). One of the poems which appeared in The Greek Anthology 
is the epigram by Leonidas of Tarentum which I will soon take as this section’s example, helping 
me to draw attention to a less performable ancestor of lyric poetry which may provide better 
historical grounding to counter the claim that ‘radical, self-conscious ambiguity […] was invented 
only quite recently’ (Griffiths, p. 169), indeed, invented by the ‘New Criticism’, and for the re-
introduction of the position that some lyric poems are fruitfully approached not as events, but as 
objects. 
 
But before we read that poem, it is necessary to counter the final major aspect contributing to 
the general preference for ‘event’ over ‘object’, to which I have already alluded. That is, Derrida’s 
response to interpretation and synthetic ambiguity. One of ‘Signature Event Context’s’ 
conclusions is that ‘the semantic horizon that habitually governs the notion of communication is 
exceeded or split by the intervention of writing, that is, by a dissemination irreducible to polysemy. 
Writing is read; it is not the site, “in the last instance”, of a hermeneutic deciphering, the 
decoding of a meaning or truth’ (Limited, pp. 20–1). Polemical responses to caricatures of the 
‘New Criticism’ have seized upon Derrida’s notion of ‘dissemination’, despite the fact that it is 
not clear that Derrida is thinking about the ‘New Critics’ in his passage from ‘Signature Event 
                                                        




Context’ (its ‘polysemy’ is a term from linguistics, and marks it out as a response to structuralist 
concerns). Here is A Dictionary of Literary Terms and Literary Theory’s entry on ‘dissemination’: 
‘“Dissemination” basically suggests that “plurisignification”, or a multiplicity of meanings, is not 
something that is under control as it is in the New Criticism, where the fact that a text can be 
interpreted in more than one way is treated as a dimension of its inherent and organic 
“greatness”’ (Cuddon, p. 208). Regardless, however, of the direct relevance of ‘Signature Event 
Context’s’ description of ‘dissemination’ to ‘New Critical’ positions, or caricatures, it is a concept 
which does seem to sound a death knell for any position which considers a poem to be an 
ambiguous object, ripe with self-conscious ambiguity. Interpretation can never be final: another 
meaning can always be disseminated, because ‘context is boundless’, and so it is not possible to 
mark off any particular meaning as irrelevant to any particular interpretation (On Deconstruction, p. 
123). This conclusion seems to prevent the possibility of an individual text employing synthetic 
ambiguity as part of its own coherent project, since ambiguity is ultimately disruptive: a poem 
cannot confine its reader to an investigation of the synthetic parts of its polysemy. 
 
Wittgenstein helps us see the error in a too-fixed concept of ‘dissemination’: ‘Can I say 
“bububu” and mean “If it doesn’t rain, I shall go for a walk”? – It is only in a language that I can 
mean something by something’ (PI, §38n., p. 22e). As Toril Moi recounts, Jonathan Culler 
responds to this sentence in On Deconstruction, finding it ultimately to agree with and fall under 
Derrida’s concept: ‘Attempts to describe limits always make possible a displacement of those 
limits, so that Wittgenstein’s suggestion that one cannot say “bububu” and mean “if it does not 
rain I shall go out for a walk”, has, paradoxically, made it possible to do just that. Its denial 
establishes a connection which can be exploited’ (On Deconstruction, p. 124). In responding to 
Culler’s response, Moi helpfully explicates Wittgenstein’s point: 
 
Culler takes Wittgenstein to deny that one can give ‘bububu’ this specific meaning. But 
this is too quick. Wittgenstein isn’t denying anything. He is simply saying that as it stands, 
‘bububu’ has no use in English (or German), and therefore no meaning either. 
To say ‘bububu’ and attach a specific mental content, or a specific intention to the 
sound, is simply to give it a private meaning – a psychological content or association. If I 
share that association with you, we will now have a secret code we can use when the 
occasion calls for it. But this still doesn’t give ‘bububu’ a use in the language, a meaning 
in English, or German, for we still haven’t found a place for it in our language-games: the 
phrase has no grammar, Wittgenstein might say. ‘Bububu’ may of course acquire a use at 
some point in the future. In The Blue Book, Wittgenstein uses the example of a ‘man who 
tells us he feels the visual image two inches behind the bridge of his nose’. We don’t 
understand what the man means, but it doesn’t follow that we never could: ‘The 





Poems, and our responses to them, have their grammar, too. It is this which stifles 
dissemination, which prevents me from making a justifiable claim that, shall we say, ‘The Two 
April Mornings’ is about chocolate biscuits, or that ‘A god, and yet a man?’ is about the internal 
combustion engine. As the final sentences of Moi’s passage make clear, this is not the same as to 
suggest that poems have a final meaning or definitive reading which we can ‘decode’. Not even 
Cleanth Brooks thought that: ‘Of course, there may be multiple readings. But of those multiple 
readings, you may find that some are much more satisfactory than others’ (Spurlin, p. 368). What 
we find satisfactory can change, and can be tested by example, as we ask another, ‘[l]ook and find 
out whether you can see what I see, wish to say what I wish to say’.  
 
We are now in a position in which we can draw this chapter to a close by reading its final 
example: an epitaph written by Leonidas of Tarentum in the third century BC. Leonidas is not a 
familiar name in lyric studies, certainly compared to the likes of Sappho, Pindar, Alcaeus (all of 
whom make appearances in Theory of the Lyric).57 Leonidas wrote two or three centuries after such 
canonical Greek lyricists, at a time when anonymous poets were already beginning to compose 
‘literary forgeries’ of the famous earlier lyric poets, using their names ‘to manufacture a venerable 
tradition’.58 But, as Michael Wolfe advises, we would do well not to write off the poems of this 
period, which sprang up as ‘the epigram, and so the epitaph, were rapidly refined into a 
sophisticated literary form’. Wolfe describes how three third-century poets in particular ‘led this 
transformation: Leonidas of Tarentum, Anyte of Tegea, and Nossis of Locri’: ‘Working 
independently, this trio and their many contemporaries wrenched the epigram away from its 
time-honoured topics of military prowess, elite social values, and male dominion. They 
personalised its voice, diversified its rhetorical style, and expanded its social range’ (Wolfe, p. 47). 
They were also experimenting, as the epitaph moved to become a self-conscious literary form, 
with what happened when an epigram was divorced from the object on which it had traditionally 
been inscribed. As the inscription lost the object on which it was to be written, it could come to 
replace it, become an object in itself. For epitaphs were primarily objects which demanded 
readerly attention.  
 
We can read the nature of that attention in such a way as to support the theoretical emphases on 
memory and iterability this thesis has been discussing. Anne Carson’s illuminating work on 
Simonides paints a picture of pre-literary epitaph which has memory at its centre. An epitaph 
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makes a dead person live again, as long as we remember him. ‘[A]s a poet’, writes Carson of 
Simonides’ epitaph for the Skopads, Simonides ‘is under contract to say something that will 
continue the Skopad memory for as long as his words can charm our attention’ (Carson, p. 41). 
This implies that the ideal epitaph might be one which never ended; or at least held its reader’s 
attention indefinitely. But George B. Walsh makes a convincing case for a different view: 
 
Apologizing for some past offense, we make no promise about the future; reading an 
epitaph, we undertake no further service to the dead, not even recollection, for the 
epitaph, in its simplest form (composed for ordinary people, buried privately by their 
families), is not meant to be memorable.59 
 
‘[T]he topic [in epitaphs] of survival in memory, or even of recollection, is surprisingly rare’ 
(Walsh, p. 78). Reading an epitaph begins as a self-contained, one-off encounter with an object, 
which invites its reader to halt a while, read, and pass by. ἰσχε και αὐδησας “σηµ᾽Αλινης” ἀπιθι... 
(‘Stop, say “tomb of Aline”, and then go away’).60 ‘Epitaphs’, writes Walsh, ‘were aimed at a 
reluctant and indifferent reader to whom the stone’s information was of no intrinsic interest. If 
attention was to be captured, the stone’s message had to be given some apparent value, and the 
curiosity of the passerby had to be provoked’ (Walsh, p. 92). In other words, an epitaph sought 
to provide an answer as to why it in particular should catch any particular person’s attention. 
‘Why this?’, to recall Cavell’s ‘essential [of] criticism’, and not another?61 
 
Leonidas answers this question, in the following lines, by writing a literary epigram with a 
possible hole at its heart: 
 
τὴν ὀλίγην βῶλον καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ὀλιγήριον, ὦνερ,  
σῆµα ποτίφθεγξαι τλάµονος Ἀλκιµένευς,  
εἰ καὶ πᾶν κέκρυπται ὑπ᾽ ὀξείης παλιούρου  
καὶ βάτου, ἥν ποτ᾽ ἐγὼ δήϊον Ἀλκιµένης.  
 
Address the little mound and this small stone, sir, 
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as that of steadfast Alkimeneus, 
though/even if it has been all hidden by a sharp thorny shrub 
and a bramble, on which I Alkimeneus ever [wage[d]] war. 
 
This little mound, this mean stone, whoso sees, 
Know them for those of poor Alcimenes, 
Although scarce seen through thistles and thorns they are, 
On which his hook once waged unresting war. [Bevan’s translation]  
 
Pay a small tribute, O traveller, to this mound over Alkimenes. Though sharp thorns and 
brambles cover me now, I was once his tomb. [Whitall’s translation]62 
 
To what extent do these lines claim to be an inscription? The poem talks of τοῦτ᾽ ὀλιγήριον […] 
σῆµα (‘this small stone’), so we know that there is a stone somewhere nearby.63 It is not, however, 
speaking the lines in its own voice, as Whitall, for reasons we’re about to discuss, decides to 
render things (though Walsh informs us that epitaphs often employed this technique). But they 
are spoken by Alkimeneus, who as the dead person ‘enjoys a privileged relation to his 
gravestone, since he is supposed to remain consciously present in the vicinity of his grave’ 
(Walsh, p. 86). According to the logic of this literary epitaph’s authentic precursors, then, 
Alkimeneus can only speak because these words are inscribed on a stone which lies close to his 
body.  
 
The poem is certainly asking us, as literary epitaph does all the time, to consider the fantasy that 
these are words inscribed on a real tomb. This is what Richard P. Martin means when, in a 
foreword to Wolfe’s book, he asserts that in ‘imaginary epitaphs we see the earliest beginnings of 
virtual reality’ (Wolfe, p. xix). But whether we successfully entertain that fantasy depends on how 
we read εἰ καὶ – as ‘although’ or as ‘even if’.64 In the former case, the logic of the authentic 
                                                        
62 Greek text and translation are from The Poems of Leonidas of Tarentum, ed. Edwyn Bevan (Oxford, 1931), pp. 6, 7. 
Whitall’s translation comes from Poems of Leonidas of Tarentum, trans. James Whitall (London, 1915), p. 5. 
63 σῆµα literally means ‘sign [with which a grave is identified]’. 
64 My apologies for the lengthy footnote, but the reader may want some justification for the claim of ambiguity here. 
The phenomenon whereby ‘although’ comes to be the sense of εἰ καὶ is discussed, for example, in Albert Rijksbaron, 
The Syntax and Semantics of the Verb in Classical Greek: An Introduction (Amsterdam, 1984), p. 75: ‘Sometimes an 
indicative in the protasis refers to a factive state of affairs, i.e. the reality of the state of affairs is presupposed […], in 
which case εἰ καὶ and καὶ εἰ come to mean “although”’. In this case, καὶ functions as an adverb, not a conjunction (see 
James L. Boyer, ‘Other Conditional Elements in New Testament Greek’, Grace Theological Journal, 4.2 (1983), 173–
188, p. 186). Many grammarians would argue that, since the main verb of the protasis – κέκρυπται – is in the 
indicative (and not the optative), ‘although’ is the only valid reading: the stone being covered is not a possibility but 
a fact. But the argument that an indicative in this kind of conditional sentence – known commonly as a ‘first class 
conditional’ – must of necessity refer to a ‘factive state of affairs’ has been countered in an article by L. W. 
Ledgerwood (‘What does the Greek First Class Conditional Imply?’, Grace Theological Journal, 12.1 (1992), 99–118). 
He cites many examples of cases in which the protasis does not refer to a fact, and which therefore ‘prove that 
conditionals of the form ei p, q do not have the conventional implicature that the proposition p is true. Therefore 
the English causal “since p, q” is not a good translation for ei p, q across the board’ (p. 110). It seems there is no 




epitaph is not preserved. If these four lines are indeed an inscription on a stone, when, exactly, 
were they inscribed? An inscription would only have been carried out before the stone was 
planted in the earth; and yet these words appear to contain knowledge which could only have 
been gathered long after. (It is for this reason that Whitall’s translation takes the stone to be 
speaking: wrenching the poem away from the written and into the spoken leaves the moment of 
inscription irrelevant. His translation makes a poem which is an event, not an object.) In the case 
of ‘although’, then, a hole opens at the poem’s heart, a temporal trough. As our fantasy of 
authenticity to a real tomb breaks down, so might our picture of Alkimeneus. One way we can 
read that relative pronoun, ἥν, sees it refer to the shrub or the bramble. The image attains a 
quality of the ridiculous as a gap opens up between the grand word δήϊον (battle) and the 
shrubbery (a kind of analogue to the poem’s temporal gap). We have an Alkimeneus, once a man 
important enough to be worthy of an epitaph, bathetically reduced to fighting battles with 
brambles. But Alkimeneus is speaking; and so unless he is making fun of himself, this comedy 
seems somehow misplaced. Bevan’s decision to hoist ἐγὼ into the third person is a testament to 
this feeling insofar as it seeks to remove it (since Alkimeneus is no longer speaking in Bevan’s 
poem), to turn the epigram into the simple bit of fun-poking which Leonidas at once approaches 
and resists (‘mean’, ‘poor’, the half-rhyme of ‘are’ and ‘war’, and most of all the interpolation of 
‘hook’ are all choices which make their contribution to Bevan’s turning). We can also read the 
relative pronoun in a manner which resists Bevan’s comedic reading. ἥν, being in the singular, 
refers rather uncomfortably only to one of the two shrubs covering the grave, and since there is 
no satisfyingly certain referent it becomes tempting to look back all the way to the other pair of 
feminine nouns with which the epigram began, βῶλον and σῆµα. There then suddenly arises the 
sense that Alkimeneus forever battled the grave, the dust, the fact of death, only to succumb to 
his inevitable end, and we have a very different poem indeed, two very different tones each 
eternally on their own side, their own side of the temporal gulf between inscription and (non-
)reception, and the sense that that might be precisely what that gulf is up to, as the second and 
last lines end with a variation of Alkimeneus, each, since he is now dead, as true and 
indecipherable as the other, steadfast and tragic or poor and comic it cannot be told. 
 
I am working on the assumption that our psychical mechanism has come into being by a 
process of stratification: the material present in the form of memory-traces being 
subjected from time to time to a rearrangement in accordance with fresh circumstances – 
to re-transcription.65 
                                                        






Freud’s letter (to Wilhelm Fliess, on December 6th) speaks to Leonidas’ epigram: here is an 
epitaph which, freeing itself by divorcing itself from a monument, creates for itself two 
alternative interpretations, two separate moments of inscription (interestingly, that word, ‘re-
transcription’, Umschrift, might also be rendered (in another context) as ‘inscription’).66 In so 
doing Leonidas’ poem and its odd temporal trough might in part be an attempt to get at how we 
experience the past which, a complex interplay of presence and absence, is how we experience 
the dead. Like the tomb it keeps in various degrees of play, it grabs our attention by giving us an 
ambiguous crux: in response, we decide not which of the two it means but that it means both, 
and because it means both, we may feel that there is something about it which we want to say.
                                                        
66 Pertinently too does Freud’s letter speak to Bevan and Whitall: every translation of this poem, in a more 






This thesis has called for a radically different understanding and practice of exemplarity, as 
developed in the work of Wittgenstein, Austin, and Cavell, and exhibited in the work of critics 
such as Empson and Griffiths, to be thoroughly introduced to lyric studies and, more broadly, 
the discipline of literary studies as a rather ungainly whole. That understanding and practice is 
currently almost entirely alien to the discipline and – since the downfall of the ‘New Critics’ – its 
dominant paradigm of scholarship. Scholars think about literature as a means to think about 
something else; individual examples are subservient to broader analyses and theories of history 
and culture. To that paradigm, that radically different practice of exemplarity makes no sense. 
Reading a poem in order to learn something further about that poem and about ourselves, to 
cultivate our own understanding, and to share that understanding with a readership: this is 
simply undisciplinary, as things stand. The language of ‘research’ and ‘contribution to knowledge’ 
is incompatible with this mode of reading. Stefan Collini, a prolific and astute recent thinker on 
the institution of the university, has it that ‘in many areas of the humanities “research” can be a 
misleading term’; instead, he argues, we need phrases such as ‘“cultivating understanding”, 
“nurturing and extending a cultural heritage”, “thinking critically about the profoundest 
questions of human life”, and so on’.1 We need a distinct paradigm for literary study; a radically 
different spirit of reading and criticism with its own institutional language – not of research, of 
productivity, of knowledge, but of criticism, of judgement, of thinking.  
 
A PhD thesis, taken as a job application which must meet certain requirements, is an awkward 
place to call into question what those requirements should be. I have kept any questioning of the 
task at hand out of the main body of the thesis, resolved that, there, it could ultimately be only 
self-defeating. This thesis has straightforwardly sought to conform to the institutional demands 
pressed upon it: its ‘contribution to knowledge’ has been the articulation of a radically new spirit 
of exemplarity and a criticism of the spirit which currently dominates lyric studies (its ‘field 
specificity’). But an ‘afterword’ seems to offer a different kind of space, one more suited to self-
conscious, personal reflection. One in which those demands can be questioned. In a discussion 
of ‘incipient counter-tendencies’ to the historicist/contextualist paradigm (North, p. 196), Joseph 
North takes the examples of Eve Sedgwick and D. A. Miller, and enquires as to the context in 
which their work was produced. These were ‘obviously senior’ academics, he writes, who were 
‘thus insulated from pressing institutional demands like “field specificity” and “contribution to 
                                                        




knowledge” – concerns that were nonnegotiable lower down the scale, and remain 
nonnegotiable today’. A PhD student ‘trying to find a job on the basis of work’ of their kind 
would encounter much difficulty: 
 
A junior scholar in literary studies who elects to write chiefly about the virtues of 
nondualist Buddhist thought, conceived pedagogically, as Sedgwick did; a newly-minted 
PhD with a dissertation that simply engages with the text in a personal way, claiming the 
representativeness and intellectual value of insights so discovered, in the absence of any 
further proof secured by means of rigorous historical or contextual analysis – I do not 
say it is impossible that such a person could be taken seriously by the discipline, but I do 
not think anyone who knows the field would deny that they would encounter difficulties 
on a scale not faced by those pursuing projects of the more usual kind. (North, pp. 168–
9) 
 
I have attempted to show in this thesis that there can also be a way of doing literary study which, 
in Stanley Cavell’s words, ‘like art, is, and should be, powerless to prove its relevance’; for which 
‘further proof secured by means of rigorous historical or contextual analysis’ makes no sense, 
since the aim has never been proof at all, but test, expression, and attention. Rigorously 
defended by such philosophy, the trouble encountered by work of such a kind, at PhD level, can 
be lessened. My own experience of the PhD chimes with North’s account: you may have noticed 
that another thesis (as is not atypical) lurks somewhere in the depths of this one, the origins of 
an older project which gave birth to the one you have read. It was conceived as a trans-historical 
attempt to think about the ways poems can think (about) the unthinkable, with especial attention 
paid to their use of marginal space, and the ways they might hold themselves between 
contradictions, in a space of potentially fruitful aporia. (They’re origins which are apparent in 
many of the examples I have taken – Forrest-Thomson’s ‘Sonnet’, ‘A god, and yet a man?’, 
Leonidas’ epigram.) As my work progressed, and as I swiftly began to ‘encounter difficulties’, as 
North puts it, I started to explore more concertedly the reasons for those difficulties, and the 
philosophy I knew, to an extent, had informed the spirit of my previous, undergraduate study. 
The thesis slowly transitioned into what it is now.  
 
I find myself ultimately glad that my work underwent such a transition, despite its bumps. I have 
found work both on ordinary language philosophy and on the history and theory of literary 
criticism to be just as rewarding as, complementary to, and indeed to the enhancement of the 
work I was doing in the first year of the PhD. But I do not think it should be necessary for all 
students who want to undertake work of the kind North and I describe to defend it to such an 




the unthinkable, there is plenty of important precedent work by the likes of Derek Attridge, 
Michael Hurley, and Mark Payne to help a student along, to serve as a defence which could 
ground that thesis, but not overwhelm and change it.2 But performed outside of a critical 
paradigm, it would remain a stretch to make such a thesis conform to all institutional demands.  
 
The dominance of the historicist/contextualist paradigm has led to the tendency in lyric studies 
to dampen the lyric conversation, to treat lyric as nothing special, only worthy of attention if that 
attention enables us to say something about something other than lyric. To argue that lyric is 
capable of feats such as thinking the unthinkable goes entirely against this grain. ‘If “lyric” is a 
concept that will help us think’, writes Rei Terada, 
 
it’s because it helps us think about something besides lyric. Saying that lyric studies is a 
means to an end does not denigrate lyric, but only requires it to be like anything else. It 
comes as a relief that after years, probably centuries, during which lyric is used as an 
intensifier, reflecting the assumption that lyrics more than other media are concentrates 
of culture or consciousness, the current conversation about lyric isn’t especially 
heightened. The lyric zone of electrification is dissipating along with belief in the 
autonomy of the lyric object and in the specialness of the lyric mode. I’m relieved to see 
this and would like to see still more of it.3  
 
The words ‘autonomy’ and ‘object’ recall, as we saw in chapters one and five, perceived ‘New 
Critical’ attitudes to poetry. Terada’s words see a lyric studies still continuing to recover from a 
‘New Critical’ hangover; the presence of ‘New Criticism’ is here, in 2008, still being used as a 
means of holding any version of the critical paradigm at bay, and of making the 
historicist/contextualist one seem inevitable. Not only will the attempt to argue that lyric poems 
can, in fact, be a special mode of writing – that they can interrogate and capture truths and 
aspects of experience which other forms of writing might not have the ability to reach – only 
continue to be heard as harking back to the good old days of ‘New Critical’ chitchat, to recall 
Rita Felski’s phrasing, as long as we continue to leave the ghostly presence of ‘New Criticism’ 
unacknowledged in our conversations about lyric. But calls to instigate a new critical paradigm, 
within which such arguments make proper sense, will also be seen in the same way if we leave 
that presence unaddressed. We need much more research to be undertaken into its nature, a re-
evaluation of what ‘New Criticism’ was and what our hangover from it might be, before we can 
have proper conversations both about the extent to which it would ultimately be desirable to ‘de-
                                                        
2 I have already mentioned Mark Payne’s work in relation to Jonathan Culler. For an account of some of Michael 
Hurley’s research interests, see ‘Straight Talking’, Cambridge Alumni Magazine, 69 (2013), 28–31. On the ‘unthinkable’ 
in Derek Attridge, see The Singularity of Literature (London, 2004), p. 36 (for example). 




electrify’ the lyric mode, and about the possibility that the historicist/contextualist paradigm 
might begin to loosen its grip on its institutional dominance.   
 
The attempt to instigate a new critical paradigm also needs a kind of writing that might not so 
easily be classed as ‘research’. At this point I return to the objection I mentioned in my first 
chapter’s discussion of close reading. For plenty of such writing does exist, primarily within what 
is often now called ‘public engagement’. Something like the critical appreciation of specific 
examples does continue in a range of publications to one side of academic periodicals (I am 
thinking in particular of the London Review of Books and the Times Literary Supplement). I do not 
wish to overstate the extent to which close reading (taken broadly) has been banished from the 
academy by appearing to ignore these important elements of literary studies. Equally, I want to 
be careful not to overstate the similarities between such forms of writing and the spirit of 
exemplarity for which I have argued here (taking close reading broadly, as I argued in my first 
chapter, is something we now do too much). It is certainly the case that a presuppositionless 
attention to specific examples flourishes in such publications. Occasionally, this breaks into the 
kind of close reading which this thesis envisages. Most of the time, however, it remains as a kind 
of journalistic close reading which rarely enters into the kind of close linguistic detail which is 
absolutely central to what is being proposed here. The basis, then, for the kind of criticism for 
which I am arguing certainly exists in the TLS and LRB (occasionality, specificity of example); it 
is, however, at least most of the time, only a basis. At any rate, my decision to focus almost 
exclusively on what, for lack of a better phrase, we might call strictly academic research (a 
phrase, of course, which makes no sense within a critical paradigm for literary study) has been 
made largely based on the fact that while such valuable critical writing does exist in the separate 
sphere of public engagement, it can be comfortably ignored by those within the academic 
research bubble. As long as we allow the dominance of the scholarly paradigm within the realm 
of strictly academic publication to go unchallenged, from the perspective of that realm work 
intended for ‘a general audience’ – to recall North’s distinction between scholarly and critical 
paradigms – will only appear as non-specialist, and therefore somehow inferior to the real work 
of the scholar. That perspective matters – not least to all those students who down their pens 
and even their reading glasses when it becomes clear that they cannot make a conventional 
academic career as a literary critic whilst writing according to their preferred paradigm. It is, after 
all, the demonstration of ability in the ‘strictly academic’ strand of literary study – not in public 
engagement or pedagogy – which enables a student to become a ‘specialist’, and therefore, in 




form of close reading as a viable approach for the mainstream of academic publication, an aim 
which involves re-thinking what that mainstream classes as suitable ‘research’, indeed questions 
the value, in all circumstances, of that term, and the very distinction between the ‘non-specialist’ 
and the ‘specialist’. The publication of important and valuable critical work within a different 
sphere will not provoke such re-thinking while it can be safely ignored; indeed, if we are happy, 
as writers within a critical paradigm, for our work to flourish solely within the non-academic 
realm, we are ourselves perpetuating an essentially scholarly distinction between the specialist 
and the general audience. Room for such work needs to be found in all realms of literary study. 
 
What we need especially, then, is more imaginative criticism performed in the realistic spirit I 
have described, by those currently in a position to perform it within the context of strictly 
academic publication, where it may challenge the assumptions of the ‘specialists’, and not simply 
beyond it, where it may be safely ignored. Further work towards the assembly of a ‘sort of 
collection of examples’, to remember Wittgenstein. Lyric studies is a particularly apt site for both 
kinds of work. One way in which we can still all agree that the lyric is ‘special’ is the place it once 
occupied in the university, at the centre of thinking about culture, even as a ‘concentrate’ of it, as 
Terada had it. Bill Readings told us in 1996 that the ‘German Idealists attributed the 
guardianship of culture to philosophy, although in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries it has 
come increasingly to be housed in departments of national literature’; and for the ‘New Critics’, 
the lyric was literature’s height.4 Regardless of the powers we may or may not want to attribute to 
lyric poetry, lyric studies is in a strong position to be at the forefront of conversations we might 
want to have now about the direction of criticism, of humanities, of the university, since lyric 
once figured so highly in such conversations of old. It may well be something to be welcomed 
that poems are no longer being asked to bear the weight of theories of higher education. But it is 
not clear to me that it is welcome to concede that lyric is just ‘like anything else’. If it is, we 
encounter serious questions about the future of lyric study. As Denis Donoghue has written, 
‘[t]here is no point in offering our students the experience of reading works of literature as if it 
could compete with more mundane felicities. A different experience is entailed, not an 
immediate gratification’.5 If lyric is like anything else, it will lose the competition for our 
attention. Readings has some insightful comments on the transition from the ‘University of 
Culture’ to the ‘University of Excellence’ which are interestingly relevant here. ‘[T]he institutional 
success of cultural studies in the 1990s’, he writes, ‘is owing to the fact that it preserves the 
                                                        
4 Bill Readings, The University in Ruins (Cambridge, MA, 1996), p. 16. 
5 Denis Donoghue, ‘The Practice of Reading’, p. 133, in What’s Happened to the Humanities?, ed. Alvin Kernan 




structure of literary argument, while recognising that literature can no longer work – throwing 
out the baby and keeping the bathwater, as it were’ (Readings, p. 17). The tools with which we 
learnt to talk about literature have become tools with which we can talk about anything at all 
(and what we talk about doesn’t matter). ‘[T]he idea that functions as the University’s referent – 
excellence – itself has no referent’; ‘[t]he University will produce excellence in knowledges, and 
as such will link into the circuits of global capital and transnational politics without difficulty’ 
(Readings, pp. 54, 38). Thus, ‘[h]enceforth, the question of the University is only the question of 
relative value-for-money, the question posed to a student who is situated entirely as a consumer, 
rather than someone who wants to think’ (Readings, p. 27). Reading lyric poems is very often 
difficult, invites sustained thought; and it’s not clear what ‘value-for-money’ learning to read 
them well provides. Joseph North described how Franco Moretti’s arguments against close 
reading are really arguments against reading. How will the academic study of lyric continue to be 
relevant to those who read lyric, if ‘reading’ ends up as a non-academic mode of study, and if 
looking at a lyric is deemed by the academy to be just like looking at anything else? That’s a 
question which deserves serious reflection, especially by those who, like Terada, are so 
comfortable with lyric’s ‘de-electrification’. It is to be hoped that such reflection, prompted by 
thinkers such as Terada and Moretti taking the historicist/contextualist paradigm to its natural 
conclusion, will itself drive increasing calls for a paradigm of literary study which shares the 
mode of reading with those outside of the academy; that such a split, between scholars and non-
academics who may both devote much of their lives to literature, will increasingly seem 
unsatisfactory and untenable, and drive the winds of change from within. 
 
Having briefly sketched out a number of potential routes by which the advent of a new critical 
paradigm for literary study can become more likely, it remains only to repeat and make explicit 
my conviction, which has grown in the course of writing this thesis, that there is cause for 
positivity. Joseph North makes the argument, in his own conclusion to Literary Criticism, that ‘the 
discipline’s future shape will depend most of all on the character of whatever new period of 
capital emerges in the wake of the current crisis’. The future of the discipline is linked to the 
‘coming social order’ (North, p. 197). I am not unpersuaded by this. But I am not sure we need 
to play so much of a waiting game. North’s ‘incipient counter-tendencies’ to the dominant 
scholarly paradigm might, perhaps, provide me with more encouragement than they do him. 
There will be, I think, a critical mass of work which presses against institutional expectations of 
and demands on what work in literary studies can and should be, which, if reached, will provoke 




supported by thorough-going research into our current and historical assumptions about what 
literary study is and can do (which may, for now, be more realistic at PhD level). A paradigm-
shift may indeed happen as a result of corresponding political change. But critics who want to do 
criticism rather than scholarship can do more than simply wait in a corner for that change to 
occur, or produce work which will may take its place either at the margins of academic research 
or in the realm of public engagement. I am firm in the hope that such shifts can also happen as a 
result of thought, rigorous argument, and practice; and that, in their light, the future of criticism 
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